CONFIDENTIAL— FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 

NOTES  ON 
RECENT  OPERATIONS 


JULY,  1917 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1917 


6U&7 


WAR  DEPARTMENT 

Document  No.  630 
Office  of  The  Adjutant  General 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

WASHINGTON,  July,  1917. 

The  following  notes  on  recent  operations  are  published  for  the 
information  of  all  concerned. 
[  350.05  A.  G.O.] 

llY  ORDER  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

TASKER  H.  BLISS, 
Major  General,  Acting  Chief  of  Staff. 
OFFICIAL: 

H.  P.  MCCAIN, 

The  Adjutant  General. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
THE  ADJUTANT  GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

Washington,  June  19,  1917. 
To  all  officers  of  the  Army: 

You  are  advised  that  this  and  all  subsequent  documents  of  a 
similar  character  which  may  be  furnished  you  from  this  office 
are  to  be  regarded  as  strictly  confidential.  They  are  to  be  kept 
at  all  times  in  your  personal  possession  and  are  not  to  be  copied 
nor  are  any  parts  of  their  contents  to  be  communicated  either 
directly  or  indirectly  to  the  press  npr  to  any  persons  not  in  the 
military  or  naval  service  of  the  United  States.  In  Europe  these 
documents  are  not  to  be  carried  into  the  front-line  trenches  nor 
farther  to  the  front  than  the  usual  post  of  the  officers  to  whom 
issued. 

Strict  compliance  with  this  injunction  is  enjoined  upon  every 
officer  into  whose  hands  any  of  these  confidential  documents  may 
come. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

H.  P.  McCAiN, 
The  Adjutant  General. 
B 


664361 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Instructions   for  gunners   drawn   from   the   lessons   of   the 

Battle  of  the  Somme 7 

Information  resulting  from  the  Battle  of  the  Somme 10 

Tlie  Hindenburg  position 14 

Notes  on  the  work  of  an  instruction  division  in  the  German 

Army 17 

Estimates  by  the  artillery  of  the  moment  when  the  enemy 

will  make  his  attack 20 

Lc  ssons  to  be  drawn  by  the  infantry  from  the  combats  on 

right  bank  of  the  Meuse 22 

E xperience  of  the  recent  fighting  at  Verdun 24 

Some  tactical  notes  on  the  recent  operations  up  to  April 

7,  1917 33 

Assault  battalions  in  the  German  Army 38 

German  army  orders 42 

Experiences  of  a  division  in  recent  fighting 45 

Instructions  for  battle 48 

Underground  works  prepared  by  the  Germans  before 

falling  back  in  front  of  the  third  army 56 

Notes  on  recent  operations  in  front  of  the  first,  third, 

fourth,  and  fifth  armies 59 

Supply  of  ammunition  in  the  field 68 

Information  from  captured  documents 71 

Supplementary  instructions  as  to  the  construction  of  defenses.  74 
Experiences  of  the  German  first  army  in  the  Somme 

Battle 77 

Sketch  of  the  organization  and  defenses  of  a  division 

sector -. 144 

5 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 


G.  K.  Q.  of  the  North.     North  and  Northeastern  Armies. 
General  Staff. 

Second  Bureau.  •»«*»»  » 

At  G.  H.  ,Q.,  14tfi~ May,  1917- 

[Appendix  to  the  Information  Bull  stir,  j 
Translation  of  a  German  document. 

INSTRUCTIONS— ARTILLERY  FIGHTING  ON  THE 
SOMME— PART   II. 

STAFF  OF  THE  HTH  A.  C., 

H.  Q.,  Sept.  16,  1916. 

The  artillery  power  of  the  English,  as  well  as  that  of  the 
French,  continued  to  increase,  as  during  the  first  month  of 
the  offensive.  Each  infantry  attack  was  preceded  by  an  efficient 
artillery  preparation  of  very  large  and  heavy  caliber  guns. 
Infantry  attacks  took  place  immediately  after  the  artillery 
preparation  ceased;  simultaneously  a  large  zone  efficaciously 
covered  by  barrage  fire  on  the  terrain  of  attack  prevented  the 
bringing  up  of  any  reserves.  The  first  attacking  lines  often 
escaped  our  (German)  barrage  fire;  only  our  (German)  in- 
fantry and  machine  "gunners  could  deal  with  them ;  usually 
the  last  waves  were  efficaciously  caught  under  our  fire.  When 
the  enemy  was  able  to  penetrate  our  lines  it  was  necessary  to 
eject  them  by  energetic  and  rapid  counter  attacks. 

The  ability  of  the  subordinate  commanders  who  found  them- 
selves in  front  consisted  in  being  able  to  hold  their  troops  well 
in  hand  in  order  to  carry  out  these  decisive  counter  attacks. 
A  delayed  counter  attack  wasted  lives  and  time  and  usually- 
had  no  effect.  The  enemy,  by  renewed  attacks,  engaged  our 
supports.  The  enemy  was  able  to  gain  success  because  our 
troops  were  hard  pressed  and  were  not  familiar  with  the  ter- 
rain. 

The  greatest  attention  should  be  given  to  the  observa- 
tions ~by  periscopes  in  the  first-line  trenches.  Complicated  ap- 

7 


8          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS, 

paratus  are  not  necessary.  A  small  mirror  at  the  end  of  a 
stick  is  the  best  kind,  but  it  is  necessary  that  each  observa- 
tion post  should  have  a  large  number  of  these  mirrors  m 
reserve,  a  single  one  being  too  quickly  demolished  by  fire. 

In  all  severe  engagements  in  trench  warfare  the  important 
point  is  to  determine  rapidly  the  position  of  our  infantry  in  the 
first  lines  of  defense  during  every  stage  of  the  action.  This 
point  must  never  Jbe  lost  sight  of.  When  the  advanced  troops 
change  position,- tie  colored  panels  (light  brown  on  the  side  of 
the  enemy)  'miist'alSQ  be  moved. 

Reports  by  tele^hoife  or  sketch  are  at  best  incomplete.  Pho- 
tographs from1  'ballo'o'n  or,  better  still,  from  aeroplanes,  have 
been  successful  in  determining  the  position  of  the  first  line. 
For  photographs,  the  best  way  to  indicate  the  positions  is  by 
using  strips  of  white  canvas  and  the  firing  of  magnesium  lights, 
but  the  latter  must  be  fired  everywhere  at  the  same  moment, 
so  far  as  possible,  when  they  are  called  for  by  the  balloon  or 
aviators. 

In  determining  a  battery  position  be  sure  that  it  can  still 
fire  on  the  enemy  if  he  penetrates  our  lines,  and  that  it  will  not 
have  a  dead  space  into  which  the  enemy  can  penetrate. 

The  material  damage  sustained  by  our  field  and  heavy  guns 
has  here  and  there  been  so  great  that  it  is  beginning  to  be 
difficult  to  replace  the  unserviceable  parts,  or  those  damaged  by 
the  enemy  fire,  especially  the  barrels.  The  guns'  greatest 
enemy  is  not  the  enemy  artillery,  but  our  rapid  fire  and  the 
small  amount  of  care  taken  of  the  material.  It  is  necessary 
that  officers  and  men  should  take  greater  ca*re  of  their  guns 
than  they  have  done  up  to  the  present,  fro  gun  barrel  can  re- 
sist a  too  prolonged  barrage  fire.  Barrage  fire  must  be  rapid, 
but  it  must  only  last  a  few  minutes;  it  should  not  be  recom- 
menced except  in  a  case  of  need.  (Note  circular  of  chief  of 
staff  in  the  field  Nov.  3,  1915,  No.  17,  411  op.)  There  must  be 
buckets  full  of  water  behind  each  gun,  and  wet,  solid  canvas  to 
place  on  the  hot  barrels. 

It  is  a  false  idea  to  think  that  demolished  and  unserviceable 
guns  should  be  abandoned  to  the  enemy;  they  must  be  taken 
to  the  rear  as  soon  as  possible,  because  certain  parts  of  them 
can  be  used  again.  This  also  refers  to  machine  guns  and  trench 
mortars. 

In  case  of  an  enemy  attack  the  artillery  must  remain  in  posi- 
tion to  the  last.  When  all  the  gun  ammunition  has  been  fired 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  9 

the  guns  must  be  defended  by  means  of  carbines  and  hand 
grenades  until  an  infantry  counterattack  can  bring  relief. 

On  the  Somme,  as  well  as  at  Verdun,  our  infantry  complained 
of  suffering  heavy  losses  from  our  own  artillery.  It  is  abso- 
lu;ely  necessary  that  this  be  remedied  by  auxiliary  observers 
and  by  artillery  liaison  officers  placed  in  the  first  line.  Barrage 
fire  must  not  be  lifted  and  thrown  forward  on  a  hasty  and  ill- 
considered  request  of  the  infantry.  It  must  be  remembered  that, 
even  with  a  wrell-regulated  barrage,  some  projectiles  may  fall  in 
our  own  ranks.  Consequently,  only  officers  should  carry  signal 
pistols  and  the  like.  But,  in  general,  it  should  never  happen 
that  our  artillery  fire  falls  destructively  on  and  behind  our  line 
of  infantry  as  a  consequence  of  our  artillery  being  badly  in- 
formed as  to  the  position  of  our  first  line. 

During  the  fighting  on  the  Somme  the  enemy  aviators  de- 
scended to  within  several  hundreds  of  meters  of  the  ground  and 
sv/ept  our  trenches  with  their  machine  guns.  Our  aviators  must 
fU;'ht  in  the  same  way,  with  machine  guns  and  bombs.  They 
mast  practice  this  manner  of  fighting. 

Signs  showing  the  routes  to  known  columns  must  be  coated 
with  a  luminous  color,  otherwise  they  are  useless  in  the  dark. 
These  routes  must  not  be  used  except  in  important  engagements, 
otherwise  they  are  spotted  at  once. 

The  approach  trenches  must  be  laid  out  across  places  and 
woods  which  protect  them  from  view  and  in  which,  during  a  lull, 
would  be  quite  safe  to  traverse.  It  would  be  very  difficult  to 
do  this  after  a  fight. 

It  was  found,  during  the  fighting  on  the  Somme,  that  can- 
noneers wearing  masks  at  their  guns  had  great  difficulty  in 
breathing.  During  periods  of  inaction  frequent  and  progressive 
drills  should  accustom  the  cannoneers  to  serve  the  guns  while 
wearing  masks. 

(Signed)  V.  PLUSKOW. 


GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS, 

May  11,  .1017. 

General  Headquarters  of  the  Armies  of  the  North  and  Northeast. 
General  Staff. 
Second  Bureau. 

[Appendix  to  the  Information  Bulletin.] 

Translated  from  a  German  document. 

INFORMATION  ON  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME. 

418th  Infantry  Regiment. 

No.  133.     Secret.  MARCH  10,  1917. 

This  is  compiled  from  information  I  gathered  concerning  the 
first  army  in  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  and  which  seemed  to  merit 
special  attention.  I  submit  it  to  the  division  commanders  to  be 
reviewed  and  acted  upon. 

What  was  done  in  the  way  of  equipment  (canteens),  clothing 
(boots,  foot  bandages,  socks),  stores,  close-combat  weapons, 
maps,  signal  apparatus,  boundary  tapes?  Form  four  sections  of 
professional  workmeji  (tailors  and  cobblers). 

The  machine-gun  officer  of  the  regimental  staff  takes  charge  of 
all  supplies  for  the  machine-gun  companies. 

Where  are  the  depots?  The  supply  depot  of  the  regiment  is 
in  the  engineer  garrisons  of  the  regiment.  (For  further  details 
see  Army  Order,  order  1/c,  IV/a,  No.  5,053.) 

What  are  approximately  the  resources  of  the  supply  depots 
of  the  regiment? 

Are  the  commanders  of  infantry  battalions  and  engineer  com- 
panies how  in  the  rear,  in  readiness  or  in  reserve,  familiar  with 
the  terrain?  Are  the  information  sections  organized? 

Are  the  regimental  commanders  in  touch  with  the  barrage 
battalions  of  their  sector?    Are  the  troops  supplied  with  signals 
for  barrage  fire,  for  destructive  fire,  and  are  they  familiar  with 
the  instructions  for  their  use? 
10 


NOTES  ON  ftECENT  OPERATIONS.  11 

Barrage  fire :  Yellow  ball  signal.  Should  only  be  given  by  one 
holding  the  rank  of  platoon  commander  or  higher. 

To  lift  the  barrage  fire:  Green  signal.  To  be  given  only  by 
company  commander  or  higher  officer. 

Destructive  fire:  Red  star  signal.  To  be  given  only  by  bat- 
talion commander  or  higher  'officer,  and  used  only  if  the  tele- 
phone is  out  of  order. 

Are  the  commanders  of  machine-gun  companies  in  reserve 
familiar  with  their  probable  positions? 

Limits  of  sectors  of  divisions,  regiments,  battalions,  com- 
panies? They  should  never  follow  depressions,  ravines,  sunken 
roads,  small  wood,  isolated  farm. 

How  are  reinforcements  and  supplies  brought  in?  Accurate 
knowledge  of  the  roads  in  the  sector. 

Do  not  simultaneously  relieve  the  infantry  and  the  machine 
gi  ns  of  the  first  line. 

Density  of  the  first  line  (experience  on  the  Somme),  one  man 
for  every  Jf  to  6  meters. 

Where  are  your  immediate  supports?  (Immediately  in  the 
rear. ) 

How  are  the  machine  guns  distributed?  First  line:  In  the 
rear  of  the  first  line  (but  preferably  by  sections).  Flanking 
fire  and  mutual  support. 

For  each  machine  gun  of  the  first  line,  belts  furnished  with 
at  least  3,000  rounds  for  each  gun. 

For  each  machine  gun  in  the  rear,  belts  furnished  with  at  least 
5,000  rounds  for  each  gun. 

Ammunition  depots  by  battalion  (if  possible,  by  company). 
The  machine-gun  personnel  should  know  where  the  regimental 
ammunition  depots  are  situated.  The  machine-gun  officer  of 
regimental  staff  must  see  to  this. 

The  improvement  of  the  organization  of  the  positions  by  a 
system  of  trenches  developed  in  point  of  depth  (front  to  rear) 
and  in  the  form  of  a  labyrinth,  which  gives  a  wide  zone  of  de- 
fense. 

When  forming  new  positions  first  build  the  obstacle  in  front 
of  the  first  line  of  combat,  then  dugouts  in  the  second.  Organize 
localities  into  supporting  points.  Determine  on  the  garrison, 
designate  the  man  in  charge  of  the  orderlies,  of  the  clerks. 
Put  the  communication  or  approach  trenches,  at  least  on  one 
side,  in  a  state  of  defense ;  obstacles,  dugouts. 

Combats  in  and  around  the  first  line. 


12  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

Reserves  ready  on  time. 

Build  unceasingly  new  obstacles.  Their  destruction  costs  the 
enemy  much  in  ammunition.  Flank  them  with  machine  guns. 

For  the  obstacles  in  the  rear  leave  staggered  passages  for  the 
counterattacks.  The  following  works  are  specially  important: 
The  trenches  in  the  rear  should  be  supplied  with  the  greatest 
possible  amount  of  munitions,  weapons  for  close  combat,  the 
greatest  possible  food  supply  (three  rations  per  man),  water, 
installation  of  kitchens. 

Up  to  what  line  can  the  portable  kitchens  be  brought?  How 
food  is  brought  up.  The  troops  of  the  first  line  require  hot 
food. 

Dugouts  for  dressing  stations.    Wide  passages. 

Craters  transformed  into  positions  are  inconvenient  and  should 
be  improved.  First  make  nests  for  snipers  for  one  or  two 
squads  with  one  or  two  machine  guns  and  surround  them  with 
wire  entanglements ;  then  connect  them  up  in  an  irregular  man- 
ner. The  nearer  they  are  to  the  enemy  the  less  they  are  in 
danger  from  his  artillery  fire.  That  is  the  reason  we  prefer  to 
prepare  the  craters  situated  in  front,  rather  than  those  in  the 
rear.  Incessant  work  on  the  positions  and  efficient  organization 
of  the  munitions  and  food  supply  keep  up  the  morale  of  the 
troops. 

To  pass  each  other  temporarily,  advance ;  that  is  best. 

It  is  not  practical  for  troops  to  move  to  the  side  to  avoid  a 
wide  zone  of  running  fire. 

If  the  enemy  observes  an  evacuation,  there  is  great  danger 
that  he  will  extend  his  fire  and  occupy  the  evacuated  position. 

To  move  to  the  rear  is  a  fatal  mistake,  the  terrain  being  un- 
der the  heaviest  fire  and  the  troops  being  soon  demoralized. 

The  French  expect  to  take  us  by  surprise ;  therefore  extreme 
vigilance  should  be  kept  at  the  front,  in  all  positions  of  readi- 
ness, in  garrisons  of  supporting  points,  and  in  local  garrisons. 

Increased  vigilance  on  dark  nights. 

Vigilance  during  foggy  weather. 

Immediate  counter  attack,  without  awaiting  orders.  For 
that  purpose,  proper  distribution  of  all  the  troops  in  rear  of 
the  first  line,  in  garrisons,  and  troops  for  counter  attack  (but 
not  assembled  in  mass). 

Guard  against  the  incursions  or  infiltrations  of  small  enemy 
detachments  by  saps,  which,  little  by  little,  draw  large  de- 
tachments after  them.  Destroy  immediately  and  systemati- 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  13 

cally  all  such  nests.  Regarding  immediate  reaction  and  pre- 
pared counter  attack,  see  "  Experience  of  the  First  Army  on 
the  Somme."  Use  the  Pioneers  to  the  best  advantage.  Use 
light  trench  mortars  for  barrage  fire.  The  battalion  com- 
manders are  responsible  for  their  use. 

Where  should  the  companies  of  trench  mortars  be  placed  in 
line?  Asphyxiating  bomb  fire,  destructive  fire.  Observe  care- 
frlly.  Distribute  the  companies  of  trench  mortars  at  large 
intervals,  echeloned  in  small  groups  in  the  terrain.  Prepare 
ammunition  in  time. 


General  Headquarters  of  the  Armies  of  the  North  and  Northeast. 

General  Staff, 
Second  Bureau. 
No.  12,620. 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS, 

May  14, 1917. 

HINDENBURG  POSITION. 
I. 

THE    WORKS    RECENTLY    EXECUTED    RESEMBLE    THE    TYPE     OF 
DEFENSIVE  POSITIONS  IN  DEPTH  APPROVED  BY  HINDENBURG. 

In  a  survey  of  March  26,  1917,  and  according  to  information 
on  hand  at  that  date,  the  conclusion  was  reached  that  "  the 
fortified  position  of  Hindenburg  presented,  up  to  this  time,  a 
linear  and  regular  appearance,  without  great  depth,  and  which 
did  not  correspond  to  the  regulations  set  down  in  Hindenburg's 
note  of  December  25,  1916,  on  the  organization  of  fortified  posi- 
tions, in  which  he  demanded  the  construction  of  positions  of 
depth,  with  dugouts  far  from  the  first  line,  machine  guns  and 
obstacles  scattered  in  depth  and  not  regularly  aligned  on  the 
front." 

From  information  received  since  then  the  conclusion  is  reached 
that  the  so-called  Hindenburg  position  becomes  more  and  more 
an  organization  of  great  depth. 

In  March  only  the  first  position  was  near  completion ;  the  Ger- 
mans rushed  work  to  finish  it. 

At  least  several  positions  are  known  to  be  in  course  of  con- 
struction north  of  the  Oise;  they  are  echeloned  in  rear  of  the 
first  position  to  a  depth  varying  from  10  to  15  kilometers. 

II. 

DETAILS  OF  ORGANIZATION  AND  CONDITIONS  OF  THE  WORKS, 

Hindenburg's  system  of  defensive  organization  seems  to  in- 
clude— 

First.  The  plan  of  two  positions  out  of  the  enemy's  direct 
sight,  one  on  the  descending  slope  away  from  the  enemy,  the 
14 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  15 

other  on  the  ascending  slope,  flanking  the  first  from  above  and 
covering  the  artillery  observation  posts. 

Second.  A  series  of  positions  intended  to  form,  with  the  first 
two,  a  deep  system,  converted  into  a  rather  dense  network  of 
coi  imunicating  trenches  and  bordered  by  wire  entanglements. 

According  to  the  German  orders  of  December  25,  1916,  the 
whole  should  form  a  network  with  large  links,  when  the  at- 
tack, after  having  broken  through  a  part  of  the  network,  is 
cai:ght  in  the  links  that  have  resisted. 

The  positions  in  rear  of  the  first  two  seem,  as  a  rule,  to  be 
laid  out,  as  far  as  trace  and  interior  organization  is  concerned, 
like  the  second  position,  in  the  sense  that  they  do  not  perhaps 
present  an  obstacle  as  deep  as  the  first,  but  they  are  well 
supplied  with  dugouts. 

It  is  quite  possible  that  the  positions  will  be  doubled  later, 
to  form  a  series  of  consecutive  systems  similar  to  that  formed 
by  the  first  two. 

Generally  speaking,  the  works  are  more  or  less  advanced, 
and  their  trace  seems  to  be  well  defined.  The  first  positions 
may  be  considered  completed.  The  second  positions  are  already 
completely  laid  out.  The  third  and  fourth  positions  are  under 
construction  ;  in  some  places  they  are  only  staked  out. 

Everywhere  one  finds  they  have  taken  pains  to  place  the 
obstacles  and  to  dig  the  dugouts  before  constructing  the  trenches. 
According  to  refugees,  they  intend  to  make  the  maximum  use 
of  the  cellars  in  the  village,  reinforced  by  cement,  and  con- 
nected with  each  other  by  subterranean  passages. 

III. 

ORGANIZATION   OF  THE   VARIOUS   SECTORS  AT   THE   BEGINNING 
OF  MAY. 

(a)  District  between  Lille  and  the  road  to  Cambrai :  In  this 
sector  there  are  three  positions  on  a  depth  of  15  kilometers. 

In  rear  of  the  above-mentioned  Drocourt-Queant  line  two 
positions  appear  to  be  in  course  of  construction,  one  on  the 
general  front  Cuincy  (northwest  of  Douai)  Goug-sous-Bellonne, 
and  the  other  on  the  Waziers,  Arleux,  Sains-les-Marquion  line. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  owing  to  the  construction  of  the 
cross  trenches  (already  well  advanced)  Inchy-Villiers-les  Cagin- 
court  and  Bouilon-Marquion  the  Drocourt-Qu6ant  line  and  the 
Wajiers-gains-les-Marquiou  line,  can,  one  after  the  other,  ex- 


16          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

tend  the  Hindenburg  position,  the  very  important  organization 
of  the  Moeweres  district  serving  as  a  pivot. 

(&)  District  between  Cambrai  and  the  Oise:  In  this  sector 
there  are  four  positions  on  a  depth  of  10  to  15  kilometers. 

It  is  in  this  district  that  the  organization  in  depth  is  the 
most  evident,  as  foifr  consecutive  positions  have  been  made  out. 

The  first  position  has  already  been  described  in  detail.  Ac- 
cording to  latest  information,  it  is  almost  entirely  finished. 

The  second  position  now  exists  on  the  entire  front ;  it  passes 
Flesquieres,  le  Pav6  (north  of  Banteux),  West  Aubancheul, 
Le  Cutelet,  Mauroy,  Magny-le-Fosse,  south  of  Lenergies,  Reman- 
court,  Fermstilloy,  Homblieres,  Regny,  Sissy.  Distance  from 
the  first  position,  1,500  to  2,500  meters. 

This  position  is  protected  along  its  entire  front  by  wire.  The 
trenches  are  almost  completed,  but  the  communicating  trenches 
are  shallow.  A  great  many  dugouts  for  the  personnel,  the  ma- 
chine guns,  and  trench  mortars  are  finished  or  under  construc- 
tion. 

The  third  position  passes  to  the  west  of  Cambr.ai  (information 
obtained  from  returning  refugees).  It  was  found  by  aircraft 
from  Lesdain,  and  follows  the  line  of  Estries,  Fontaine-Uterte, 
Fonsomme,  Fontaine-Notre  Dame.  Distance  from  the  first  posi- 
tion, 4  to  6  kilometers. 

It  is  under  construction.  The  trenches  are  not  continuous. 
In  only  a  few  places  it  has  a  first  line,  and  a  supporting  line, 
usually  shallow.  A  line  of  wire  runs  along  the  entire  front. 
Only  a  few  dugouts  are  finished. 

Finally,  the  fourth  position  passes  to  the  west  of  Wallincourt 
and  Malincourt,  to  the  east  of  Montbrehain,  to  the  southwest 
of  Fresnoy-le-Grand,  to  the  southwest  of  Montigney-en-Arrow- 
ceise,  and  ends  on  the  Oise  near  Macquiny.  Distance  from  the 
first  position,  7  to  15  kilometers.  On  the  east  side  of  the  Oise 
it  is  extended  to  Sains-Richaumont.  This  fourth  position  has 
not  been  completely  photographed.  It  appears  to  be  entirely 
discontinuous,  shallow,  and  equipped  only  in  places  with  wire. 

Inside  these  positions — which  may  be  called  the  principal 
ones — there  are  sometimes  intermediate  ones.  For  example,  be- 
tween St.  Quentin  and  the  Oise  a  position  of  this  kind  follows 
the  Mezieres-sur-Oise,  Ferme  de  Lonval  line,  and  passes  west  to 
Mesnil-Saint  Laurent. 

(c)  Forest  of  St.  Gobain:  Little  is  known  about  the  works 
in  the  St.  Gobain  Forest.  We  only  know  that  the  first  position, 
is  completed. 


G.  a.  Q.  of  the  North  and  Northeastern  Armies, 
General  Staff, 
Second  Bureau. 

At  G.  H.  Q.,  19  May,  1917. 

[Appendix  to  the  Information  Bureau.] 
Translation  of  a  German  document. 

NOTES   ON  THE  WORK   OF  AN   INSTRUCTION 
DIVISION. 

2l£T  Div.  INF. 

Bb.  No.  155.    Secret. 

H.  Q.  OF  THE  Div.,  2  March,  1917. 

First.  INFANTEY. — Organization  of  combat  companies  accord- 
ing to  special  instruction  and  equipment  of  the  men.  Only 
occupy  each  position  as  long  as  it  is  necessary  to  hold  it.  Study 
the  defending  garrisons,  the  hidden  groups  of  machine  guns, 
and  the  supporting  points.  Cover  the  artillery  and  observing 
stations  after  arriving  at  an  understanding  with  them. 

Second.  THE  ALARM  in  case  of  a  gas  attack  or  a  serious 
alarm  does  not  require  a  very  considerable  displacement  of 
troops.  Consequently  troops  are  placed  in  fighting  position  dur- 
ing a  calm  period.  A  serious  alarm  must  be  quickly  met  by 
special  orders,  by  the  establishment  of  many  advance  posts,  by 
the  occupation  of  machine-gun  shelters,  etc. 

Third.  COUNTEBATTACKS  are  made,  whenever  possible,  by 
several  columns  in  line  and  by  enveloping  columns.  The  ad- 
vance must  be  made  not  only  by  communication  trenches,  but 
also  on  the  open  terrain.  As  often  as  possible  commence  by 
placing  the  special  attacking  troops  in  such  a  way  that  they 
will  not  be  checked  by  our  own  obstacles. 

Fourth.  GROUPS  OF  RUNNERS  at  intervals  of  300  to  400  meters. 
No  isolated  men.  Several  groups  commanded  by  a  sergeant. 
Indicate  the  roads  by  means  of  transparent  colored  paper. 

Fifth.  THE  RESERVES  must  constantly  make  known  the  points 
they  have  reached.  Thus  only  can  the  moment  of  their  arrival 
and  intervention  in  action  be  calculated. 

Sixth.  AUXILIARY  DEFENSES  must  not  be  placed  too  near  the 
supporting  points,  so  as  to  protect  the  garrison  from  grenade 

3577°— 17 2  17 


18          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

attack.  It  is  important  to  dispose  of  the  auxiliary  defenses  in 
such  manner  as  to  separate  the  attacking  waves  of  the  enemy 
into  several  fragments  (chiefly  in  the  zone  situated  between  the 
two  first  positions)  and  to  draw  them,  without  their  knowing  it, 
under  the  fire  of  our  hidden  machine  gun  posts  and  supporting 
points.  In  this  way  the  action  of  the  enemy  will  be  seriously 
weakened,  even  in  places,  annulled,  and  the  support  of  the 
artillery  greatly  interfered  with. 

Seventh.  MACHINE  GUNS. — Light  machine  guns  of  model  li 
have  proved  themselves  to  be  particularly  effective  and  easy 
handle.     (Mobile  reserve  of  machine  guns.)     They  use  them  ii 
groups,  particularly  in  the  first  position.    The  company  of  im 
chine  guns  is  posted  behind  them.     The  infantry   (one  or  two 
groups)  covers  the  hidden  machine  guns  (center  of  resistance). 

Eighth.  LIGHT  TKENCH  MOBTABS. — The  effects  of  their  bursting 
projectiles  is  excellent.  Consequently  these  weapons  are  well 
adapted  to  fighting  moving  objectives  and  for  barrage  fire.  They 
are  echelpned  in  depths  the  same  as  the  machine  guns.  They 
are  under  the  orderg  of  the  battalion  commanders,  and,  if  circum- 
stances demand  it,  the  regimental  commanders.  Light  trench 
mortars  generally  come  into  action  with  the  barrage  fire,  ab- 
staining from  firing  beforehand  and  disguising  their  ranging  fire 
in  that  of  the  artillery.  Covered  shelters  often  are  not  available 
and  it  may  be  necessary  to  make  use  of  substitute  emplacements 
which  are  open  but  well  masked.  The  mortars  should  be  utilized 
in  groups.  They  have  barrage  fire  tables  the  same  as  the  artil- 
lery. They  should  strengthen  the  barrage  fire  of  the  artillery 
on  the  particularly  important  or  threatened  points.  Cooperation 
is  necessary.  If  the  light  trench  mortars  are  also  used  for  dem- 
olition fire  it  is  necessary  before  they  join  in  the  barrage  fire  that 
they  should  change  their  positions  in  order  to  be  ready  to  open 
fire  and  to  be  efficaciously  screened  from  the  enemy  artillery. 

Ninth.  GRENADE  THROWERS. — For  defense  during  calm  periods 
place  them  at  the  disposal  of  the  commanders  of  companies  to 
execute  demolition  fire  and  to  check  the  work  on  the  enemy's 
trenches,  etc.  If  the  struggle  becomes  too  violent,  they  are  used 
by  their  own  officers  in  groups  or  in  sections,  especially  for  bar- 
rage fire.  They  are  used  to  make  the  barrage  fire  denser  the 
same  as  the  light  trench  mortars  (echeloned  in  depth).  In 
the  attack  place  them  in  the  first  line  or  immediately  behind  it ; 
advance  them  in  three  or  four  \vaves  to  harass  every  movement 
of  the  enemy,  to  bomb  "the  depressions  and  communication 
trenches,  etc. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  19 

Tenth.  DIVISIONAL  COMPANY  OF  TRENCH  MORTARS. — They  will 
be  employed  under  the  orders  of  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
division  pioneers.  The  medium  and  heavy  pieces  will  be  espe- 
cially used  in  demolition  fire  against  the  observation  posts,  the 
mi  .chine-gun  shelters,  the  shelters  for  the  troops,  and  the  tanks, 
etc.  The  trench  mortar  fire  is  also  used  to  fire  on  the  sectors 
which  are  to  be  subjected  to  barrage  or  annihilating  fire.  Once 
engaged  in  action,  the  company  is  at  the  disposal  of  the  com- 
m?  nder  of  the  sector,  under  whose  orders  it  fires.  Its  fire  must 
be  coordinated  with  that  of  the  artillery.  Mutual  understand- 
ing is  necessary.  Graphic  tables  of  barrage  and  annihilating 
fire  must  be  made.  In  executing  certain  duties  (preparation  of 
counter  attacks)  the  company  will  sometimes  be  under  orders 
of  the  commander  of  artillery  (by  special  order  of  the  division). 

Eleventh.  Fire  on  aircraft  with  machine  guns  is  carried  out  at 
the  same  time  by  several  groups  of  machine  guns,  which  will 
change  their  place  immediately,  in  order  to  screen  themselves 
from  the  fire  which  will  be  directed  against  them  by  the  aero- 
planes. 

Twelfth.  COMMUNICATION. — The  commander  of  the  combat 
battalion  will  establish  communication  by  visual  signals,  not 
only  with  his  own  regiment,  but  also  with  the  combat  battalion 
of  the  adjoining  sector,  profiting  by  the  rare  moments  which 
present  themselves.  With  this  aim  in  view,  agree  on  a  small 
number  of  important  signals,  for  example,  "  All  is  well,"  "An- 
nihilating fire  demanded,"  etc.  Signal  panels,  well  stretched 
out,  should  be  used,  giving  the  aircraft  clearly  marked  outlines, 
in  order  to  make  them  easily  recognizable  (canvas  on  wooden 
frames)  and  in  order  that  the  aeroplanes  may  easily  distinguish 
mine  craters,  water  holes,  etc. 

FINAL  REMARKS. — The  defense  is  strongly  reenforced  by  trench 
mortars,  grenade  throwers,  and  light  machine  guns. — Barrage 
fire  must  not  be  looked  upon  as  the  only  means  of  repulsing  an 
attack,  but  the  excellent  defensive  arms  of  the  infantry  should 
be  used  normally  and  thoroughly.  Furthermore,  confidence 
must  be  developed  in  rifles,  grenades,  bayonets  for  hand-to-hand 
fighting,  as  this  is  the  latest  and  best  method.  For  the  conduct 
of  the  fight  and  the  occupation  of  posts  under  heavy  artillery 
fire  of  the  enemy,  see  the  corrective  plan  of  the  defensive  battle 
sent  in  on  March  1. 

S.  WENDORFF. 

MARCH  3,  1917. 


General  Headquarters  of  the  Armies  of  the  North  and  Northeast. 
General  Staff. 
Second  Bureau. 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS,  14  May,  1917. 

[Appendix  to  the  Information  Bulletin.] 
Translation  of  a  German  document. 

HOW  THE  ARTILLERY  MAY  ESTIMATE  THE  TIME 
WHEN  THE  ENEMY  INFANTRY  LAUNCHES  ITS 
ATTACK. 

APRIL  16,  1917. 
Group  of  regiments  of  field  artillery. 

THE  ORDER  OF  THE  DAY  TO  THE  GROUPS  OF  REGIMENTS  OF 
FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

I  call  attention  to  the  fact  that,  according  to  the  new  pro- 
cedure of  attack  of  the  French,  the  task  of  destroying  the  artil- 
lery devolves,  the  greater  part  of  the  time,  on  the  heavy  artil- 
lery and  that  of  medium  caliber,  by  intensive  fire.  The  enemy 
proceeds  at  the  same  time  with  the  destruction  of  obstacles 
and  defensive  organizations  by  means  of  mines,  plunging  fire, 
and  guns-  of  small  caliber. 

When  he  considers  these  two  objects  have  been  attained  he 
then  begins  the  attack.  It  is  at  this  time,  as  a  rule,  that  he 
uses  intensive  fire  with  his  heavy  and  medium  caliber  guns  in 
order  to  support  the  infantry  attack  immediately,  and  with  the 
available  batteries  of  small  caliber  (75  and  105)  he  tries  to 
destroy  that  part  of  the  artillery  that  he  does  not  believe  to  be 
entirely  disabled. 

The  cessation  of  the  bombardment  by  the  guns  of  medium 
and  heavy  caliber  is  consequently  a  good  indication  that  the 
enemy  passes  to  the  attack.  This  point  must  not  be  lost  sight 
of  by  anyone  connected  with  the  battery,  from  the  battery  com- 
mander to  the  youngest  gunner.  Taking  into  consideration  that 
the  infantry  can  not  recognize  the  moment  of  attack  because 
of  the  progressive  advance  of  the  enemy  fire,  and  consequently 
20 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          21 

that  we  can  not  count  iipon  any  signal  for  barrage  fire,  we 
must  begin  our  own  barrage  fire  at  the  moment  indicated  above, 
and  immediately  use  all  our  forces  and  guns  capable  of  being 
firod.  Every  available  man  jumps  to  the  guns  and  executes 
barrage  fire  to  the  fullest  capacity  of  the  pieces. 

Each  officer  and  each  soldier  connected  with  the  battery 
should  realize  from  the  above  that  at  that  moment  our  success 
or  failure  and  the  issue  of  the  entire  battle  may  depend  upon 
hi^  acting  with  initiative  and  self-sacrifice.  The  batteries  which 
have  not  observed  a  change  of  caliber  in  the  enemy  artillery 
fire  or  that  are  still  under  its  fire  should  also  take  part  in 
the  barrage  fire  of  the  other  batteries.  We  can  be  sure  that 
enemy  infantry  which  has  ever  been  subject  to  our  annihilating 
acd  destructive  fire  and  still  retains  the  memory  of  its  effect 
will  not  leave  its  trenches  if  at  the  right  moment  we  drop  our 
barrage  fire  on  it. 

All  the  gunners  should  be  informed  of  this  order. 

(Signed)  BUEDE. 


General  Headquarters  of  the  Armies  of  the  North  and  Northeast. 
General  Staff. 
Second  Bureau. 

AT  GENEBAL  HEADQUARTERS,  Hay  14,  1917. 
[Appendix  to  the  Information  Bulletin.] 
Translation  of  a  German  document. 

LESSONS  TO  BE  DRAWN  BY  INFANTRY  FROM  THE 
COMBATS  OF  THE  RIGHT  BANK  OF  THE  MEUSE. 

Plushon  groups. 
No.  810. 

STAFF  OF  THE  XI  ARMY  CORPS,  March,  1917. 

The  reports  of  the  army  group  of  the  Imperial  Crown  Prince 
have  the  following  lessons  for  the  infantry  from  the  failures 
at  Verdun: 

All  infantry  officers  should  be  clear  in  their  own  minds  of 
the  exact  manner  in  which  they  desire  to  conduct  an  active 
defense  by  infantry.  They  should  prepare  themselves  by  drills 
in  typical  defense  works  (the  lines  may  be  shown  by  means 
of  white  ribbons).  The  adopted  method  should  be  one  familiar 
to  the  infantry  and  artillery,  as  the  cooperation  of  the  artil- 
lery, the  intelligence  service,  and  aviation  corps  are  of  the 
greatest  importance  in  actual  combat.  This  requires  practical 
exercises  and  criticisms  on  the  terrain  and  the  map.  The 
artillery  officers  concerned  should  attend. 

It  is  not  the  material  strength  of  a  position  but  the  skill  and 
spirit  of  the  defense  that  repels  an  attack. 

The  posts  of  infantry  officers,  including  the  brigade  com- 
manders, are  on  the  battle  field,  in  a  position  where  they  can 
personally  control  the  tactical  situation  without  being  dependent 
on  their  telephone  connections.  They  should  choose  their  post  so 
as  to  have  their  reserves  immediately  at  hand,  and  they  should 
transmit  to  their  reserves  such  combat  orders  as  their  own 
knowledge  of  the  terrain  and  tactical  observation  dictate.  As 
22 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          23 

means  of  communication  between  themselves,  couriers  may  also 
be  used,  according  to  circumstances,  and  shelters  must  be  pro- 
vided for  them.  A  position  well  echeloned  in  depth  on  the 
flanks,  close  communication,  and  cooperation  in  the  fight  with 
the  neighboring  troop  should  prevent  any  bending  back  of  the 
fla:iks  of  the  sector. 

]  request  the  division  to  notify  me  whenever  any  practice  of 
active  infantry  defense  takes  place.  I  desire  that  the  infantry 
commanders,  from  the  brigade  up,  should  ascertain  from  their 
staff  officers  whether  the  measures  of  defense  correspond  with 
the  above. 

I  shall  expect  a  report  on  this  matter  by  March  27. 

The  commanding  general. 

(Signed)  KTJHNE. 


18:5d  Div.  IH.     645.     Secret. 

DIVISIONAL  HEADQUARTERS,  20  March,  1917. 

The  brigade  will  select  and  organize  a  command  post  corre- 
sponding as  nearly  as  possible  with  the  requirements  expressed 
above.  The  command  posts  of  the  regiments  and  of  the  bat- 
talions will  be  again  inspected.  Whenever  they  are  found  not 
to  meet  with  the  above  requirements,  others  must  be  immedi- 
ately constructed.  They  must  make  sure  to  find  the  regimental 
C.  P.'s  with  C.  P.'s  of  the  subordinate  groups  of  artillery  whose 
batteries  execute  barrage  fire  in  the  sector  of  the  regiment. 

The  brigade  will  submit  a  report  by  the  26/3  on  this  subject, 
and  on  the  state  of  advancement  of  the  work. 

The  infantry  exercises  of  active  defense,  executed  by  the  bat- 
talions in  billets  and  by  the  reserves  (where  such  exercises  can 
take  place)  must  be  reported  to  the  division  two  days  in  advance 
in  the  evening  report.  Each  company  in  billets  should,  during 
its  rest  period,  execute  at  least  one  active  infantry  defense, 
using  the  model  defensive  work. 


Translation  of  a  German  document. 

EXPERIENCE  OF   THE  RECENT   FIGHTING   AT 
VERDUN. 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS, 

25  December,  1916. 

Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Field  Army. 
Il/Ia.    Nr.  42728  op. 
Secret.     T.40. 
Not  to  be  taken  into  the  trenches. 

The  serious  and  regrettable  reverses  sustained  at  Verdun  dur- 
ing October  and  December  have  led  me  to  issue  the  following 
orders : 

1.  CONSTRUCTION  OF  DEFENSES. 

The  principles  laid  down  in  the  textbook  "Construction  of 
Defenses  "  (Stellungsbau)  have  proved  sound.  Single  lines  of 
trenches  do  not  suffice.  A  fortified  zone  must  be  constructed, 
organized  in  depth,  allowing  of  a  stubborn  defense  of  an  area 
even  after  the  capture  of  fragments  of  its  lines  of  defense. 

The  rearward  portion  of  this  zone  will,  therefore,  consist  of 
a  system  of  strong  points,  machine-gun  nests,  etc.,  merging 
toward  the  front  into  an  increasingly  closer  meshed  network  of 
trenches.  The  individual  trenches,  machine-gun  nests,  etc.,  must 
afford  each  other  mutual  flanking  support. 

Deep  mined  dugouts  in  the  front-line  trench  will  be  absolutely 
prohibited.  They  simply  form  man  traps  and  will,  therefore, 
be  blown  up  wherever  they  exist.  The  place  for  the  majority 
of  the  dugouts  (which  should  be  of  concrete  and  be  well  dis- 
tributed and  masked)  is  in  the  rearward  lines  and  in  the  in- 
termediate zone.  Vast  subterranean  accommodation  is  only 
admissible  for  reserves  far  in  rear. 

Of  greater  importance  than  a  wide  obstacle  covering  the  front- 
line, trench,  which  will,  in  any  case,  always  be  destroyed  in  a 
serious  attack,  is  the  construction  of  a  number  of  obstacles 
within  the  fortified  zone,  namely,  along  the  communication  and 
switch  trenches,  and  farther  in  rear,  forming  a  part  of  the 
24 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  25 

strong  points.  These  obstacles  form  the  meshes  in  which  an 
enemy  who  has  broken  through  is  caught,  and  which  prevent 
him  from  surrounding  the  portion  of  the  garrison  which  has 
hell  out  in  the  front  line. 

Difficulties  will  be  added  to  the  enemy's  reconnaissance  and 
artillery  work  by  the  construction  of  the  greatest  possible  num- 
ber of  targets  and  by  making  them  difficult  of  recognition  (also 
of  dummy  defenses). 

At  Verdun,  where  there  were  too  many  dugouts  in  the  front- 
line trench,  a  proportion  of  the  infantry  did  not  get  out  of  them 
quickly  enough.  A  close-meshed  network  of  trenches  was  lack- 
ing, as  were  also  obstacles  running  perpendicular  to  the  front. 

2.   OBSERVATION. 

Observation  both  for  artillery  and  infantry  must  be  assured 
even  under  the  heaviest  fire.  This  is  not  the  case  when,  as  at 
Verdun,  observation  is  mainly  carried  out  from  the  front-line 
treach.  It  is  preferable  to  construct  a  network  of  observation 
posts  located  at  points  in  rear.  The  view  from  one  post  must 
supplement  that  from  another. 

In  addition,  constant  observation  of  the  enemy's  activity, 
from  balloons  and  by  artillery  and  infantry  aeroplanes  (con- 
tact patrols),  must,  of  course,  be  absolutely  guaranteed. 

Finally,  one  must  insist  that  infantry  quartered  in  deep  dug- 
outs and  shelters  protect  themselves  effectually  against  sur- 
prise attacks  by  posting  lookout  men  and  by  frequent  visiting 
rounds.  The  large  number  of  unwounded  prisoners  shows  that 
this  was  not  properly  done. 

3.  METHOD  OF  HOLDING  THE  POSITION  AND  THE  INFANTRY 
BATTLE. 

As  pointed  out  in  the  "Defensive  Battle"  (AbtvehrschlacJit)1 
(see  more  particularly  pars.  6,  13,  and  15),  a  stubborn  defense 
alone  will  not  lead  to  the  desired  result. 

The  front-line  trench  can  not  be  too  thinly  held.  Distribution 
in  depth  is  essential,  even  for  a  company.  Each  strong  point 
must  have,  its  definite  garrison,  which  will  be  responsible  for 
holding  it. 

1  Not  yet  captured. 


26          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

Only  isolated  machine  guns  will  be  taken  into  the  front-line 
trench;  they  will  usually  be  kept  in  carefully  selected  positions 
behind  the  front  line,  concealed  and  posted  checkerwise,  fre- 
quently in  hollows,  which  are  difficult  to  detect  from  the  air  and 
can  not  be  reached  by  the  artillery ;  their  main  task  is  to  open 
a  surprise  flanking  fire  on  an  enemy  who  has  broken  through. 
The  operation  of  bringing  machine  guns  into  position  and  re- 
lieving them  will  be  specially  supervised. 

Reserves  must  also  know  their  way  about  the  sectors  of  the 
divisions  on  their  flanks.  When  fighting  conditions  permit,  a 
certain  tactical  situation  will  be  assumed,  schemes  will  be  set, 
and  maneuvers  carried  out  over  the  actual  ground.  Tactical 
work  in  the  front-line  position  and  tours  of  inspection  must  be 
exacted  from  senior  officers,  from  the  battalion  commander  to 
the  higher  commander  or  the  latter's  staff  officers.  In  certain 
circumstances,  the  regimental  commander,  just  like  the  bat- 
talion commander,  must  personally  lead  forward  his  reserves. 
No  one,  from  the  counter-attacking  squads  of  the  front-line 
garrison  down  to  the  divisional  reserves,  is  to  wait  for  orders 
to  counter  attack,  but  each  will  act  on  his  own  initiative. 

During  training  the  following  must  be  practiced  and  super- 
vised : 

The  counter  attack,  from  that  of  the  counter-attacking 
squads  of  the  front-line  garrison  to  that  of  the  larger 
reserves. 

The  measures  to  be  adopted  by  the  front-line  garrison, 
while  awaiting  the  counter  attack  of  the  formations  in  rear, 
against  an  enemy  who  has  broken  through  and  is  surround- 
ing this  garrison. 

The  action  of  the  emergency  garrisons  posted  in  machine- 
gun  nests  and  strong  points. 

At  Verdun  these  arrangements  partially  broke  down.  Units 
in  rear  showed  a  lack  of  offensive  initiative.  Portions  of  the 
foremost  fighting  lines,  which  were  gallantly  holding  out,  were 
left  in  the  lurch  by  those  in  rear  and  fell  victims  to  the  enemy. 

4.  THE  ARTILLERY   BATTLE. 

As  in  the  preceding  case,  if  proper  arrangements  are  made  for 
the  battle,  the  enemy's  attack  can  be  anticipated. 

Nevertheless,  at  Verdun,  artillery  support  appears  to  have  been 
lacking. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  27 

It  is  not  quite  clear  to  what  extent  the  enemy's  artillery  was 
engaged  by  our  own.  To  engage  the.  enemy's  artillery  (with  the 
help  of  aeroplane  observers)  is,  however,  the  principal  and 
most  effective  means  of  fighting  a  defensive  battle  to  a  success- 
ful conclusion.  Should  this  succeed,  the  enemy's  attack  is 
absolutely  paralyzed. 

\Vhen  the  enemy's  infantry  attack  is  imminent,  fire  must  be 
more,  and  more  concentrated  on  the  enemy's  infantry  as  well. 

1 1  so  doing,  it  is  not  advisable  to  direct  a  destructive  fire  on 
successive  portions  of  the  enemy's  position  chosen  arbitrarily. 
Piro  will  preferably  be  directed  on  points  where  work  is  in 
progress  and  where  effect  against  living  targets  may  be  ex- 
pected. The  same  holds  good  for  harassing  fire,  for  which,  in 
certain  circumstances,  gas  shells  are  particularly  effective. 

For  both  kinds  of  fire,  observation  and  supervision  are  the 
main  factors  for  obtaining  effective  results  (see  above). 

Ihe  destructive  fire  to  be  directed  on  the  enemy's  front-line 
trenches  will  be  increased,  both  as  regards  the  number  of  bat- 
teries engaged  and  the  expenditure  of  ammunition,  in  propor- 
tion to  the  increase  of  the  enemy's  fire  on  our  infantry  lines. 
It  will  be  increased  to  annihilating  fire  as  soon  as  a  maximum 
rate,  of  fire  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  or  other  signs,  denote  that 
the  attack  is  about  to  be  launched.  From  this  time  onward  the 
mass  of  the  artillery,  even  including  the  21-centimeter  mortars, 
will  concentrate  fire  of  the  utmost  intensity  on  the  enemy's  start- 
ing points  and  assembly  trenches,  so  as  to  annihilate  the  troops 
held  in  readiness  for  the  attack  before  they  can  move  to  the 
assault.  Arrangements  must  be  made  for  annihilating  fire  to 
be  broken  off  like  barrage  fire,  but,  in  any  case,  only  on  re- 
ceipt of  an  order  from  a  senior  officer  (battalion  commander). 

During  these  short  phases  of  the  battle  there  is  to  be  no 
thought  of  economizing  ammunition. 

This  procedure  does  not  debar  individual  batteries  from  simul- 
taneously continuing  to  sweep  valleys  and  ways  of  approach,  so 
as  to  prevent  reserves  from  being  brought  up.  At  such  mo- 
ments, also,  it  is  advisable  to  neutralize  sections  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  by  using  gas  shell. 

It  is  the  duty  of  all  artillery  commanders  to  acquire  a  prac- 
ticed eye  and  ear  and  to  utilize  every  means  of  reconnaissance 
and  observation  to  gauge  accurately  the  moment  at  which  the 
maximum  intensity  of  fire  should  commence.  In  no  circum- 
stances should  this  increase  of  fire  take  place  only  when  the 


28  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

infantry  ask  for  barrage  fire,  as,  in  that  case,  the  most  effec- 
tive, period  for  engaging  the  enemy's  infantry,  the  period  of 
assembly,  is  missed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  duration  of  anni- 
hilating fire  will,  naturally,  always  be  strictly  limited. 

When  the  enemy's  attack  is  launched,  barrage  fire  will  finally 
be  opened  automatically.  Barrage  fire  is  purely  a  means  to  repel 
an  attack.  The  artillery  must,  however,  assume  the  offensive 
not  only  against  the  enemy's  artillery  but  also  against  his 
infantry.  Acting  on  their  own  initiative,  artillery  of  all  calibers 
and  also  the  Minenwerfer  will  devote  their  main  strength  to 
seeking  and  engaging  the  most  favorable  targets  and  not  merely 
to  putting  up  a  purely  mechanical  barrage. 

Well-organized  barrage  fire,  important  as  it  is,  does  not  neces- 
sarily by  itself  afford  absolute,  protection.  The  enemy  may  either 
run  the  gauntlet  of  our  barrage  or  else  draw  it  before  the 
attack,  and,  at  the  decisive  moment,  endeavor  to  neutralize  it 
by  opening  fire  with  gas  or  high-explosive  shell.  Or,  again, 
he  may  make  a  detailed  study  of  the  lie  of  our  rather  mechanical 
barrage,  with  the  result  that  he  will  find  points  which  are  less 
heavily  shelled  than  others  and  will  make  his  way  through 
them  with  few  casualties. 

It  thus  follows  that  the  barrage  must  be  flexible,  i.  e.,  it  must 
be  mobile  so  as  to  correspond  to  the  probable  movements  of  the 
enemy. 

Observation  and  fire  control  (cf.  par.  2)  must  be  also  aimed 
at  during  the  annihilating  and  barrage  fire.  This  will  gen- 
erally be  achieved  by  transforming  automatic  and  spontaneous 
unobserved  fire  as  soon  as  possible  into  observed  fire.  For  this 
purpose  it  is  often  possible  for  the  aeroplane  observer  to  fly  at 
a  low  altitude,  far  behind  our  own  line,  and  as  though  perched  on 
a  giant  observation  ladder,  and  communicate  with  the  batteries 
in  action  not  only  by  wireless  but  by  means  of  the  simplest 
signals.  Only  thus  will  it  be  possible  to  engage  fleeting  targets 
and  to  punish  immediately  any  imprudence  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy — batteries  moving  across  the  open,  infantry  advancing 
or  concentrating  without  cover. 

But  even  making  allowances  for  considerable  improvement  in 
our  artillery  work,  the  infantry  must  clearly  understand  that 
artillery  can  only  relieve  them  of  a  part  of  the  defense,  and  that, 
finally,  it  is  the  infantryman  who  has  to  repulse  the  enemy  at 
close  quarters  with  machine  gun,  rifle,  hand  grenade',  and  trench 
mortar. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  29 

5.  ARTILLERY  COMMAND. 

The  long  ranges,  combined  with  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  a 
general  view  of  the  country,  necessitate  the  general  allotment 
of  targets  and  fire  control  being  carried  out  by  the  higher  com- 
mand, from  the  group  of  armies  downward,  even  for  artillery 
under  divisional  commands.  The  higher  commanders  must  issue 
precise  instructions  for  the  artillery  battle  and  must  not  hesitate 
to  £;o  into  details  when  it  is  a  question  of  cooperation  between 
neighboring  sectors.  The  division,  for  its  part,  must  daily 
define  the  tasks  for  its  artillery.  (See  par.  23  of  the  "  Defensive 
Battle.")  Fire-control  practices  must  constantly  be  held.  If, 
in  addition  to  the  issue  of  precise  orders,  there  is  a  thorough 
supervision  of  the  work  of  all  grades  (down  to  and  including  the 
observers),  the  artillery  will  prove  equal  to  its  task. 

6.  RELIEFS. 

Timely  relief  is  very  important  (see  the  "Defensive  Battle," 
par;*.  9  and  18)  ;  it  can  only  take  place  gradually  and  requires 
the  most  careful  preparation.  The  infantry  has  frequently,  for 
example,  to  relieve  the  unit  farthest  in  rear,  and  then  gradually 
work  forward  until  the  front  line  is  reached.  Regiment  must 
hand  over  to  regiment,  and  battalion  to  battalion,  etc.  The  out- 
going commander  may  only  leave  the  position  with  the  consent 
of  the  commander  who  is  relieving  him.  This  method  should 
insure  that  during  the  actual  relief  there  is  always  one  unit  in 
the  position  which  knows  the  ground,  and  that  the  incoming 
unit  gradually  obtains  a  knowledge  of  the  position. 

The  relief  of  artillery,  other  than  divisional,  demands  special 
attention,  and  experience  shows  that  this  matter  often  receives 
less  consideration. 

During  pauses  in  the  fighting,  batteries  belonging  to  armies 
and  groups  of  armies  must  be  withdrawn,  which  will  also  give 
them  an  opportunity  to  overhaul  their  material. 

The  same  principle  holds  good  for  pioneers  and  other  auxiliary 
services. 

7.  MORALE,    CARE    OF    TROOPS,    AND    SUPERVISION    OF 
COMMANDERS. 

The  number  of  prisoners  (which  was  unusually  large  for  Ger- 
man troops),  some  of  whom  evidently  surrendered  without  offer- 


30  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

ing  serious  resistance  and  without  suffering  heavy  losses,  shows 
that  the  morale  of  some  of  the  troops  engaged  was  low.  The 
reasons  for  this  require  most  careful  investigation.  The  whole 
spirit  of  the  German  infantry  must  be  revived  by  means  of 
training  and  the  strictest  drill,  as  well  as  by  educating  and  in- 
structing the  men.  It  is  a  matter  of  vital  importance  to  our 
Army  that  the  proper  steps  be  taken. 

This  question  is  closely  allied  to  that  of  looking  after  the 
troops  in  regard  to  clothing,  food,  and  quarters,  adjustment  of 
work  and  rest,  equitable  allotment  of  leave,  as  well  as  the  per- 
sonal example  of  all  ranks.  I  particularly  wish  to  emphasize 
the  fact  that  under  the  extraordinarily  difficult  fighting  condi- 
tions at  Verdun,  this  latter  point  is  just  as  important  for  fight- 
ing efficiency  as  are  correct  tactical  decisions. 

The  supervision  of  officers,  particularly  of  the  more  senior 
officers,  must  be  searching,  and  the  above-mentioned  matters 
must  also  be  taken  into  account.  Any  officer  incapable  of  doing 
his  work  will  be  summarily  removed  from  his  post.  Long  leave, 
given  in  time,  will  frequently  suffice  to  enable  officers  suffering 
from  nervous  strain  to  recuperate  and  return  to  their  work. 

8.  TROOPS  AT  REST. 

Troops  which  have  been  withdrawn  must  be  given  facilities 
for  rest  and  training.  The  necessity  for  bringing  them  up  to 
dig  trenches  is  an  evil  which  can  not  be  completely  avoided. 

Training  and  inspections  alike  must  reflect  the  spirit  of  the 
foregoing.  The  attack  will  also  be  practiced  by  higher  forma- 
tions. 

As  remarked  in  paragraph  7,  training  for  battle  is  not  sufficient 
by  itself,  but  must  be  combined  with  drill.  The  experience  of 
war  confirms  the  principles  of  our  peace  training. 

(Signed)  v.  HINDENBURG. 

PRECIS  OF  AN  ARMY  ORDER  ISSUED  BY  THE  GERMAN  FIRST 
ARMY. 

An  order  issued  by  the  German  first  army,  dated  11  January, 
1917,  with  reference  to  the  above,  lays  stress  on  the  following 
points : 

(a)  The  garrison  of  the  front-line  trench  should  be  reduced 
to  a  minimum;  one  man  to  every  6  yards  (see  (&)  below). 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  31 

(&)  Only  a  feiv  deep  dugouts  should  exist  in  the  front-line 
trench,  sufficient  to  accommodate  a  minimum  emergency  garri- 
son. The  scale  should  be  one  dugout  every  55  yards,  to  hold  a 
group  (i.  e.,  one  N.  C.  O.  and  eight  men)  or  two  dugouts  every 
110  yards  to  hold  two  groups  each.  Larger  dugouts  to  hold 
mo:*e  than  two  groups  will  not  be  constructed  in  future  in  the 
fro  it-line  trench. 

(c)  The  existing  dugouts  in  the  front-line  trench  should  be 
reduced  to  the  scale  laid  down  above,  by  dismantling  them,  by 
nailing  up  the  entrances,  or  by  digging  a  new  front-line  trench 
in  iront  of  the  existing  one,  where  the  enemy's  line  is  not  too 
close. 

(d)  The  depth  of  these  dugouts  below  ground  should,  if  pos- 
sible, be  reduced  by  constructing  them  of  concrete,  steel,  and 
girders.    In  no  case  may  they  be  a  greater  depth  than  that  re- 
qui  red  to  provide  20  feet  of  earth  cover. 

(e)  During  an  intense  bombardment,  observation  will  be  ef- 
fected from  posts  in  rear  of  the  front-line  trench  or  by  individuals 
momentarily  issuing  from  the  dugouts  in  that  trench. 

(/)  Strong,  wide  obstacles,  arranged  checker-wise,  must  be 
erected  in  front  of  the  second,  third,  fourth,  etc.,  trenches  of  the 
first-line  position,  particularly  in  front  of  the  deep  dugouts ; 
similar  measures  must  be  taken  in  front  of  the  positions  in  rear. 

(g)  Lookout  posts  must  always  be  manned  even  in  the  rear 
trenches  and  positions. 

(h)  A  trench  must  be  provided  in  front  of  the  deep  dugouts 
for  the  supports;  this  trench  must  be  easily  accessible  and  de- 
fended, and  should  be  wired. 

(i)  The  emergency  garrison  of  trenches  behind  the  front-line 
trench  will  not  take  part  in  counterattacks. 

(;)  Machine  guns  will  be  sited  mainly  outside  the  trenches, 
particular  care  being  taken  that  all  hollows  running  perpen- 
dicular or  parallel  to  the  front  can  be  brought  under  fire. 

(fc)  Every  infantry  commander  must  have  a  reserve  at  his 
immediate  disposal,  with  which  to  counterattack. 

(I)  As  soon  as  an  attack  is  expected,  all  supports  and  reserves 
must  be  held  ready  under  cover  at  the  points  where  they  are  to 
be  employed  in  counterattack  or  defense.  They  can  not  be 
formed  up  methodically,  and  in  time,  if  they  are  only  brought  up 
after  the  enemy  has  attacked. 


32          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

In  the  case  of  operations  of  some  months'  duration,  the  above- 
mentioned  information  must  be  constantly  maintained,  in  spite 
of  the  hardships  involved. 

(m)  Arrangements  are  to  be  made  for  switching  artillery 
fire  rapidly  onto  an  enemy  who  has  broken  through.  This  can 
be  done  by  direct  laying  or  by  fire  control  from  a  good  viewpoint, 
which  must  be  close  to  the  batteries. 

(n)  Single  guns,  sections,  and  batteries  will  be  pushed  for- 
ward to  open  harassing  fire,  and  these  will  also  be  employed 
against  "  tanks  "  as  required. 


GENERAL  STAFF  (INTELLIGENCE), 
GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS, 
28  February,  19111. 

SOME  TACTICAL   NOTES   ON   THE   RECENT    OPERA- 
TIONS UP  TO  7TH  APRIL,  1917. 

I. 

RIFLE  BOMBS. 

The  following  extract  from  the  report  of  a  company  com- 
mander who  has  been  engaged  in  the  recent  fighting  is  circu- 
lated as  being  of  interest : 

During  the  recent  operations  in  the  Serre-Bucuoy  district  the 
rifle  bomb  has  proved  very  effective  in  dealing  with  machine 
guns  which,  in  conjunction  with  wire,  were  being  used  to  delay 
our  advance,  and  which,  unless  knocked  out  very  quickly,  did 
considerable  damage. 

The  rifle  bomb,  used  in  cooperation  with  the  Lewis  gun,  rifle- 
men, and  occasionally  bombers,  has  been  the  chief  weapon,  as  it 
has  been  found  that,  provided  cover  can  be  given  by  the  Lewis 
gun  and  riflemen,  the  rifle  bombers  can  approach  to  within  range 
and  by  a  sudden  and  rapid  barrage  can  knock  the  gun  or  team 
out,  make  it  withdraw,  or  enable  the  Lewis  gunners,  riflemen, 
and  bombers  to  advance. 

It  has  been  found  that  if  the  Lewis  gun  opens  fire  first  the 
German  machine  gunner  will  almost  invariably  direct  his 
attention  to  it,  and,  owing  to  the  apparently  limited  traverse  of 
the  German  machine  gun,  the  rifle  bomber  can  work  around  to 
either  flank  and  get  within  range. 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS, 
2  April,  1917. 

II. 

MACHINE    GUNS    AND    LEWIS    GUNS. 

It  is  reported  that  during  the  recent  advance  on  the  Somme 
battle  front  advantage  could  not  be  taken  of  good  targets  owing 

3577°— 17 3  33 


34          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

to  the  range  being  too  great  for  Lewis  guns  to  deal  accurately 
with  them. 

This  points  to  the  advisability  of  some  machine  guns  being 
placed  well  forward  in  an  advanced  guard  to  deal  with  fleeting 
targets.  If  so  placed,  they  can  also  be  used  to  hold  important 
tactical  points  which  may  have  been  gained. 

In  this  connection,  attention  is  directed  to  "Notes  on  the 
Tactical  Employment  of  Machine  Guns  and  Lewis  Guns " 
(S.  S.  106),  page  6,  paragraph  4. 

GENEBAL  HEADQUARTERS, 
3  April,  1917. 

III. 

ADDITIONAL  POINTS   BROUGHT   OUT   IN   OPEN   FIGHTING  UP   TO 
APRIL  7,  1917. 

1.  CAVALBY  AND  MOUNTED  TROOPS. —  (i)   Considerable  success 
was  obtained  despite  action  being  necessarily  restricted. 

(ii)  Machine-gun  fire,  like  shell  fire,  can  be  ridden  through,  if 
it  is  not  intense,  and  provided  no  check  is  allowed  to  occur. 

(iii)  Turning  movements  should  be  made  wide  and  in  some 
strength. 

(iv)  Mounted  attack  by  small  numbers  of  cavalry  on  similar 
numbers  of  infantry  was  successful. 

(v)  During  halts  as  much  wire  as  possible  must  be  cut  to 
allow  of  room  for  maneuver. 

(vi)  A  sound  preconcerted  plan  for  the  cooperation  of  artil- 
lery and  machine  guns  in  the  attack  is  most  necessary. 

(vii)  When  possible,  long-range  guns  should  be  pushed  for- 
ward in  support  of  cavalry. 

(viii)  Supporting  infantry  should,  when  possible,  keep  liaison 
with  attacking  cavalry. 

2.  ARTILLERY. —  (i)  Teams  of  guns  moved  forward  should  re- 
main at  hand. 

(ii)  F.  O.  O.'s  pushed  well  forward  with  telephones  proved 
invaluable,  as  there  was  no  hostile  barrage  to  cut  the  lines. 

(iii)  Covering  fire  of  18-pounders  and  4.5-inch  howitzers  can 
not  be  too  far  exploited. 

(iv)  There  was  a  tendency,  due  to  trench  warfare,  among 
C.  R.  A.'s  to  attempt  to  control  individual  batteries.  Brigade  or 
group  commanders  should  be  given  a  task  and  allowed  to  carry 
it  out.  > 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  35 

3.  INFANTRY. —  (i)  Relentless  pushing  forward  of  patrols  night 
and  day  to  occupy  points  of  vantage  is  the  surest  means  of  suc- 
cess. Patrols  can  not  be  too  venturesome  or  too  tenacious  of 
ground  gained.  They  must  cooperate  with  one  another  along 
the  ]'ront,  if  necessary  covering  each  other's  advance  by  fire. 

(i:.)  A  tactical  point  is  not  necessarily  held  in  strength  be- 
cause a  machine  gun  is  located  in  it. 

(i:i)  Fire  from  rifles,  machine  and  Lewis  guns  to  cover 
movement  is  as  effective  as  ever. 

(iv)  In  dealing  with  tactical  points,  including  villages,  the 
importance  of  combined  action  of  all  infantry  weapons  was 
clearly  proved.  Rifle  grenades  were  used  with  great  effect. 
The  3-inch  Stokes  mortars  also  proved  most  valuable.  These, 
like  machine  guns,  can  not  be  used  too  far  forward  in  an 
advance.  If  even  30  rounds  only  can  be  got  up  to  the  gun,  its 
moral  effect  is  often  sufficient  to  induce  the  enemy  to  quit  his 
position. 

(v)  Visual  signaling  is  of  utmost  assistance. 

(vi)  An  advance  party  of  Royal  Engineers  is  required  well 
forward  to  reconnoiter  for  removal  of  obstacles  left  by  the 
enemy.  This  party  should  be  mounted  on  horses  or  bicycles. 

(vii)  Villages  should  usually  be  avoided.  Their  attack  in- 
volves heavy  losses  and  when  occupied  they  become  shell  traps. 
They  are  better  captured  when  possible  by  a  turning  movement. 

(viii)  The  amount  of  personal  activity  required  from  an 
advance-guard  commander  is  very  great. 

(ix)  All  ranks  adapted  themselves  readily  to  open  fighting, 
despite  few  opportunities  for  previous  instruction. 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS, 
10  April,  1917. 


Headquarters  of  the  Armies  of  the  North  and  Northeast. 
General   Staff. 
Second  Bureau. 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS,  April  26,  1917. 
[Appendix    to   information    bullentin.] 

BATTALIONS  OF  ASSAULT. 

(Based  on  the  Provisional  Regulations  for  the  Instruction  of  Foot  Troops  in 
the  Field,  of  January,  1917,  and  Information  from  Other  Sources.) 

I. 
In  General. 

Battalions  of  assault  have  been  organized  in  each  army  for 
the  purpose — 

1.  Of  facilitating  the  special  preparation  of  the  greatest  pos- 
sible number  of  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  as  instruc- 
tors in  the  war  of  position  and,  principally,  for  close  combat. 

2.  In  order  to  work  out  further  improvements  in  the  methods 
of  attacking  fortified  positions. 

The  battalions  of  assault  are  not  merely  instruction  battalions, 
they  are  also  combat  units  assigned  to  the  execution  of  attacks 
in  which  the  conditions  of  execution  are  particularly  difficult. 
The  instructors  of  the  battalions  of  assault  seem  to  have  been 
trained  in  a  common  training  center  for  all  the  theaters  of  op- 
erations (reports  from  the  Russian  General  Staff).  This  train- 
ing center  is  said  to  be  near  Longuyon  in  a  special  camp  where 
training  is  carried  out  by  Col.  Rohr  (mentioned  in  the  exhibit 
herewith ) . 

So  far,  up  to  the  present,  one  or  two  battalions  of  assault 
have  been  identified  with  each  army.  These  battalions  had  the 
same  number  as  that  of  the  army  to  which  attached.  But  an 
order  of  the  seventh  army,  dated  18  September,  1916,  informs  us 
that  the  battalion  of  assault  of  that  army  had  been  abolished  on 
account  of  the  constant  renewal  of  the  elements  of  that  army. 
86 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          37 

The  army  corps  then  received  the  mission  of  themselves  organ- 
izing battalions  of  assault  on  the  same  lines  as  the  army  bat- 
talion of  assault  (exhibit  herewith).  At  present  the  battalion 
of  j  ssault  is  accordingly  not  only  an  element  of  an  army,  it  may 
also  be  an  element  of  any  army  corps. 

II. 

Organization — Composition. 

The  noncommissioned  officers  and  privates  who  form  a  bat- 
talion of  assault  are  specially  selected.  They  are  young,  strong, 
single  men,  or  married  men  without  children.  Sometimes  even 
the  more  unruly  or  undisciplined  men  of  the  company  are  taken. 
(From  statements  of  prisoners.)  The  drafts  from  some  com- 
panies have  amounted  to  25  men.  The  best  of  them  have  re- 
mained with  the  battalion  after  a  course  of  training,  which  lasts 
sis  weeks ;  the  others  are  sent  back  to  their  organizations, 
where  they  form  platoons  of  assault  or  patrols  when  needed  to 
execute  raids.  Under  certain  conditions  these  platoons  may  be 
united  into  one  company  of  assault  by  infantry  brigade;  the 
companies  in  their  turn  may  form  a  battalion  of  assault  for  an 
army  corps. 

The  composition  of  a  battalion  of  assault  varies.  The  follow- 
ing composition  of  the  second  battalion  of  assault  of  the  third 
army  is  given  as  an  example. 

This  battalion  was  commanded  in  March,  1917,  by  a  captain 
assisted  by  a  lieutenant.  It  was  composed  of  four  companies 
of  assault,  each  of  100  men  and  3  officers ;  one  machine-gun  com- 
pany of  6  pieces  (model  1908)  ;  one  company  composed  of 
trench  mortars  and  bomb-throwing  machines  (4  heavy  and  4 
light  trench  mortars)  ;  eight  bomb-throwing  machines,  two 
bomb-throwing  machines  to  throw  winged  bombs ;  one  company 
of  flame  throwers  (4  heavy  and  4  light  machines  for  making 
flames)  ;  one  battery  called  an  assault  battery  of  4  pieces  (cali- 
ber 57  mm.,  i.  e.,  2i  inches). 

III. 

Training. 

It  is  both  theoretical  and  practical. 

(a)  THEORETICAL  TRAINING. — Its  object  is  to  enable  the  offi- 
cers and  noncommissioned  officers  detached  from  their  organ- 
izations to  take  advantage  of  the  experience  acquired  in  action. 


3S  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

This  instruction  concerns  itself  chiefly  with  the  following 
points  : 

Instruction  of  the  infantry,  especially  the  groups  of  assault, 
in  the  methods  of  the  war  of  position.  Employment  of  the 
groups  of  assault  and  of  the  armament  placed  at  the  disposition 
of  the  battalions  of  assault.  Cooperation  with  the  infantry  by 
all  the  special  weapons  of  the  battalions  of  assault  during  the 
attack.  Besides,  the  noncommissioned  officers  and  men  must 
understand  the  effects  of  the  German  and  foreign  arms,  the 
methods  of  liaison  between  the  infantry,  the  machine  guns,  the 
trench  mortars,  the  artillery,  and  all  the  means  of  close  fighting 
in  the  offensive  and  defensive. 

( & )  PRACTICAL  TRAINING. — Iron  discipline,  strong  professional 
pride,  great  self-confidence  mean  success  in  assault  troops  even 
more  than  in  any  other  troops.  In  every  drill,  in  every  duty,  the 
object  to  be  attained  is  to  harden  the  body  and  stiffen  the  char- 
acter. The  noncommissioned  officers  must  confront  their 'men 
with  confidence  and  bear  themselves  as  superiors,  with  initiative 
in  ideas  and  deeds.  The  troops  of  assault  must  be  accustomed 
to  all  the  methods  used  in  combat. 

Their  training  will  be  carried  out  on  special  ground.     They 
are  trained  to  perfection  in  trench  fighting  as  well  as  in  the 
management  of  German  and  foreign  machine  guns. 
The  different  exercises  comprise: 

Throwing  of  German  and  foreign  grenades ; 

Passage  of  various  sorts  of  obstacles; 

Destruction  of  barbed  wire  with  cutters  and  explosives ; 

Use  of  automatic  rifles  and  pistols. 

Actual  maneuvers  with  the  use  of  flame  throwers. 
After  a  detailed  training  of  the  soldier,  first  individually, 
then  in  groups,  drills  are  carried  out  with  the  simultaneous  em- 
ployment of  all  the  arms  used  by  the  assault  battalions  in  order 
to  increase  the  men's  confidence  in  each  other  and  to  assure  in 
action  an  effective  support  and  teamwork. 

The  following  points  are  especially  dwelt  upon  during  train- 
ing, making  use  of  works  made  for  the  purpose  and  varying  the 
details  as  much  as  possible: 

Attack  of  an  enemy  trench ; 

Attack  through  several  enemy  lines  and  positions; 

Counter  attacks; 

Cleaning  up  nests  of  the  enemy ; 

Combats  between  machine  guns  and  small  strong  points; 

Repulse  of  enemy  counter  attacks. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  39 

It  is  recommended  that  these  maneuvers  be  carried  out  with 
the  infantry ;  if  none  are  available,  men  can  be  taken  from  the 
assault  battalion  to  represent  them. 

Experience  acquired  in  action  can  be  utilized  in  the  organi- 
zation of  these  maneuvers  and  to  serve  for  the  special  in- 
str  action  of  the  assault  battalions. 

IV. 

EMPLOYMENT. 

The  assault  battalion  has  its  definite  place  in  the  scheme  of  a 
regularly  organized  attack.  It  is  under  the  direct  orders  of  the 
commander  charged  with  execution  of  this  attack.  It  is  espe- 
cially useful  in  the  struggle  for  the  possession  of  a  fortified  po- 
sition, but  these  chosen  troops  also  form  a  combat  unit  under 
many  other  conditions.  At  times  it  may  be  expedient  to  supply 
them  with  bicycles  or  to  transport  them  by  automobile. 

When  an  assault  battalion  must  be  employed  during  a  long- 
drawn-out  action  or  in  a  counterattack  it  must  be  sent  in  ad- 
vance to  the  sector  where  it  will  be  engaged  in  order  to  avoid 
having  its  entrance  into  action  delayed  by  preliminary  recon- 
naissances and  the  long  march  through  the  approaches  which  it 
would  have  to  make  if  it  started  from  a  rest  camp. 

The  battalion  of  assault  furnishes  groups  of  assault  to  the 
infantry.  It  must  avoid  giving  whole  platoons  or  companies  for 
this  purpose  in  order  to  preserve  all  its  combative  power  and  to 
better  utilize  the  individual  valor  of  its  men. 

Before  an  attack  the  officers  and  group  leaders  of  the  assault 
battalion  make  the  necessary  reconnaissances  with  the  infantry 
commanders. 

They  are  responsible  for  the  regular  execution  of  the  attack 
by  the  groups  of  assault. 

Preparatory  exercises  carried  out  with  the  infantry,  on  a  se- 
lected drill  ground,  increase  the  chances  of  success  and  give  to 
the  assaulting  troops  confidence,  cohesion,  and  surety  of  execu- 
tion. 

During  an  attack  the  groups  furnished  by  the  assault  battalion 
must  lead  the  infantry  at  the  difficult  points.  They  make  the 
breaches  across  the  enemy  trenches,  destroy  the  machine  guns 
and,  strong  points,  and  aid  the  infantry  in  the  organization  of 
the  conquered  position.  In  their  mission  they  are  supported  by 
the  special  armament  of  the  assault  battalion. 


40  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

After  the  attack  the  battalion  assembles  all  of  its  detached 
elements  and  becomes  available  for  new  duties.  However,  it 
must  not  be  withdrawn  from  action  except  on  the  order  of  the 
infantry  commander  who  directs  the  action. 

V. 

Equipment  and  armament. 

The  equipment  and  arms  of  the  troops  of  assault  have  been 
prescribed  in  the  appendix  of  the  Information  Bulletin  of  Sep- 
tember 23,  1916. 

VI. 

Employment  of  the  auxiliary  arms. 

1.  Grenade  throwers,  Model  1916. — Some  grenade  throwers  can 
be  given  to  each  group  of  assault.    These  can  be  placed  either  in 
immediate  rear  of  the  starting  position  or  in  the  second  line.    A 
short  time  before  the  beginning  of  the  assault  they  should  throw 
their  projectiles  on  the  points  where  breaches  are  to  be  made, 
taking  them  obliquely,  if  possible. 

2.  The  light  trench  mortars. — The  light  trench  mortars  are 
in  battery  in  preference  in  immediate  rear  of  the  position  from 
which  the  attack  starts.     They  have  the  same  purpose  as  the 
grenade  throwers,  model  1916. 

3.  The  light  flame  throwers. — These  pieces  of  apparatus  have 
the  special  mission  of  facilitating  the  attack  on  the  trenches  and 
in  attacking  the  small  strong  points  of  the  enemy.     In  the  attack 
of  a  trench  they  spray  the  parapet  before  the  infantry  moves 
forward,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  defending  himself. 
In  the  attack  against  a  strong  place  the  apparatus  must  be 
brought  up  as  close  as  possible,  and  under  cover,  either  on  the 
flanks  or  in  rear  of  the  work'.     In  order  to  reach  it  the  de- 
fenders must  be  held  down  by  a  frontal  attack  of  machine  guns. 
The  light  flame  projectors  must  be  kept  under  the  constant  pro- 
tection of  the  assault  groups.     As  soon  as  the  apparatus  is  in 
action  the  infantry  must  push  forward  at  once  to  occupy  the 
enemy  trenches  and  exploit  the  success. 

4.  Infantry  guns— The  role  of  the  guns  of  the  infantry  is  to 
attack  either  from  the  position  which  the  infantry  holds  or  from 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  41 

places  even  nearer  them,  close  the  various  positions  that,  either 
because  of  their  small  size  or  their  location,  can  not  be  reached 
by  the  artillery  at  a  great  distance.  These  objectives  are 
principally  given  parts  of  the  trenches,  cover  for  machine  guns, 
flank  defenses,  posts  of  sharpshooters,  observation  stations,  etc. 
Infantry  guns  serve  also  to  repulse  an  assault. 

5.  Other  arms. — The  arms  of  heavier  types  which  also  are 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  assault  battalion  are  employed, 
undor  normal  conditions,  which  are  already  understood. 


Translation  of  a  German  document. 

ARMY  ORDER. 

VII  Army,  General  Staff. 

Pi.— No.  717. 
Subject:  Assaulting  elements. 

SECRET. 

SEPTEMBER  13,  1916. 

The  frequent  changes  in  the  units  which  form  the  army, 
changes  which  one  must  expect  to  be  even  more  frequent  in  the 
future,  rentier  it  unfortunately  impossible  to  longer  maintain  the 
integrity  of  the  units  of  assault  of  the  army.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  special  training  for  the  "  service  of  assault "  is  indis- 
pensable. The  long  duration  of  the  war,  the  development  of 
technical  methods,  the  undeniable  progress  of  the  enemy  in- 
fantry, and  the  difficulties  which  trench  warfare  impose  upon 
the  instruction  of  noncommissioned  officers  and  privates,  require 
the  augmentation  of  the  offensive  force  of  a  part  of  the  infantry 
and  of  the  engineers  and  the  placing  at  the  disposal  of  the  com- 
manders of  units  of  a  special  force  most  carefully  trained. 
This  special  training  will  henceforth  be  intrusted  to  the  army 
corps. 

Accordingly,  in  canceling  the  provisions  of  the  order  of  the 
VII  army  II,  6  Pi  244,  Secret,  and  Pi  No.  10535,  I  order  the 
following : 

1.  The  assault  detachment  of  the  VII  army  is  discontinued. 
Its  quarters  at  Mons-en-Laonnois,  its  drill  grounds  and  buildings, 
as  well  as  its  instruction  materiel,  as  far  as  it  does  not  belong 
to  certain  bodies  of  troops,  are  to  be  assigned  at  once  to  the  First 
Bavarian  Reserve  Army  Corps  and  will  be  employed  by  the 
assault  detachment  which  will  be  formed  by  that  corps  (see 
par.  2).  The  First  Bavarian  Reserve  Corps  will  report  having 
taken  it  over.  The  officers,  noncommissioned  officers,  and  men 
will,  as  soon  as  possible,  join  their  own  units.  They  will  take 
with  them  the  property  they  brought  with  them.  Capt.  Mun- 
chau,  commanding  the  assault  detachment,  will  stand  available 
for  further  orders  on  16th  of  September,  at  the  latest. 

The  officer  placed  in  command  of  the  assault  detachment  of 
the  First  Bavarian  Reserve  Corps  is  advised  to  communicate 
as  soon  as  possible,  in  person,  with  the  commander  of  the 

42 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  43 

assault  detachment  of  the  army,  in  order  to  acquaint  himself 
with  the  experience  which  has  so  far  been  obtained. 

All  returns  and  papers  of  the  assault  detachment,  including 
the  route  diary,  and  the  orders  and  instructions  received  by 
it,  must  be  sent  to  the  Chief  Engineer  Officer  of  the  Army. 

2.  The  army  corps  will  themselves  organize  assault  detachments 
from  the  personnel  which  has  already  been  trained  in  the  assault 
detachment  of  the  army,  from  officers,  noncommissioned  officers, 
and  men  taken  from  the  companies  of  infantry,  engineers,  and 
mint nwerfer  (trench  mortar)  detachments.    It  is  of  utmost  im- 
portance that  this  personnel  be  chosen  with  great  care.     The 
composition  of  the  assault  detachment   of  the  army   and   its 
organization  and  methods  in  use  may  well  serve  as  models  for 
the  assault  detachments  of  the  army  corps  whose  effectives 
will  remain  under  the  control   and   jurisdiction   of  the   corn- 
man  lers  of  the  army  corps. 

As.  soon  as  their  degree  of  instruction  will  permit,  courses  of 
instruction  of  the  same  kinds  as  those  in  the  assault  detach- 
men ;  of  the  army  will  be  organized  in  the  assault  detachments 
of  the  army  corps. 

3.  The  officers,  noncommissioned  officers,  and  men  who  have 
taken  these  courses  will  form  a  group  of  assault  in  the  infantry 
battalions,  the  strength  of  which  will,  as  soon  as  possible,  be 
brought  up  to  that  of  a  half  platoon.    If  circumstances  permit, 
and  the  personnel  under   instruction   is   sufficient,   it   will   be 
possible  to  make  more  rapid  progress  carrying  on  instruction 
also  within  the  regiments  and  battalions. 

In  assembling  the  groups  of  assault  in  the  interior  of  the 
brigade,  a  company  of  assault  may  be  formed  provisionally  for 
special  missions;  in  the  same  way,  a  battalion  of  assault  may 
be  organized  for  the  army  corps.  Except  when  a  special  mis- 
sion is  assigned,  the  groups  of  assault  must  remain  with  their 
battalions  so  as  not  to  permanently  deprive  them  of  this  selected 
and  trained  personnel.  Special  training  of  the  assault  groups 
must  be  constantly  continued  within  the  battalions. 

The  returns  of  the  officers  to  be  assigned  individually  from  the 
assault  detachments  to  the  Rohr  battalion  of  assault 1  must  be 
sent  on  the  first  day  of  each  month  to  the  general  staff  of  the 
army  (general  of  engineers). 

4.  In  all  these  assault  units,  instruction  must  be  pushed  to  its 
limit.     The  greatest  possible  skill  in  the  utilization  of  terrain 
and  in  crossing  obstacles,  as  well  as  complete  mastery  of  all 

1  Instruction  battalion,  organized  near  Longuyon. 


44  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

means  of  combat  (German  and  foreign  arms,  machine  guns, 
grenades,  bomb  throwers,  light  trench  mortars,  etc.),  are  indis- 
pensable factors  of  success.  The  cleaning  up  of  the  enemy 
trenches  and  their  immediate  utilization  for  combat  are  a  par- 
ticularly important  part  of  the  instruction.  In  all  training 
effort  must  be  made  to  develop  in  each  man  the  quality  of  firm 
decision  and  a  taste  for  attack.  Cooperation  with  the  sector 
garrisons,  the  trench  mortar  batteries,  the  field  and  the  heavy 
artillery  must  be  studied  in  all  the  training,  which  will  be 
executed  according  to  a  definite  plan. 

The  men  must  be  taught  to  feel  that  assignment  to  the  assault 
troops  is  a  high  distinction.  The  man  thus  assigned  may  be 
aided  in  feeling  this  by  the  fact  that  his  difficult  duty  excuses 
him  from  the  normal  fatigue  duties  of  the  trenches  and  secures 
him,  in  addition,  good  quarters  and  good  food.  It  is  also  recom- 
mended that  he  be  favored  in  the  distribution  of  rewards.  The 
man  who  has  not  proved  his  personal  valor  and  zeal  should  at 
once  be  relieved  from  duty  in  the  assault  units,  without  any 
personal  consideration  whatever. 

5.  As  soon  as  the  assault  units  have  been  sufficiently  trained 
they  must  be  given  an  opportunity  to  show  their  value  by  in- 
trusting them  with  the  execution  of  an  operation  which  has 
been  minutely  rehearsed.    As  a  general  rule,  the  sector  garrisons 
should  take  part  in  them.     The  directors  of  the  operation  decide 
whether  the  control  thereof  is  to  be  intrusted  to  the  commander 
of  the  assault  troops  or  to  the  commander  of  the  sector.     For 
such  an  operation  not  only  is  good  instruction  required  in  the 
assault  units  but  also  the  taste  for  attack  and  the  feeling  of 
superiority  over  the  enemy  must  be  developed  in  the  sector  garri- 
sons.    The  purpose  is  to  cause  permanent  damage  to  the  enemy 
and  to  find  out  conditions  in  his  front  lines  (prisoners).    Avoid 
any  great  sacrifice  of  human  life  and  any  great  expenditure  of 
artillery  ammunition. 

6.  All  assault  units  are  temporary  formations.     Their  per- 
sonnel is  considered  as  on  detached  service. 

7.  The  commanders  of  army  corps  will  report  to  the  army 
commander  the  time  and  place  where  assault  detachments  will 
be  formed ;  they  will  state  their  strength ;  who  is  designated  to 
command  and  when  their  first  course  of  training  will  be  over. 
The  contemplated  inspections  will  be  announced  two  days  in 
advance. 

THE  ARMY  COMMANDER, 
VON  SCHUBERT. 


Issw  d  down  to — Company  commanders. 
Squadron  leaders. 
Battery  commanders. 

EXPERIENCES  OF  A  DIVISION  IN  RECENT  FIGHTING. 

ISSUED  BY  THE  GENERAL  STAFF,  MAY,  1917. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  experiences  of  a  division  are 
published  for  information: 

1.  After  the  first  advance  the  enemy  was  particularly  quiet. 
Men  were  able  to  show  themselves  on  the  western  slopes  of  the 
ridge  without  being  fired  at  from  the  neighboring  village.  It 
was  also  possible  to  walk  up  to  the  tactical  point  at  the  tower, 
whi^h  had  been  previously  strongly  held  by  the  enemy  as  an 
observation  post. 

The  commander  of  the  battalion  concerned,  on  hearing  of  this, 
at  once  went  up  with  a  view  to  advancing  his  line.  On  his  way 
up  to  the  tower  he  caught  sight  of  the  enemy  approaching  it  in 
threes  and  fours  by  short  rushes.  Without  hesitation  he  ordered 
the  nearest  platoon  to  charge  the  tower  and  establish  themselves 
east  of  it.  The  platoon  dashed  at  the  tower  and  arrived  there 
almost  simultaneously  with  the  enemy.  The  platoon  established 
itself  east  of  the  tower,  killing  about  20  of  the  enemy  and  taking 
three  prisoners. 

That  night  three  unsuccessful  bombing  attacks  were  made  on 
the  tower.  During  the  battalion  relief  the  next  night  the  enemy 
opened  a  heavy  bombardment  on  the  tower  and  its  immediate 
vicinity,  following  it  up  with  an  attack  by  two  companies  of 
infantry.  This  attack  succeeded,  chiefly  owing  to  the  relief  being 
in  progress.  A  local  counterattack  delivered  by  the  incoming 
battalion  failed  owing  to  the  darkness,  pouring  rain,  and  lack  of 
knowledge  of  the  ground. 

It  was  then  decided,  that  nothing  could  be  done  till  daylight. 
All  guns  were  ordered  to  be  carefully  ranged  on  the  tactical 
point  as  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see.  The  artillery  reported 
all  ready  at  11  a.  m.  The  attack  was. ordered  for  12  noon.  The 
batteries  opened  fire  on  the  enemy  at  12  noon  on  a  front  of  about 
200  yards,  and  two  companies  of  infantry  retook  all  the  lost 
ground  without  a  single  casualty. 

45 


46  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

LESSONS. 

(a)  Boldness  of  action  makes  for  success. 
(&)  The  presence  of  an  officer  on  the  spot  who  can  grasp 
a  situation  quickly  is  invaluable.    Much  lies  in  the  hands  of 
battalion  commanders  in  this  matter. 

(c)  If  after  a  successful  attack  by  the  enemy  an  immediate 
counterattack  is  unsuccessful,  it  is  essential  that  the  artil- 
lery shall  have  sufficient  time  to  register  the  target  care- 
fully before  further  counterattacks  are  launched. 

2.  Later  a  general  advance  took  place.  The  attack  proceeded 
satisfactorily,  as  far  as  the  division  was  concerned,  and  the  ob- 
jective was  reached. 

During  this  period  four  batteries  had  been  sent  forward  to  be 
ready  to  assist  in  the  second  phase. 

For  various  reasons,  however,  by  11  a.  m.  all  the  troops  were 
back  in  the  original  line. 

It  happened  that  in  the  arrangements  for  the  advance  the 
supporting  brigade  was  to  take  over  the  defense  of  the  line.  It 
was,  therefore,  close  up  and  all  the  officers  and  men  knew  the 
ground. 

Five  and  a  half  hours'  notice  was  given  for  a  fresh  attack 
and  proved  sufficient.  The  artillery  barrage  needed  some  slight 
adjustment,  owing  to  the  absence  of  the  four  batteries  which  had 
been  sent  forward. 

The  barrage  started  punctually  at  6  p.  m.,  and  the  infantry 
commenced  to  move  forward. 

All  went  well  for  the  first  300  yards,  when  an  enemy  machine 
gun  in  a  railway  cutting  opened  fire  and  caused  a  check ;  im- 
mediately some  rifle  bombers  fired  rifle  bombs  into  the  cutting 
and  the  machine  gun  ceased  fire.  This  enabled  the  troops  to  go 
forward  again,  but  the  barrage  had  meantime  moved  away  from 
them,  and  machine  gun  and  rifle  fire  was  immediately  opened  on 
them  from  a  trench  some  distance  ahead.  The  whole  line 
commenced  advancing  by  section  rushes  supported  by  the  fire  of 
alternate  sections.  In  this  way  the  advance  continued  until  the 
left  of  the  line  had  gained  the  flank  of  the*  enemy,  when  the  fire 
of  a  well-placed  Lewis  gun  caused  the  enemy  to  surrender. 

The  remainder  of  the  advance  to  the  objective  was  carried  out 
in  a  similar  manner  by  short  rushes  supported  by  rifle  fire.  By 
the  time  the  troops  were  established  in  the  objective  they  hnd 
about  50  rounds  per  man  left  out  of  the  170  with  which  they 
started. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          47 

The  battalion  commander  accompanied  his  rear  company  and 
was  in  conversation  with  some  of  his  company  commanders 
during  the  whole  attack.  He  and  the  company  commanders  were 
able  to  employ  fire  power  as  the  situation  demanded  and  keep  a 
grip  of  the  fight. 

LESSONS. 

(a)  Supporting  troops  should  be  so  placed  and  have  such 
knowledge  of  the  ground  that  they  can  be  employed  at  short 
notice. 

(&)  All  ranks  must  be  taught  to  use  their  rifles  readily 
and  to  employ  fire  to  cover  movement.  The  artillery  bar- 
rage is  to  be  regarded  as  a  useful  adjunct  and  not  a  necessity. 

(c)  In  open  fighting  battalion  commanders  should  go 
forward  in  rear  of  their  battalions  so  as  to  be  able  to  take 
charge  in  the  later  stages. 


Issued  down  to — Battalion  commanders. 
Battery  commanders. 
Regimental  commanders. 

INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  BATTLE. 

ISSUED  BY  THE  GENERAL  STAFF,  MAY,  1917. 

Not  to  be  Taken  into  the  Trenches. 

1.  The   Extracts   and    Summaries,    compiled    from    captured 
documents,  which  have  recently  been  issued  from  general  head- 
quarters, as  well  as  other  extracts  published  from  time  to  time 
in  Intelligence  Summaries,  are  of  value  as  showing  the  prin- 
ciples and  methods  on  which  the  enemy's  defense  is  based,  and 
which  we  have  to  meet  and  overcome.     Commanders  of  all 
grades  should  study  these  extracts  thoroughly,  and  always  with 
the  object  of  considering,  first,  how  to  defeat  the  enemy's  meth- 
ods when  we  are  attacking  him,  and,  secondly,  what  we  can 
learn  from  him  as  regards  the  strengthening  of  our  own  de- 
fenses, so  as  to  enable  garrisons  to  be  reduced,  thus  not  only 
saving  casualties,  but  making  it  possible  to  mass  larger  numbers 
for  an  offensive. 

2.  The  field  marshal,  commanding  in  chief,  desires  to  call  spe« 
cial  attention  to  the  following  principles  which  underlie  all  thy 
enemy's  instructions: 

(i)  The  constant  insistence  on  the  supreme  importance  of  a 
spirit  of  determination  to  endure  and  to  conquer  at  all  costs. 

(ii)  Although  this  spirit  of  determination  is  the  main  factor 
in  success,  no  material  precaution  which  skill  and  foresight  can 
provide  is  to  be  neglected. 

(iii)  The  defeat  and  destruction  of  the  hostile  infantry  is  tht 
aim  to  be  held  constantly  in  view.  All  means  available  and  all 
methods  employed  must  be  directed  toward  this  end. 

3.  These   three   fundamental   principles   do   not   differ   from 
those  on  which  we  also  rely.    It  is  on  applying  them  more  thor- 
oughly than  the  enemy  that  we  must  primarily  depend  for  suc- 
cess. 

4.  Another  point  of  great  importance  is  the  advantage  of  sur- 
prise.   In  some  instances  the  enemy  ascribes  his  failure  to  this 

48 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          49 

cause.    For  example,  the  following,  relating  to  the  Vimy  Ridge 
attack,  appears  in  one  of  the  captured  documents : 

"Although  the  intended  attack  was  well  known  beforehand, 
the  reply  of  our  artillery  was  very  feeble  during  the  first  days 
of  the  artillery  struggle,  and  its  fire  was  not  intensified  until 
too  late,  so  that  at  the  decisive  moment  our  infantry  were  left 
without  the  protection  of  their  artillery.  It  appears  that  an 
art  llery  preparation  of  several  days'  duration  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy  was  counted  on  in  certain  places,  and  that,  in  conse- 
quence, the  fire  of  our  artillery  was  reserved,  with  a  view  to 
insuring  a  sufficient  supply  of  ammunition  during  the  decisive 
dajs." 

5.  In  consequence  of  this  and  other  similar  experiences  the 
enemy  prescribes  very  active  counterbattery  work  in  future, 
but  always  with  the  same  ultimate  aim — the  defeat  of  our  in- 
fantry.   The  different  ways  in  which  his  artillery  is  to  assist  in 
this  ultimate  aim  are  clearly  explained  in  the  captured  instruc- 
tions, and  we  must  be  prepared  for  the  possibility  of  more  active 
hostile  counterbattery  work,  more  artillery  fire  on  our  assem- 
bly trenches,  and  a  heavier  fire  on  our  advancing  infantry  in 
future  attacks. 

6.  This  possibility,  however,  is  nothing  new.    We  know  that 
the  enemy  has  done  his  utmost  in  all  these  respects  already, 
and  no  extraordinary  improvement  is  likely.    In  guns,  ammuni- 
tion supply,   and   observation  from   the   air  we  have   a   very 
decided  advantage,  and  the  skill  of  our  artillery  and  our  air- 
craft in  combination  has  been  proved  more  than  equal  to  any- 
thing that  the  enemy  can  do. 

7.  We  can  increase  or  decrease  the  duration  of  our  bombard- 
ment as  we  please,  and  vary  its  nature,  always  subject  to  the 
essential  need  that  wire  shall  be  sufficiently  destroyed.    We  can 
vary  the  time  and  often  the  place  of  our  assaults,  and  by  these 
and  the  various  other  means  of  deceiving  the  enemy  which 
have  been  tried  already  with  good  effect — provided  secrecy  as 
to  our  plans  and  intentions  is  maintained — we  can  always  keep 
him  in  doubt  as  to  when — and  sometimes  as  to  where — the 
assault  will  start,  and  so  gain  at  least  some  measure  of  sur- 
prise. 

8.  If  the  enemy  enters  on  an  artillery  duel  our  undoubted 
superiority  in  artillery  and  munition  supply  will  enable  us  to 
exhaust  his  ammunition  and  destroy  many  of  his  guns;  while 
such  guns  as  he  may  still  have  in  action  when  our  infantry 
assaults  are  no  more  likely  in  the  future,  than  they  have  been 
in  the  past,  to  check  our  advance  across  "  No  Man's  Land." 

3577°— 17 4 


60  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

Once  our  troops  have  reached  his  trenches  his  artillery  fire  on 
our  leading  waves  is  masked  for  a  time,  and  we  know  that  a 
considerable  proportion  of  his  infantry  then  fail  in  that  spirit 
of  determination  to  conquer,  on  which  the  final  decision  must 
always  depend.  The  number  so  failing  will  certainly  not  de- 
crease as  the  war  goes  on. 

9.  Wo  have  therefore   nothing  new   to   expect   in  these  re- 
spects, and  the  methods  we  have  already  employed  will  still 
prove  effective,  so  long  as  they  are  worked  out  with  the  utmost 
care  and  applied  with  initiative,  skill,  and  determination. 

10.  The  system  of  defense  on  which  the  enemy  relies  after 
our  assault  has  been  launched  is  also  explained  clearly  in  the 
captured   instructions.     It   does   not   differ   in   principle   from 
what  we  have  experienced  and  have  overcome  during  the  last 
few  weeks  and  in  the  battles  of  the  Somme  offensive.    To  speak 
broadly,   the  enemy  depends  on  several  systems  of  trenches, 
each  of  several  lines,  with  a  considerable  distance  between  the 
systems ;   this  intervening  space  is  defended  by  strong  points 
and  fortified  localities  flanking  each  other,  giving  a  cross  fire 
to  the  front,  and  plentifully  supplied  with  machine  guns.     The 
trench  lines  have  strong  points  at  intervals,  giving  mutual  flank- 
ing fire,  and  the  garrisons  are  meant  to  hold  out  to  the  death 
to  beat  off  attack,  or,  failing  that,  to  facilitate  recapture  if  the 
position  or  any  part  of  it  is  lost.    In  this  system  of  defenses  the 
enemy's  troops  are  disposed  in  depth;  the  object  of  the  whole 
arrangement  being  first  to  wear  down  and  then  to  destroy  the 
attacking  infantry. 

11.  The  Germans  lay  down  that  fighting  is  to  be  for,  but  not 
necessarily  in  the  first  line;  but  it  is  clear  that  this  does  not 
mean  that  the  garrison  of  the  first  line  is  not  to  defend  it  to 
the  last.     On  the  contrary,  it  is  laid  down  that  only  army  and 
corps    commanders,    and    "  in    most    urgent    cases "    divisional 
commanders,  may  authorize  the  abandonment  of  any  position, 
although  under  certain  conditions  a  limited  degree  of  move- 
ment is  permitted — e.  g.,  troops  in  shell-hole  positions  may  move 
in  order  to  reduce  losses  from  hostile  artillery  fire,  but  the 
movement  should  be  local  and  forward  or  to  a  flank. 

12.  Ifc  is  clear,  therefore,  that  in  the  future,  as  in  the  past, 
the  garrisons  of  the  enemy's  first  lines  will  attempt  to  fight 
in  them,  and  when  we  have  captured  them  the  enemy's  troops 
disposed  in  rear  will  fight  for  them  by  utilizing  any  marked 
pause  in  our  advance  to  counterattack  without  delay.     When 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  51 

our  advance  pushes  on  into  the  spaces  between  the  lines  or 
systems  of  defense,  the  fortified  localities  and  machine  guns  in 
those  spaces  are  depended  on  to  cause  us  delay  and  loss  and  to 
open  up  further  opportunities  for  counterattack.  In  short,  the 
enemy's  system  is  well  designed  to  fulfill  the  principles  on  which 
it  is  based,  viz,  to  wear  out  and  then  destroy  the  attacking 
infantry;  and  with  this  object  in  view  the  enemy's  infantry  is 
disposed  so  that  it  can  be  brought  into  action  in  successive 
bodies,  those  in  front  preparing  the  way  for  the  blows  to  be 
launched  later  by  those  behind. 

13.  The  principles  of  the  tactics  we  have  employed  hereto- 
fore against  this  system  of  defense  have  been  proved  sound, 
although  some  improvement  in  details  and  in  execution  will 
always  be  possible. 

14.  Speaking  generally,  we  have  only  been  partially  success- 
ful rp  to  date  in  pressing  home  the  great  successes  invariably 
gainod  in  our  first  advance,  with  sufficient  rapidity  to  derive 
full  advantage  from  the  demoralization  of  the  defeated  hostile 
troops^ 

The  exhaustion  of  the  attacking  troops,  combined  with  the 
greai:  depth  in  which  the  enemy's  defenses  are  organized  and 
his  troops  disposed,  render  the  immediate  exploitation  of  suc- 
cess very  difficult. 

But  the  strength  of  the  defense  lies  in  the  spirit  of  the 
troops ;  and  by  hard  fighting  we  are  steadily  progressing  toward 
the  time  when  the  morale  of  the  men  opposing  us  will  be 
broken.  Then  no  system  of  defense,  however  sound,  will  suffice 
to  check  our  advance.  Meanwhile,  any  improvements  which  can 
be  made  in  our  methods  and  in  the  execution  of  our  attacks 
will  hasten  the  enemy's  downfall. 

15.  Our  chief  problem,  then,  is  how  to  push  each  advance  far- 
ther than  we  have  been  able  to  do  in  the  past,  while  retaining 
the  power  to  beat  off  counterattacks   with   equal   or   greater 
certainty   than   before,   with  less  loss  to  ourselves   and   with 
greater  loss  to  the  enemy.     The  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
enemy's  principles  and  methods,  gained  by  experience  and  by  a 
study  of  the  documents  captured,  furnish  the  data  necessary  for 
the  solution  of  these  problems,  provided  we  remember  that  no 
solution  can  be  satisfactory  which  fails  to  take  into  full  account 
the  physical  and  moral  powers  of  our  own  men  or  makes  greater 
demands  on  them  than  they  can  meet. 


52          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

16.  From  our  intelligence  service  we  know  before  a  battle 
the  strength  and  approximate  fighting  value  of  the  troops  imme- 
diately opposed  to  us.    We  have  accurate  maps  of  the  enemy's 
defenses ;   we  know  from   his   instructions   that  normally   his 
troops  in  these  defenses  will  be  disposed  in  depth,  in  three  bodies 
of  approximately  equal  strength.    We  can  calculate,  therefore, 
with  considerable  accuracy  the  strength  of  the  forces  to  be  over- 
come by  each  of  our  successive  waves  of  assault,  and  adjust  the 
numbers  we  allot  to  each  wave  accordingly. 

The  passage  of  our  rear  waves  of  assault  through  the  enemy's 
barrage  presents  difficulties,  but  various  ways  of  overcoming 
it  have  been  tried  with  success,  and  the  enemy  will  always 
experience  at  least  equal  difficulty  in  passing  his  counter- 
attacking troops  through  our  barrage,  so  that  he  certainly  has 
no  advantage  over  us  in  bringing  troops  from  the  rear  into 
action. 

17.  In  short,  the  principle  of  successive  employment  of  troops, 
in  order  to  wear  down  the  enemy  and  then  throw  fresh  reserves 
in  to  destroy  him,  applies  to  the  attack  as  well  as  to  the  defense ; 
and  as  the  attack  will  probably  always  be  considerably  superior 
in  numbers  and  in  weight  of  artillery  fire  the  advantage  lies 
with  it,  provided  the  strength  of  each  assaulting  wave  is  care- 
fully adjusted  to  its  task  and  no  more  men  are  employed  in 
each  than  are  really  required ;  and  also  provided  the  rear  waves 
are  pushed  on  in  succession  as  and  when  opportunity  offers  or 
occasion  demands. 

18.  The  enemy's  system  of  local  counterattack,  as  applied  by 
him,  must  be  regarded  as  offering  us  valuable  opportunities 
of  inflicting  loss  and  demoralization.     We  know  by  experience 
that,  in  accordance  with  these  captured  instructions,  local  coun- 
terattacks are  launched  at  once  on  the  initiative  of  local  com- 
manders.    We  have  seen  that  as  a  result  they  are  almost  in- 
variably  launched   piecemeal,   seldom   in   great   strength,   and 
often  with  little  or  no  artillery  preparation  or  support,  and 
they  have  almost   invariably   failed,   with   heavy   loss   to   the 
enemy,   as   they   are  bound   to   fail   against   staunch   infantry 
(even  without  artillery  support)  who  have  confidence  in  their 
weapons  and  know  how  to  use  them. 

19.  Each  counterattack  beaten  off  means  heavy  moral  and 
material  loss  to  the  enemy,  and.  commencing  with  a  considerable 
superiority  of  numbers,  a  few  hours  of  this  style  of  fighting 
must  leave  us  in  possession  of  the  last  reserves  on  the  battle 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  53 

field,  provided  we  have  not  used  up  our  superiority  by  making 
our  leading  waves  unnecessarily  strong.  The  problem  to  be 
solved  is  how  to  bring  these  reserves  into  action,  under  control, 
at  the  right  time  and  place,  and,  if  possible,  well  supported  by 
artillery. 

Wo  have  but  a  few  hours  at  our  disposal,  since  the  enemy 
only  requires  time  to  bring  up  fresh  troops  from  elsewhere; 
and  it  will  seldom  be  advisable  to  expose  our  troops,  tired,  in 
some  disorder  after  their  advance,  without  prepared  defenses, 
and  without  efficient  artillery  support,  to  the  assaults  of  any 
large  masses  of  fresh  troops.  What  profits  us  most  is  that 
these  fresh  hostile  troops  should  be  hurried  into  attacks,  which 
we  have  made  all  preparation  to  meet  whilst  they  are  mov- 
ing up. 

But  if  our  advance  has  come  to  a  standstill,  the  enemy  will 
probably  not  throw  in  these  troops  as  they  arrive,  but  will  take 
time  to  secure  new  defensive  positions  in  our  front,  and  to  pre- 
pare for  methodical  counterattack.  His  dispositions  to  gain  the 
necessary  time  for  this,  as  we  have  seen  in  all  recent  battles, 
consist  of  strong  points  held  by  his  staunchest  men,  and  numer- 
ous machine  guns  very  difficult  to  locate.  This  is  the  style  of 
defense  we  have  to  find  means  to  overcome,  with  as  little  delay 
as  possible,  on  the  first  day  of  every  battle,  after  our  main 
forces  have  reached  their  farthest  objective  and  defeated  prac- 
tically all  the  formed  bodies  of  trooops  immediately  oppposed 
to  them. 

20.  A  study  of  these  conditions  makes  it  clear  that,  in  broad 
outline,  the  general  and  normal  method  of  procedure  should  be 
as  follows  in  a  battle  on  a  great  scale : 

(i)  Close  study  of  the  disposition  of  the  enemy's  troops  up  to 
the  last  moment,  to  determine  what  hostile  forces  we  have  to 
deal  with  during  the  first  day,  what  forces  are  likely  to  arrive 
subsequently  and  how  soon,  and  what  their  probable  line  of 
advance  to  the  battle  field  will  be. 

(ii)  Determination  of  the  successive  objectives,  and  of  the 
final  objective  to  be  captured  on  the  first  day.  The  defensibility 
of  each  such  objective  to  be  taken  into  careful  consideration, 
including  facilities  for  artillery  support  (although  our  infantry 
must  be  trained  not  to  regard  that  as  indispensable  to  the  defeat 
of  a  counterattack). 

An  enemy's  trench  line  is  not  necessarily  a  good  position  to 
halt  on,  even  temporarily,  though  mopping-up  parties  to  deal 


54  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

with  it  are  indispensable  and  must  be  provided  in  sufficient 
strength  and  made  to  understand  how  much  depends  on  them. 
The  best  objectives  to  choose  will  almost  always  be  those  be?t 
suited  to  cover  the  advance  of  our  artillery  to  more  forward 
positions,  so  that  infantry  and  artillery  continue  to  work  for 
each  other,  from  position  to  position. 

(iii)  Very  close  study  of  the  ground  between  the  enemy's 
successive  lines  of  defense,  and  of  the  ground  beyond  our 
farthest  main  objective,  so  that  probable  strong  points  and 
machine-gun  positions  may  be  located  beforehand  and  artillery 
fire  concentrated  on  them  in  due  course. 

(iv)  Careful  adjustment  of  the  strength  and  number  of 
successive  waves  of  assault  to  the  tasks  allotted  to  them.  Each 
stage  of  the  advance  to  reach  a  line  to  be  then  held  against 
counterattacks,  and  garrisons  for  this  purposes  to  be  definitely 
allotted.  The  final  stage  (for  the  day)  of  the  main  advance  to 
be  on  a  line  chosen  for  its  defensive  capacity,  especially  as 
regards  giving  cover  to  good  artillery  positions  to  which  our 
guns  can  advance. 

(v)  Some  troops  to  be  held  in  hand  from  the  outset  especially 
to  exploit  success  beyond  the  farthest  main  objective.  The 
theory  of  their  employment  being  that  they  will  come  into  action 
after  the  enemy's  main  forward  bodies  have  already  been  de- 
feated, when  the  opposition  met  with  will  be  from  small  gar- 
risons in  strong  points  and  scattered  machine  guns.  Their  task 
will  be  to  overcome  these,  to  capture  guns  and  prisoners,  to  seize 
and  occupy  strong  points  themselves  well  in  advance  of  our 
farthest  main  objective,  and  to  reconnoiter  as  far  as  may  be 
possible  beyond  them,  in  order  to  get  touch  with  the  advance 
of  hostile  fresh  troops  coming  up  from  elsewhere.  These  cover- 
ing troops  should  act  against  the  hostile  reinforcements  coming 
up  on  much  the  same  principles  as  the  enemy's  strong  points 
act  against  us — delaying  the  advance  and  causing  as  much  loss 
and  confusion  as  possible.  If  they  succeed  in  seizing  and  hold- 
ing a  good  general  line  of  defense  it  will  generally  be  advisable 
to  reinforce  them  and  fight  on  that  line,  if  the  general  situation 
admits  of  this.  Otherwise  they  must  fall  back  if  attacked,  but 
not  otherwise — drawing  the  enemy  after  them — to  the  line  we 
have  chosen  for  defense  while  preparing  for  our  next  advance. 

Small  bodies  of  cavalry  (corps  mounted  troops)  working  in 
combination  with  infantry,  tanks,  and  field  guns  will  be  best 
for  this  duty.  They  can  be  got  forward  quickly,  and  it  is  un- 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          55 

likely  during  the  first  day  of  the  battle  that  masses  of  cavalry 
can  be  got  forward  sufficiently  rapidly  or  would  find  sufficient 
room  for  their  action.  Their  opportunity  will  come  later  when, 
by  a  rapid  succession  of  advances,  conducted  on  the  above  prin- 
ciples, open  country  is  reached  beyond  the  enemy's  fully  pre- 
pared systems  of  defense. 

(vi)  To  permit  of  the  free  action  of  these  light  troops  thrown 
boyond  our  main  farthest  objective,  artillery  barrages  must  be 
adjusted  to  the  situation. 

This  main  farthest  objective  must  be  chosen  with  due  regard 
to  the  possibility  of  efficient  artillery  support  against  strong 
and  methodical  attacks  by  fresh  reserves  in  considerable  num- 
bers. But  such  attacks  can  not  come  (usually)  for  some  hours, 
and  against  such  attacks  as  the  enemy  is  likely  to  make  on  the 
first  day  of  battle,  after  our  farthest  objective  has  been 
reached,  our  infantry  should  be  able  to  hold  their  own,  and 
must  be  prepared  to  do  so,  assisted  by  such  artillery  as  can  be 
lushed  well  forward,  and  covered  by  the  light  troops  thrown 
cut  in  front.  Unless  this  can  be  done  the  system  proposed  can 
not  be  effectively  applied. 

21.  In  conclusion,  two  main  dangers  to  the  complete  success 
of  an  advance  and  to  the  retention  of  ground  require  special 
notice. 

One  of  these  is  failure  to  "  mop  up  "  immediately  and  thor- 
oughly behind  our  advancing  lines,  with  the  result  of  the  ad- 
vance being  checked  and  perhaps  forced  to  fall  back  by  fire 
from  the  rear.  The  other  is  the  danger  of  allowing  the  enemy 
to  hold  out  in  "pockets,"  from  which  he  assists  subsequent 
counter-attacks  and  frequently  delays  and  disorganizes  our  sub- 
sequent advance. 

Although  the  leading  waves  of  an  assault  should  not  halt 
owing  to  these  pockets,  provided  there  is  room  to  pass  between 
and  establish  the  line  beyond,  it  is  important  that  the  enemy 
thus  left  behind  should  be  rounded  up  by  reserves  furnished 
from  the  rear  without  delay,  at  any  rate  unless  the  advance 
has  swept  so  far  beyond  as  to  render  these  pockets  powerless 
for  harm.  In  that  case  surrender  can  be  brought  about  at  our 
leisure. 

Tanks,  in  cooperation  with  infantry,  are  very  useful  for 
dealing  with  such  pockets,  and  it  will  usually  be  advisable  to 
hold  some  ready  for  the  purpose. 


UNDERGROUND  WORKS. 

Prepared  by  the  Germans  Before  Falling  Back  in  Front  of  the  Third  Army. 
(Information  furnished  by  the  Engineer  Corps.) 

I. 
IN  TOWNS. 

Investigations  in  the  towns  of  Noyon  and  Roye,  with  the  ob- 
ject of  discovering  underground  mines,  show  that  it  is  especially 
in  the  neighborhood  of  important  crossroads  that  the  Germans 
have  constructed  their  works.  Most  of  them  exploded,  but  a 
number  of  them  failed  to  go  off.  A  certain  number  of  timber- 
cased  branch  galleries  were  found,  the  work  on  which  was  in- 
terrupted, either  because  of  the  overflow  of  water  in  the 
ditches  or  because  of  deliberate  abandonment,  due  to  a  change 
of  program,  or  because  of  lack  of  time,  the  withdrawal  having 
been  sudden. 

IN  ROYE. 

(a)  On  the  ground  floor  of  a  house  situated  at  the  corner  of 
a  crossroad  it  was  found  by  raising  the  floor  and  digging  that 
the  Germans  had  dug  about  5  meters  below  ground  to  strike 
into  a  sewer  (masonry).  In  a  certain  part  of  the  sewer,  where 
the  sound  made  by  stamping  with  the  foot  indicated  a  hollow 
below,  a  new  well — not  deep — was  discovered. from  which  two 
galleries,  with  mine  casings  of  1.80  meters,  led  off.  At  the 
bottom  were  found  two  mine  chambers,  each  one  having  a 
charge  of  75  kilograms.  The  charges  consisted  of  prismatic 
packages  of  "  perdite,"  each  charge  having  in  its  center  a  primed 
fuse.  It  was  to  be  fired  by  electricity.  The  electric  wires  were 
cut.  According  to  information  furnished  by  the  inhabitants, 
this  work  was  done  since  September,  1916. 

(&)  In  the  same  town  were  found,  along  a  boulevard  and 
at  intervals  of  40  meters,  wooden  troughs  containing  two  copper 
wires  joined  together  with  which  the  current  from  a  high-ten- 
sion transformer  was  connected.  These  troughs  were  level 
with  the  ground. 
56 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  57 

(c)  On   one   of   the  corners   of  the   Grande   Place    (central 
square)  of  Roye,  outside  the  walls  of  one  of  the  houses,  were 
found  the  ends  of  four  wires  which  pierced  these  walls.    The 
enemy  did  not  have  time  to  explode  the  charges,  which  were 
to  be  fired  by  electricity  from  without. 

IN  NOYON. 

(d)  Here  all  houses,  especially  their  cellars,  were  thoroughly 
explored,   and   in   certain  large   houses    (hotels)    listening   by 
"  geophone "  was  resorted  to,  which  would  have  revealed  the 
presence  of  clockwork  in  the  walls ;  but  nothing  of  a  suspicious 
character,  from  this  point  of  view,  was  found.     It  was  seen 
that  the  Germans  had  excavated  the  cellars  of  the  cathedral 
and  of  the  bishop's  palace,  as  well  as  those  of  surrounding 
houses,  but  these  excavations  were  done  with  an  archaelogical 
object  in  view — that  of  disclosing  the- foundations  of  a  Galeo- 
Rom  in  wall — and  also  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  the  hiding 
place •  of  precious  objects. 

In  the  Rue  de  Chauny  several  open  shafts  were  found  under 
the  sidewalks,  and  ending  in  timber-cased  branch  galleries  with 
mine  cases.  Most  of  these  branch  galleries  were  abandoned 
when  they  became  flooded.  In  one  place,  where  two  branch 
galleries  ended  under  a  crossroads,  two  charges,  one  of  100 
kilograms  and  the  other  50  kilograms,  were  taken  out.  But, 
with  this  exception,  neither  wire  conductors  nor  explosives  were 
found  anywhere. 

Boulevard  Mouy  also  had  shafts  and  abandoned  branch  gal- 
leries. In  the  Place  de  la  Republique  the  Germans  blew  up 
some  surface  sewers  with  charges  of  "  mine "  shells  of  240, 
inclosed  in  wooden  cases. 

II. 
ROADS. 

Roads  were  destroyed: 

1.  Where  crossed  by  trenches.     (Excavating  the  entire  width 
of  the  road.    Trenches  5  to  8  meters  broad ) . 

2.  At  crossroads  (very  large  craters). 

3.  Crossing  streams — the  entire  width  of  the  road,  running 
upstream  and  causing  a  slight  overflow. 

In  towns,  as  at  the  crossroads,  the  Germans  formed  craters 
by  means  of  two  charges,  placed  either'  at  the  ends  of  two  branch 


58  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

galleries  leading  from  a  gallery  or  shaft,  or  at  the  ends  of  two 
bores  started  from  both  banks  of  a  road. 

The  following  was  found  at  the  crossroads  Guivzy-Guiscard- 
Ugny:  A  double  mine  at  each  entrance  of  the  crossroad.  Six 
mines,  only  two  of  which  were  exploded,  placed  two  together  at 
the  center  of  the  road  by  means  of  bores.  Ignited  simultane- 
ously in  series  of  two  mines  to  each  group.  Charges  inclosed  in 
zinc  envelopes  eight-tenths  millimeter  thick  and  soldered.  Steel 
cover  with  a  cap  for  the  charge  and  priming,  and  a  small  steel 
cylinder  to  touch  off  the  mine. 

Fired  by  electricity.  The  explosive  was  a  dark  brown,  muddy 
consistency  and  gave  a  strong  odor  of  nitrobenzine.  It  was 
wrapped  in  parchment  paper.  There  were  two  mines  of  33 
kg.  at  a  depth  of  2  meters.  Diameter  of  crater,  5  m. ;  that  is, 
the  width  of  the  road. 

III. 

CANALS. 

It  was  found  that  the  enemy  was  usually  content  to  blow  up 
the  locks  of  a  canal  by  charges  placed  near  the  hinges,  in  the 
abutments,  and  in  the  center  pier,  so  as  to  make  two  breaks  in 
the  canal.  Serious  injury  also  resulted  to  the  mason  work.  This 
was  especially  noted  at  Appilly.  Aside  from  destroying  the 
locks,  the  Germans  made  breaks  in  the  towpaths,  which  caused 
the  water  to  overflow  into  the  low-lying  portions  of  the  valley. 
One  canal  was  transformed  into  a  river  by  direct  connection 
between  it  and  the  Oise  at  Channy. 

IV. 

INUNDATIONS. 

A  vast  system  of  inundations  was  carried  out  in  the  region  of 
Noyon.  It  included : 

1.  Two  dikes,   with  joint  piles,   preventing  the  rivers   from 
following  their  courses. 

2.  Stopping  culverts  with  cement. 

3.  Destruction  of  bridges  where  crossed  by  roads  and  rail- 
roads downstream  from  the  town. 

4.  Upstream,  two  successive  barriers  of  piers,  forming  two 
jetties  at  road  crossings,  were  constructed. 

5.  In  the  towns  the  obstruction  of  all  sewers  and  drains  with 
paving  and  other  material  was  carried  out. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

On  the  Fronts  of  the  First,  Third,  Fourth,  and  Fifth  Armies. 

The  following  further  lessons  drawn  from  the  experience 
gained  from  recent  operations  in  trench,  open,  and  village  fight- 
in:?,  deserve  careful  study. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  a  study  of  all  actions  substantiates 
th?  soundness  of  prewar  methods. 

ARTILLERY. —  (a)  It  has  been  proved  that,  with  deep  objectives 
aid  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  employ  his  bat- 
teries at  long  ranges,  strong  and  continued  support  of  the  at- 
tacking infantry  can  best  be  insured  by  having  the  greater  part 
of  the  artillery,  both  field  and  heavy,  placed  well  forward  so 
tl  at  the  utmost  value  can  be  obtained  from  its  range.  The  im- 
portance of  the  principles  laid  down  in  Artillery  Notes  No.  4. 
Section  IV  (3)  has  been  emphasized  again  and  again. 

(&)  It  is  essential  to  arrange  for  cooperation  between  corps 
artilleries,  so  that  every  opportunity  for  enfilade  fire,  both  in 
wire  cutting,  trench  destruction,  and  in  counter-battery  work, 
may  be  fully  exploited. 

Barrages  and  wire  cutting  should  overlap  at  the  junction  of 
corps  for  about  100  yards. 

(c)  Harassing  fire  by  day   on  unseen  communications   has 
proved  to  be  of  great  value.     (Artillery  Notes  No.  4,  Section 
V  (2).) 

(d)  The  importance  of  good  counter-battery  work  can  not  be 
overrated.     Early  location  of  hostile  batteries,  destruction  dur- 
ing the  period  of  preparation,  and  neutralization  at  the  moment 
of  assault,  are  the  main  essentials. 

The  value  of  gas  shells  for  neutralization  is  undoubted,  and 
no  opportunity  for  their  employment  against  an  enemy  who  is 
trying  to  move  his  guns  must  be  lost. 

(e)  The  importance  of  the  most  careful  calibration  can  not  be 
overstated, 

(/)  The  necessity  of  care  of  buffers  needs  to  be  constantly 
emphasized. 

(g)  Knowledge  on  the  part  of  junior  officers  as  to  how,  what, 
and  when  to  report,  is  much  needed.  The  necessity  for  early 

59 


60  NOTES  ON  EECENT  OPERATIONS. 

and  accurate  information  from  F.O.O.'s  can  not  be  too  strongly 
emphasized. 

(h)  Whenever  an  advance  is  contemplated,  early  reconnais- 
sance of  possible  routes  off  the  roads  should  be  made.  Careful 
plans  must  be  made  for  crossing  our  own  and  the  enemy's 
trench  systems;  special  parties  must  be  detailed  for  the  work 
of  preparation.  The  importance  and  difficulty  of  a  rapid  ad- 
vance are  not  yet  fully  realized. 

(i)  In  any  battle  where  a  deep  advance  is  looked  for,  there 
should  be  one  or  two  brigades  R.P.A.  per  division,  ready  to  move 
forward  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

(j)  It  has  been  found  to  be  advantageous  in  the  first  stages 
of  an  advance  to  make  use  of  single  guns,  or  sections,  with 
limbers  and  teams  up  with  them. 

Difficulties  of  supply,  chiefly  in  the  matter  of  ammunition  and 
water,  will  usually  prevent  the  similar  use  of  larger  units. 

(fc)  Battery  commanders  (R.F.A.  in  particular),  must  pay 
more  attention  to  the  use  and  value  of  direct  observation,  and 
of  control  of  their  batteries  by  voice  or  through  a  short  tele- 
phone line.  There  is  a  tendency  to  place  batteries  in  fully  con- 
cealed positions  and  then  to  wait  while  the  F.O.O.  gets  out  H 
long  telephone  line. 

(0  As  the  enemy  is  driven  back  from  his  prepared  trench 
systems,  where  the  general  lines  of  defense  have  become  familiar 
to  our  artillery  and  are  accurately  marked  on  our  trench  maps, 
the  importance  of  careful  study  of  air  photos  increases.  The 
enemy  dig  rapidly  and  well,  and  the  defenses  of  positions  which 
we  are  going  to  attack  grow  quickly  day  by  day.  Unless  the 
most  recent  air  photographs  are  constantly  and  carefully  studied 
before  artillery  tasks  are  allotted,  there  is  the  danger  that  a 
vital  portion  of  the  enemy's  defenses  may  be  neglected  by  the 
artillery,  with  serious  consequences  to  the  infantry  assault. 

ROYAL  ENGINEERS. —  (a)  One  or  more  sections  of  Royal  Engi- 
neers should  move  with  the  advanced  guard  to  remove  obstacles 
and  to  effect  such  minor  repairs  as  can  be  carried  out  with  the 
stores  and  tools  carried  in  section  tool  carts.  In  addition, 
mounted  reconnaissance  parties  of  Royal  Engineer  officers  and 
N.C.O.'s  should  be  pushed  well  forward  to  report  on  the 
nature  and  extent  of  damage  of  a  more  serious  nature,  to  deal 
with  which  necessitates  special  arrangements  being  made. 

(&)  In  country  where  the  wells  were  normally  of  great 
depth  the  employment  of  helical  chain  or  canvas  band  pumps 
has  been  found  of  great  value. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          61 

INFANTRY — Patrols. — The  enemy  frequently  employs  strong 
patrols.  These  attack  or  attempt  to  cut  off  our  patrols,  if 
weak,  and  retire  before  strong  ones.  The  use  of  strong  patrols 
(10  to  20  men)  is  therefore  indicated.  Such  patrols  should 
be  plentifully  provided  with  S.A.A.,  and  bombers,  rifle  bombers, 
and  a  Lewis  gun  should  be  included  in  these  numbers. 

A  patrol  which  has  succeeded  in  penetrating  the  enemy's  line 
should  establish  a  post  on  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat. 

Advanced  posts  gained  and  established  by  day  are  often 
heavily  shelled.  It  has  therefore  been  found  advisable  gen- 
en illy  to  reconnoiter  by  day  and  gain  ground  by  night. 

The  normal  formation  and  movements  of  patrols  should  be 
constantly  practiced.  Front,  flanks,  and  rear  must  all  be 
guarded,  and  movements  must  be  made  by  BOUNDS.  All 
ranks  must  be  taught  to  realize  that  information  must  be  got 
back  to  the  proper  quarter,  no  matter  how  heavily  the  patrol 
may  become  engaged.  Relay  posts  should  be  formed  if  neces- 
sary. 

A  valuable  lesson  is  brought  home  by  the  difference  in  con- 
duct, and  consequently  in  casualties,  of  two  patrols,  each  of  12 
men,  when  held  up  by  machine-gun  fire : 

In  one  case  the  men  lay  down  when  fired  upon,  and  the 
Lewis  gun  was  used  to  cover  the  operations  of  the  remainder 
of  the  party.  The  movement  of  the  Lewis-gun  detachment  was 
then  effected  under  cover  of  rifle  fire.  Casualties,  2. 

In  the  other  case  the  patrol  made  no  attempt  to  open  fire 
and  ran  for  shelter  to  a  trench.  Casualties,  10. 

Outposts. — For  outposts  low-trip  wire  is  preferable  to  high 
wire. 

It  is  often  advisable  after  a  post  has  been  dug  and  wired 
to  place  the  garrison  by  day  in  a  fold  of  the  ground  some  little 
way  off. 

Infantry  iceapons. — The  value  of  the  use  of  fire  to  cover 
movement  from  the  various  weapons  at  the  disposal  of  infantry 
has  received  still  further  emphasis.  As  regards  the  individual 
weapons : 

The  rifle. — Full  use  is  not  being  made  at  present,  in  many 
cases,  of  the  rifle.  It  is  necessary  constantly  to  impress  upon 
troops  that  the  rifle  is  their  principal  weapon  and  must  be 
regarded  and  used  as  such. 

Rifle  bombs. — These  have  been  found  an  efficient  auxiliary 
in  dislodging  the  enemy  from  behind  cover  and  in  street  fight- 


62  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

ing.  Their  moral  effect  is  great.  It  is  recommended  that  half 
the  bombs  carried  in  the  mobile  reserve  of  units  should  be  rifle 
bombs. 

The  Lewis  gun  has  been  found  invaluable  as  part  of  the 
platoon.  It  may  be  used  to  engage  the  enemy  while  his  flank 
is  being  turned  or  if  he  opens  fire  unexpectedly.  In  some 
cases  it  has  proved  a  useful  reserve  of  fire  power  for  the 
platoon  commander.  With  patrols  its  effect  is  hard  to  over- 
estimate. 

Machine  guns. — Every  opportunity  of  overhead,  enfilade,  and 
cross  fire  by  machine  guns  must  be  seized.  The  effect  of  such 
fire  is  so  great  that  it  outweighs  the  risk  of  causing  casualties 
to  our  own  men. 

Subsections  should  not  be  allotted  to  lower  formations  than  a 
battalion.  When  so  allotted  the  officer  in  command  should 
keep  in  close  touch  with  the  battalion  commander  to  insure  co- 
operation and  to  look  after  the  arrangements  for  the  rations, 
supply,  and  comfort  of  his  own  men. 

Machine  guns  should  move  forward  by  BOUNDS,  some  being 
ready  at  all  times  to  assist  the  Infantry  by  their  fire. 

The  3-inch  Stokes  mortar. — This  has  been  found  most  useful 
against  strong  points  or  against  enemy  in  buildings.  Arrange- 
ments should  be  made  for  ammunition  to  be  carried  either  by 
pack  or  by  a  special  allotment  of  transport.  In  some  cases  a 
subsection  of  machine  guns  and  two  Stokes  trench  mortars  were 
allotted  to  advanced  guard  battalions.  It  was  found  satisfac- 
tory in  such  cases  to  detail  a  limbered  G.S.  wagon  from  the 
machine-gun  company  to  carry  Stokes  trench  mortar  ammuni- 
tion. 

House-to-house  fighting. — In  house-to-house  fighting,  where 
cellars  of  houses  are  connected  underground,  parties  must  be 
tolled  off— 

(a)  For  underground  work; 

(I))   To  search  houses; 

(c)   To  move  along  outside  the  houses,  both  front  and 

back ; 
(rZ)  To  deal  with  the  outhouses. 

When  saps  run  out  from  cellars  under  a  road  it  is  necessary 
to  establish  blocks  at  the  junction. 

Where  resistance  is  met  with  in  houses  cellars  are  usually 
barricaded. 

Lewis  or  machine  guns  should  be  posted  to  cover  the  streets 
and  fire  on  any  enemy  emerging  from  houses  or  cellars. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  63 

In  street  fighting  the  clearance  of  each  house  may  constitute 
a  BOUND. 

Movement  to  forming-up  place. — Where  no  natural  features 
or  trenches  exist  on  the  ground  selected  as  the  forming-up  place 
for  an  attack  the  line  should  be  marked  out  by  tapes. 

The  movement  of  troops  up  to  the  taped  line  must  rary  accord- 
ing to  circumstances.  In  some  cases  movement  in  single  file,  in 
others  in  artillery  formation,  has  been  found  to  be  the  best. 

Negotiating  hostile  barrage. — The  formation  to  be  adopted  for 
passing  through  a  hostile  barrage  must  be  suited  to  the  condi- 
tions on  the  ground.  On  one  occasion  two  battalions  passed 
throi  gh  in  file  with  few  casualties,  on  another  a  battalion  passed 
throi  gh  in  artillery  formation  with  equally  few  casualties. 

Hoppers  up. — It  is  more  difficult  to  "  mop  up  "  in  a  village  or 
wood  than  in  an  attack  on  a  position  in  the  open,  but  it  is 
equally  important. 

Village  and  wood  fighting. — To  delay  in  a  wood  or  village  is 
dangerous.  Provided  sufficient  "  moppers  up"  are  detailed,  the 
assaulting  troops  should  pass  through  and  get  well  clear  of  the 
wood  or  village  as  quickly  as  possible. 

Unless  the  position  selected  for  consolidation  is  well  beyond 
the  far  edge  of  the  wood  or  village,  adequate  artillery  support 
can  not  be  given. 

Use  of  reserves. — It  is  cheaper  to  employ  troops  in  sufficient 
depth  in  an  initial  operation  than  to  have  to  repeat  it  in  conse- 
quence of  failure.  When  the  reserve  units  have  passed  through 
the  original  assaulting  units  steps  must  at  once  be  taken  to  re- 
organize the  latter  as  quickly  as  possible  and  form  them  into 
reserves. 

INTERCOMMUNICATION. — The  use  of  visual  and  wireless  signal- 
ing, including  the  power  buzzer,  has-  been  much  neglected,  but 
where  full  use  has  been  made  of  these  means  important  results 
have  been  obtained. 

When  signalers  have  been  detailed  beforehand  to  work  with 
advanced  troops,  visual  signaling,  both  with  flag  and  lamp, 
has  been  successfully  employed. 

When  new  headquarters  have  been  established,  runners 
should  not  be>sent  always  to  the  same  destination.  It  is  essen- 
tial that  they  should  eventually  obtain  a  general  knowledge  of 
the  geography  of  the  occupied  area  and  not  only  of  one  par- 
ticular run. 

It  is  part  of  the  duty  of  signaling  officers  to  pass  on  informa- 
tion ;  this  has  been  frequently  neglected. 


64  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

Very  incomplete  reports  have  frequently  been  received.  A 
card  on  the  lines  of  Appendix  I.,  S.S.  148,  is  being  printed  and 
will  be  issued  shortly.  It  is  necessary  continually  to  insist 
upon  the  importance  of  early  and  accurate  information. 

The  various  means  of  communication  with  aircraft  require 
to  be  practiced  with  greater  frequency  than  at  present. 

Emphasis  must  again  be  laid  on  the  necessity  of  carrying  out 
the  instructions  for  the  use  of  telephones. 

It  must  not  be  imagined  that  because  we  have  driven  the 
enemy  from  his  front  trench  systems  he  can  no  longer  make 
use  of  listening  sets.  The  contrary  is  the  case.  It  is  easier 
for  him  to  tap  telephone  conversations  than  it  was,  since  many 
of  his  old  buried  cables  run  from  the  area  now  occupied  by  us 
into  his  line. 

AEROPLANE  CONTACT  PATROLS. — These  were  found  most  useful, 
working  with  both  the  infantry  and  mounted  troops.  They 
assisted  materially  in  reconnaissance,  and  were  able  to  give 
valuable  information  as  to  the  enemy's  strength  and  position. 
Messages  with  this  information  were  dropped  at  battalion, 
brigade,  and  divisional  headquarters. 

Care  must  be  taken  to  insure  that  infantry  and  mounted 
troops  carry  flares  to  assist  these  contact  patrols  and  under- 
stand how  and  when  they  should  be  lighted. 

In  the  pursuit,  if  the  weather  is  favorable,  these  patrols 
should  have  many  opportunities  of  harassing  the  enemy  with 
bombs  and  machine-gun  fire. 

TRANSPORT. — Pack  transport  is  often  necessary,  but  it  must 
be  remembered  that  this  method  is  wasteful  and  entails  a 
greater  strain  on  animals  than  on  wheeled  transport  for  moving 
the  same  quantity  of  material. 

Traffic  controls  should  b.e  got  forward  on  the  battle  field  as 
soon  as  possible,  but  officers  commanding  transport  are  respon- 
sible for  regulating  the  march  of  their  own  transport. 

An  order  of  precedence  for  horsed  and  motor  transport  should 
be  laid  down  according  to  the  state  of  the  roads,  i.  e.,  if  roads 
are  bad,  horse  transport  should  be  given  precedence ;  if  roads 
are  good,  motor  transport,  so  as  to  get  it  off  the  roads  sooner 
and  leave  them  free  for  horse  transport. 

When  ground  has  been  gained,  a  forward  turning  point  for 
all  transport,  including  lorries,  must  be  established  as  soon  as 
possible. 

SUPPLY. — The  following  allotment  of  pack  transport  was 
found  to  work  satisfactorily  in  one  division. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          65 

Pack  animals  were  used  almost  entirely  to  feed  the  troops 
in  the  front  line,  both  before  and  after  an  attack. 

After  one  attack  rations  and  water  were  taken  up  by  pack 
animals  to  within  200  yards  of  the  front  line. 

Practically  all  the  pack  animals  were  mules ;  very  few  horses 
were  used. 

The  number  of  pack  animals  per  battalion  was  made  up  to  30. 
Fcr  one  attack  these  animals  were  loaded  as  follows,  with  a 
view  to  establishing  a  forward  dump  as  soon  as  the  objective 
was  gained : 

Animals. 

100,000  rounds  S.A.A 50 

200  petrol  tins 25 

1,440  grenades,  No.  5 20 

4  boxes  Very  lights  1" 2 

4  boxes  red  flares 2 

200  rifle  grenades 5 

5,000  sandbags 10 

Spare 6 


120 

These  were  divided  into  four  sections,  each  section  under  a 
battalion  transport  officer,  the  whole  being  under  the  brigade 
transport  officer. 

Each  section  was  further  subdivided  into  four  subsections 
under  an  N.C.O. 

The  same  organization  was  employed  for  the  carrying  of 
rations  and  worked  well. 

The  saving  of  carrying  parties  by  using  pack  animals  is  very 
great  and  increases  the  fighting  efficiency  of  the  units  consider- 
ably. 

Each  brigade  had  the  same  number  of  animals,  which  worked 
only  for  their  own  brigade.  In  this  way  both  men  and  animals 
got  a  rest  when  its  own  brigade  was  out  of  the  line. 

These  animals  went  up  at  dusk.  The  column,  which  is  given 
in  detail  above,  was  held  ready  to  move  up  during  the  morning 
if  the  attack  was  successful  and  circumstances  demanded  their 
doing  so. 

About  40  men  were  required  for  loading  mules,  but  in  conse- 
quence of  this  use  of  pack  transport  carrying  parties  were  few 
and  small. 

3577°— 17 5 


66          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

REPORTED  TACTICS  AND  METHODS  OF  THE  ENEMY. 

Retirements  have  generally  been  carried  out  by  the  enemy  be- 
tween 3  a.  m.  and  5  a.  m.  Previous  indications  have  been  given 
by  fires  and  explosions.  An  unusual  number  of  Very  lights  have 
often  shown  when  withdrawal  was  being  effected. 

Artillery  fire  has  usually  increased  before  withdrawal  com- 
menced, presumably  to  use  up  the  ammunition  with  the  gun. 

Field  guns  and  howitzers  have  often  been  posted  in  small  posts 
in  advance  of  the  main  positions. 

Enemy  batteries  appear  to  have  little  cover  for  their  guns, 
but  good  cover  for  their  men  and  ammunition. 

Trees  are  again  being  largely  resorted  to  for  O.  P.'s. 

Thick  belts  of  wire  are  often  erected  all  around  a  battery's 
position. 

Machine  guns  are  handled  very  boldly.  The  detachments  have 
appeared  suddenly  from  cover,  mounted  the  gun,  fired,  and  then 
returned  to  cover. 

In  open  fighting  machine  guns  have  often  been  found  in  sunken 
roads  and  behind  fallen  trees.  In  the  defense  of  villages  they 
have  normally  been  placed  well  clear  of  the  buildings. 

Instances  have  occurred  of  the  fire  of  enemy  machine  guns 
being  withheld  till  our  troops  have  passed  them,  but  in  the 
majority  of  cases  machine  guns  have  opened  fire  as  soon  as  they 
have  obtained  a  target. 

MISCELLANEOUS. 

(i)  Old  enemy  headquarters  should  be  avoided.  They  are 
generally  heavily  shelled. 

Officers  should  not  crowd  together  in  the  same  house  or  cellar. 

(ii)  A  plentiful  supply  of  name  boards  for  use  in  occupied 
enemy  trenches  is  most  necessary  and  should  be  prepared  in 
advance. 

(iii)  Arrangements  should  be  made  to  send  hot  food  up  to 
troops  in  the  front  line,  if  possible,  once  a  day. 

(iv)  In  open  fighting  a  continuous  line  of  defense  is  not  only 
unnecessary  but  impossible.  It  is  essential  therefore  to  study 
and  to  practice  the  method  of  holding  mutually  supporting  tac- 
tical points. 

(v)  Each  body  of  troops  is  responsible  for  its  own  protection. 
Flanks  and  rear,  as  well  as  front,  must  be  watched,  however 
small  the  unit, 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  67 

(vi)  The  usefulness  of  tanks  is  that  of  auxiliaries,  not  prin- 
cipals. Reliance  on  assistance  from  them  must  not  form  the 
foundation  of  any  proposed  operation. 

(vii)  Medical  officers  should  carry  labels  to  show  whether 
wells,  etc.,  that  they  test  are  fit  for  use  or  not. 

(viii)  No  preparation  for  an  attack  is  complete  which  does 
not  include  the  steps  to  be  taken  to  meet  the  enemy's  counter- 
attacks that  will  almost  invariably  follow  any  success  on  our 
part. 

(ix  I  Both  field  glasses  and  compasses  are  part  of  an  officer's 
kit,  and  are  essential  for  operations. 

(x)  Mounted  officers  must  make  use  of  their  horses,  both  to 
save  time  and  their  own  and  other  people's  legs. 

(xi)  As  soon  as  one  objective  has  been  gained,  reconnaissance 
and  preparation  for  what  is  likely  to  be  the  next  objective  must 
commence  at  once.  If  this  is  done,  there  will  generally  be  ample 
time  :?or  final  preparations  when  orders  are  received. 

(xii)  Guides  to  take  troops  to  the  place  of  deployment  should, 
whenever  possible,  belong  to  the  unit  going  up.  They  should 
have  previously  made  certain  of  the  road  and  marked  it  out 
with  nape  or  other  means.  Troops  marching,  especially  at  night, 
should  send  ahead  to  prevent  checks,  etc.,  and  to  arrange  for  the 
removal,  if  possible,  of  any  obstacles  which  are  likely  to  delay 
them. 


SUPPLY  OF  AMMUNITION  IN  THE  FIELD. 

Issued  by  the  General  Staff,  March,  1917. 

1.  The  old  organization  for  the  supply  of  ammunition  in  the 
field  by  means  of  brigade  ammunition  columns  and  a  divisional 
ammunition  column  was  designed  to  meet  the  requirements  of  a 
division  acting  independently,  so  that  the  division  might  be  self- 
supporting.    Owing  to  the  necessity  for  massing  far  more  troops 
on  a  given  front  and  the  consequent  increase  in  depth  of  our 
present  organization,  the  corps  has  now  become  the  unit  for 
marching  and  fighting.    A  corps,  consisting  of  two  or  more  divi- 
sions, must  accommodate  itself  on  a  front  little  greater  than 
that  formerly  allotted  to  a  division,  and  may  have  to  move  along 
one  road. 

The  density  of  troops  on  a  given  front  automatically  creates 
an  accumulation  of  ammunition,  and,  by  the  system  of  "  pool- 
ing," a  considerable  reduction  may  be  made  in  the  number  of 
rounds  per  gun  carried  with  the  fighting  formations. 

The  new  organization  has  therefore  been  introduced  with 
the  objects — 

(a)  Of  pooling  the  ammunition  carried  under  corps  control 
and  thereby  reducing  the  number  of  rounds  per  gun  to  be  car- 
ried. 

(6)  Of  effecting  a  saving  in  personnel,  horses,  and  vehicles. 

(c)  Of  reducing  the  road  space  occupied  by  a  division. 

(d)  The  experience  of  the  earlier  part  of  the  war  showed  the 
necessity  for  separating  brigade  ammunition  columns  from  their 
brigades  and  concentrating  them  under  one  central  control. 

2.  A  further  change  has  recently  been  made  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  divisional  artillery  to  meet  the  requirements  on  an 
offensive  front.     One  brigade  of  field  artillery  has  been  with- 
drawn from  each  division,  and  these  brigades  have  been  re- 
grouped to  form  "  army  field  artillery  brigades."    The  divisional 
artillery  will  therefore  consist  of  two  field  artillery  brigades, 
each  brigade  having  three  6-gun  18-pounder  batteries  and  one 
6-gun  4.5-inch  howitzer  battery, 

68 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  69 

The  army  field  artillery  brigades  will  consist  of  three  6-gun 
18-pounder  batteries  and  one  6-gun  4.5-inch  howitzer  battery, 
or  four  6-gun  18-pounder  batteries.  These  brigades  will  be 
available  to  reenforce  the  artillery  on  any  offensive  front  as 
may  be  required. 

3.  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  DIVISIONAL  AMMUNITION  COLUMN. — 
The  brigade  ammunition  columns,  as  such,  have  been  abolished 
for  divisional  artillery,  and  the  divisional  ammunition  columns 
have  been  reconstructed  into  two  echelons. 

"A"  echelon. — Divided  into  two  sections. 

It  consists  of  one  ammunition  wagon  for  each  gun  and  howit- 
zer in  the  division  and  S.A.A.  carts,  etc.,  to  carry  the  same 
quantities  of  rifle  and  machine-gun  ammunition  and  grenades 
as  were  formerly  carried  by  the  brigade  columns. 

The  sections  are  equally  divided,  the  number  of  vehicles  to 
each  section  is  the  same,  and  they  contain  the  same  percentage 
of  gun,  howitzer,  and  S.A.  ammunition. 

"j?"  eclielon. — Has  one  section. 

It  consists  of  some  of  the  G.S.  wagons  which  formerly  car- 
ried gun  and  howitzer  ammunition  In  the  old  divisional  am- 
munition column,  and  G.S.  wagons  to  carry  the  same  amount  of 
S.A.  and  machine-gun  ammunition  and  grenades  as  was  for- 
merly carried  by  the  divisional  ammunition  column. 

4.  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  BRIGADE  AMMUNITION  COLUMN. — To 
each  brigade  of  the  army  field  artillery  will  be  allotted  a  brigade 
ammunition  column.     It  will  consist  of  one  ammunition  wagon 
for  each  gun  and  howitzer  in  the  brigade,  with  a  proportion  of 
G.S.  wagons  for  baggage,  stores,  etc. 

5.  The  new  divisional  ammunition  column  is  directly  under 
the  divisional  artillery  commander,  and  forms  an  integral  part 
of  the  divisional  artillery.    It  may  still  be  drawn  upon  as  a  first 
reserve  for  the  batteries  in  men,  horses,  and  material  in  an 
emergency. 

It  will  normally  march  with  the  division;  but,  when  several 
divisions  are  marching  on  one  road,  it  may  be  necessary  to 
withdraw  the  "  B  "  echelons,  and  concentrate  them  in  rear  unr 
der  corps  control.  The  "A"  echelons  always  accompany  their 
divisions,  and  will  usually  march  in  rear  of  all  the  batteries. 
The  divisional  ammunition  column  commander  will  remain  with 
the  "A"  echelon. 

In  action,  the  divisional  ammunition  column  will  usually  be 
concentrated,  but,  when  the  wagon  lines  are  a  long  way  from 


70  NOTES  ON  KECENT  OPEEATIONS. 

the  guns,  wagons  from  the  "A"  echelon  may  be  attached  to  the 
batteries  to  assist  in  taking  up  ammunition. 

If  the  ammunition  park  is  a  long  way  in  rear,  it  may  be 
necessary  to  keep  back  the  "  B  "  echelon,  and  push  up  the  "A" 
echelon,  but  this  case  will  be  the  exception  rather  than  the 
rule. 

The  normal  position  of  the  divisional  ammunition  column 
commander  in  action  will  be  where  he  can  best  control  the  sup- 
ply of  ammunition. 

The  normal  chain  of  supply  of  ammunition  will  be  from  the 
subpark  (which  has  now  been  transferred  from  lines  of  com- 
munication to  corps  control)  to  the  "  B  "  echelon,  and  thence  to 
any  section  of  the  "A"  echelon. 

6.  In  the  case  of  the  army  field  artillery  brigades,  the  normal 
chain  of  supply  of  ammunition  will  be  from  the  subpark  direct 
to  the  brigade  ammunition  column. 

7.  As  the  new  organization  has  reduced  the  number  of  rounds 
carried  in  divisional  charge,  it  is  essential  that  the  column  be 
looked  upon  as  a  pool  from  which  ammunition  can  be  drawn  by 
any  unit.     It  is  not  intended  that  certain  sections  of  the  "A" 
echelons  should  be  affiliated  to  certain  artillery  brigades,  but 
the  organization  is  elastic,  and  permits  of  the  detachment  of 
such  an  amount  of  ammunition  as  may  be  considered  necessary 
for  a  specific  task. 


INFORMATION  FROM  CAPTURED  DOCUMENTS. 

JULY  3,  1917. 

A  sergeant  major  of  the  two  hundred  and  sixty-first  reserve 
regiment,  seventy-ninth  reserve  division,  was  captured  in  our 
raid  on  the  1st  instant  southeast  of  Souchez.  His  notebook  con- 
tained a  number  of  entries  of  interest,  and  a  translation  of  some 
of  these  is  given  below.  The  entries  appear  to  have  been  made 
during  a  course  of  training  which  this  officer  did*  on  his  first 
arrival  on  the  western  front  from  Russia. 

A.  RAIDS. 

1.  Accurate  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  positions  through  pa- 
trols, aeroplane  photographs,  etc. 

2.  Destruction  of  enemy's  obstacles;  gaps  in  his  wire  to  be 
cut  on  the  previous  day ;  machine  guns  to  prevent  repair  of  wire. 

3.  Agree  upon  signals. 

4.  Shoot  flares  from  our  own  trenches. 

5.  Divide  raiding  party  into  assaulting  party,  blocking  party, 
mopping-up  party,  explosives  (mobile  charges)  party,  escort  for 
prisoners,  and  stretcher  bearers. 

6.  Remove  all  identifications,  viz,  letters,  sketches,   identity 
disks,  shoulder  straps,  etc. 

7.  Make  password  known. 

8.  Caps  preferable  to  steel  helmets.     White  brassards  are  not 
practicable  because  of  their  visibility. 

9.  Take  sections  of  tent  for  booty  and  wounded. 

10.  Take  flash  lamps,  luminous  watches,  tape,  wire  cutters, 
"  Very  "  light  pistols. 

11.  Hang    revolver    round    neck,    bombs    in    handiest    place; 
daggers  and  knobkerries  are  the  best  trench  weapons. 

12.  Raid  with  and  without  artillery  preparation. 

13.  In  the  former  (with  artillery  preparation)  the  aim  is  to 
penetrate  into  the  enemy's  line.     If  the  area  to  be  raided  is 
large,  heavy  artillery  and  trench  mortar  fire  on  the  objective, 
changing  to  a  box  barrage  at  the  agreed  hour. 

71 


72  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

14.  In  the  latter  case  the  aim  is  to  surprise  the  enemy.  All 
raids  have  the  object  of  bringing  in  prisoners  and  booty. 

METHODS  OF  WAR  ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT. 

B.    POSITION. 

Three  or  more  lines.  Small  sectors.  Regimental  frontage, 
1,500  meters. 

(a)  One  battalion  in  front  line. 

( & )  A  second  battalion  in  reserve  line. 

(c)  A  third  battalion  in  rest. 

Strong  organization  in  depth. — Two  companies  in  firing  line ; 
two  in  second  line ;  pla-toons  in  echelon. 

Strong  points  and  switches,  each  with  commanders. 

Rations  must  be  abundant.  Every  man  self-contained  in  this 
respect. 

Transmission  of  orders. — Runners  most  reliable. 

Machine  guns. — Machine  guns  are  mostly  kept  in  the  second 
and  third  lines,  also  in  the  fourth  line.  British  even  have 
chained  down  their  machine  guns  (?). 

Trench  mortars. — Every  company  to  have  trench  mortars. 

Sentries. — Platoons  will  place  sentries,  i.  e.,  stationary  sen- 
tries. They  will  be  instructed  in  their  duties  and  with  regard  to 
the  situation  of  their  position. 

Attack  and  defense. — The  British  prefer  to  attack  at  regi- 
mental or  divisional  boundaries,  even  company  boundaries. 
They  seldom  attack  strong  points. 

If  the  enemy  has  penetrated  our  front  line  a  counterattack  will 
be  made  from  the  second  line.  The  garrison  of  the  front  line 
will  remain  in  their  dugouts  till  the  counterattack  is  successful. 

Counterattack  with  artillery  preparation,  i.  e.,  to  regain  a 
lost  section  of  trench.  Stationary  sentries  will  remain  in  posi- 
tion in  the  trench  from  which  the  counterattack  is  launched  to 
give  information  to  messengers,  to  pass  on  orders,  to  guard  the 
trench,  and  to  pass  orders  to  the  rear.  By  day  black  flags  will 
be  placed  at  each  end  of  the  lost  section  of  trench,  by  night  white. 
"  Very  "  lights  will  be  shot  up  perpendicularly  from  these  points 
to  show  our  artillery  where  to  fire. 

Means  of  communication. — Carrier  pigeons,  runners,  telephone, 
and  chain  of  relay  messengers. 

Each  commander  will  have  his  defense  position  and  will  be 
in  touch  with  adjoining  sections. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  73 

Sentries  will  observe  the  enemy  closely  and  will  report  every- 
thing they  see. 

Reliefs  take  place  at  night.  Entrenching  tools  are  carried, 
also  methylated  spirits  for  cooking,  packs  to  be  left  behind,  as 
a  rule,  only  absolute  necessities  to  be  taken  into  the  line.  Be- 
liefs must  take  place  in  silence. 

Gas  attack. — As  soon  as  the  alarm  is  given  shoot  up  red  and 
green  flares.  Our  artillery  fires  into  the  gas  cloud  and  on  the 
hostile  trenches.  The  enemy  also  uses  smoke  bombs  and  shells 
to  imitate  a  gas  attack ;  no  danger  of  gas  poisoning. 

Barrage  is  often  placed  immediately  in  front  of  our  trenches. 
No  barrage  possible  where  enemy  lines  only  20  meters  distant. 

Artillery  fire  of  various  kinds. — Barrage,  gunfire,  destructive 
fire,  and  retaliatory  fire. 

Tanks. — The  British  armored  cars  are  not  very  dangerous  but 
can  only  be  dealt  with  by  artillery. 


Extracts  from  a  German  Document,  Issued  by  the  Sixth  Army 
September  27,  1916,  Entitled 

SUPPLEMENTARY  INSTRUCTIONS  AS  TO  THE  CON- 
STRUCTION OF  DEFENSES. 

GENEEAL  PRINCIPLES. 

1.  Corps   must    make   the   greatest   efforts   to    improve   the 
defenses  in  depth,  and  to  provide  them  with  good  obstacles 
and  switches  at  those  parts  of  the  front  which  are  especially 
threatened  by  a  hostile  attack.    All  salients  and  all  mining 
areas  should,  as  a  matter  of  course,  be  cut  off  by  retrenchments. 

When  work  on  a  new  line  has  to  be  begun,  the  obstacles  should 
be  erected  first ;  the  concrete  structures  and  shelters  which  re- 
quire a  long  time  for  completion  should  then  be  proceeded  with. 

In  order  to  insure  that  the  fire  trenches,  which  may  be  subse- 
quently dug,  shall  bear  the  proper  relation  to  the  concrete-built 
flanking  works,  the  fire  trenches  should  be  excavated  provision- 
ally to  a  depth  of  1  foot,  but  to  their  full  width.  Preparatory 
work  of  this  kind  will  alone  enable  large  working  parties  to  be 
taken  full  advantage  of,  if  they  become  available,  and  if  opera- 
tions are  to  be  carried  out  on  a  large  scale. 

All  localities  in  the  lines  of  the  rearward  positions  should  be 
organized  for  defense  as  strong  points. 

FRONT-LINE  TRENCH. 

2.  The  principal  fighting  line  is  the  front  line;  approval  of 
army  headquarters  must  be  obtained  if,  for  local  reasons,  it  is 
only  intended  to  treat  it  as  the  outpost  position. 

TRACE  OF  TRENCHES. 

3.  In  tracing  the  lines  great  care  must  be  taken  to  secure 
flanking  fire.     The  flanking  defenses  form  the  framework  of  a 
position  and  should  be  traced  by  commanders  in  cooperation 
with  the  general  staff. 

74 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  7$ 

DESIGN  OF  TEENCHES. 

4.  Where  the  widening  of  existing  narrow  trenches  can  not  be 
done  throughout,  it  should  at  once  be  executed  at  the  entrances 
to  shelters,  so  as  to  form  courtyards  and  insure  the  possibility 
of  dofense,  even  if  the  trench  is  blown  in. 

WIEE    ENTANGLEMENTS. 

5.  The  trace  of  the  wire  entanglements  should  be  entirely  inde- 
penaent  of  that  of  the  fire  trenches.    This  will  prevent  their 
bein  ?  destroyed  by  the  enemy  if  he  relies  on  the  plan  of  the  fire 
trenches  in  aeroplane  photographs  for  their  positions. 

Entanglements,  if  destroyed,  must  be  reconstructed  at  once. — 
If  the  entanglement  in  front  of  the  first  trench  has  been  de- 
stroyed, its  reerection  must  take  precedence  of  all  other  work 
on  ~:he  position,  and  every  means  at  our  disposal  must  be 
employed. 

COMMUNICATION  TKENCHES. 

6.  As,   in   the  event  of  hostile    attack,   communication  and 
approach    trenches    are   exposed   to   heavy    fire,    cross-country 
tracks  must  be  reconnoitered  and  clearly  marked,  so  as  to  be 
available  both  by  night  and  by  day.    They  should  not  be  used 
during  quiet  times,  or  the  signs  of  traffic  will  betray  them  to 
aeroplane  observation. 

Care  must  also  be  taken,  while  an  action  is  in  progress,  that 
roads  are  not  used  in  more  than  one  direction. 

DUGOUTS. 

7.  Concrete  shelters  are  preferable  to  mined  dugouts  in  all 
circumstances. 

From  our  experience  on  the  Somme,  mined  dugouts  require 
from  23  to  26  feet  of  overhead  cover  in  hard  chalk  and  of  from 
33  to  36  feet  in  clay.  Such  dugouts  are  impracticable  in  front 
line  as  men  can  not  reach  the  fire  step  in  time  from  such  depths. 

Concrete  shelters  should  be  built  in  future  of  reinforced  con- 
crete, 5  feet  thick  (2  feet  8  inches  hitherto). 

In  a  gas-cloud  attack,  braziers  with  low  fires  have  kept  the 
shelters  completely  free  from  gas.  The  shelters  should  be  dis- 
tributed over  all  three  lines  of  trenches  of  a  position,  as  required 
by  the  distribution  of  the  formations  in  depth. 


76          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

In  general,  too  much  can  not  be  done  to  provide  secure  shelter 
from  shell  fire  on  reverse  slopes  for  the  reserves.  If  there  is  not 
sufficient  time  to  make  complete  dugouts,  numerous  recesses  in 
the  form  of  gallery  entrances  will  answer  the  purpose. 

OBSERVATION   POSTS. 

8.  Shell-proof  infantry  observation  posts  must  be  constructed 
in  all  trenches  of  the  first  and  second  line  positions. 

MACHINE-GUN   EMPLACEMENTS. 

9.  The  ruling  factor  in  the  siting  of  fire  positions  for  machine 
guns  is  that  they  must  be  echeloned  in  depth.    It  is  advisable, 
therefore,  to  construct  machine-gun  emplacements  not  only  in 
the  trenches  but  in  the  spaces  between  the  lines.    Machine  guns 
should  only  be  placed  in  the  first  trench  when  they  can  bring 
flanking  fire  to  bear  and  when  the  foreground  near  the  enemy 
can  not  be  swept  from  a  machine-gun  position  on  high  ground 
behind  the  line. 

TRENCH     MORTAR    EMPLACEMENTS. 

10.  Trench   mortar    emplacements    may   sometimes   be    con- 
structed in  the  second  trench  but  are  preferably  placed  between 
the  lines.    They  should  be  sited  near  those  points  which  are  par- 
ticularly menaced  by  the  enemy  or  where  an  increase  of  the 
artillery  barrage  fire  is  necessary. 

GENERAL  STAFF  (INTELLIGENCE), 
GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS, 

May  5,  1917, 


Translation  of  a  German  document. 

EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  GERMAN  FIRST  ARMY  IN  THE 
SOMME  BATTLE. 

JUNE  24  TO  NOVEMBER  26,  1916. 

By  GEN.  VON  BELOW. 
PART  I.  TACTICAL. 

30  JANUAEY,  1917. 

A.  PRELUDE  TO  THE  BATTLE. 

1.  The  Somme  Battle  did  not  come  as  a  surprise  to  the  second 
army,  which,  from  the  19th  July,  1916,  onward,  was  divided  into 
the  first  and  second  armies.  As  early  as  February,  1916,  our 
aeroplanes  reported  the  construction  of  numerous  new  hut- 
ments in  front  of  the  northern  wing  of  the  army  on  both  sides 
of  the  Ancre.  Shortly  afterwards  an  increase  in  the  number 
of  divisions  on  the  English  front  north  of  the  Somme  took  place. 
As  a  result  of  successful  raids  and  patrol  work,  we  learned 
that  these  divisions  were  relieved  successively  after  a  few  weeks 
in  line.  Toward  the  end  of  April  the  number  of  English  divi- 
sions north  of  the  Somme  had  already  increased  to  12,  opposed 
to  only  4  German  divisions. 

The  plan  which  was  formed  at  that  time  of  meeting  the  enemy's 
expected  offensive  north  of  the  Somme  by  a  counteroffensive 
could  not  be  carried  out  owing  to  lack  of  sufficient  forces.  In 
April  one  division  was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  army  as  a 
reenforcement.  This  division  was  put  into  line  north  of  the 
River  Ancre,  where  the  English  line  was  most  strongly  held. 
Thus,  on  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  each  division  held  an  aver- 
age front  of  6  kilometers,  while  on  the  rest  of  the  army  front 
the  divisional  sectors  amounted  to  7$  to  9  kilometers. 

In  May  two  divisions  were  withdrawn  from  the  front  of  the 
second  army  and  replaced  by  one  division  which,  during  its 
short  period  of  rest,  had  not  yet  been  able  to  replace  the  losses 
which  it  had  suffered  at  Verdun.  In  addition  to  this  a  consider- 

77 


78  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

able  number  of  heavy  batteries  equipped  with  modern  German 
guns  were  replaced  by  batteries  of  captured  guns. 

Up  to  May  it  was  not  considered  probable  that  the  French 
would  cooperate  in  the  expected  attack. 

At  the  beginning  of  June  the  signs  of  an  approaching  attack 
became  more  evident.  Just  north  of  the  Somme  two  French 
divisions  took  over  the  sector  previously  held  by  the  English. 
The  conclusion  at  first  drawn,  that  this  measure  had  a  defensive 
object  with  a  view  to  giving  greater  depth  to  the  English 
offensive,  mounted  further  north,  was  rejected  as  soon  as  the 
specially  good  Twentieth  French  Corps,  known  as  a  "  gladiator 
corps,"  was  identified  by  raids  north  of  the  Somme.  South  of 
the  Somme,  also,  preparations  for  a  hostile  attack  became  more 
and  more  apparent,  so  that  during  the  course  of  June,  the  sup- 
posed frontage  of  the  enemy's  offensive  was  fairly  clearly  estab- 
lished as  extending  from  the  neighborhood  of  Gommecourt  on 
the  north,  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  Roman  Road,  about  8 
kilometers  south  of  the  Somme,  on  the  south. 

In  June  one  division  and  the  field  artillery  of  another  division 
were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  army  headquarters.  Toward  the 
end  of  June  a  further  reenforcement  of  17  light  field  howitzer 
batteries  was  allotted  to  the  army. 

2.  On  the  22d  June  the  enemy's  bombardment  began  to  become 
intense. 

From  the  24th  June  onward  the  intense  bombardment  was 
continuous.  This  bombardment  comprised  a  large  proportion  of 
artillery  of  the  heaviest  calibers  and  of  heavy,  long-range  guns. 

On  the  1st  July,  about  8  a.  m.,  the  great  English-French  in- 
fantry assault  took  place  on  a  front  of  40  kilometers  between 
Gommecourt  and  the  west  of  Vermandovillers,  while  the  artil- 
lery bombardment  was  continued  on  a  sector  which  considerably 
overlapped  the  zone  of  attack.  The  assault  penetrated  our 
badly  damaged  defensive  front  at  a  great  many  points.  North 
of  the  Ancre,  by  the  evening  of  the  2d  July,  counterattacks  were 
successful  in  recapturing  the  whole  of  our  line,  and  inflicted 
heavy  losses  in  killed  and  prisoners  on  the  English.  South  of 
the  Ancre  also,  as  far  as  Thiepval,  inclusive,  the  English,  who 
had  captured  our  trenches,  were  driven  out  of  them  by  the  eve- 
ning of  the  3d  July.  On  both  sides  of  the  Somme,  however,  the 
English  and  French  had  driven  a  deep  wedge  into  our  defensive 
front.  On  this  sector  our  losses  were  so  considerable  that  there 
was  no  available  strength  with  which  to  carry  out  the  intended 
counterattack. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          79 

During  the  following  days  and  weeks  we  continued  to  lose 
further  ground  at  this  broad  breach  in  our  front.  The  engage- 
ment of  the  reenforcements,  which  flowed  in  to  the  army  from 
all  sides,  had  to  be  effected  in  the  most  unfavorable  circum- 
stances. Owing  to  the  overwhelming  superiority  of  the  enemy 
in  aircraft,  artillery,  ammunition,  and  men,  it  was  only  possible 
to  stop  the  most  dangerous  gaps  which  had  been  made  in  the 
German  defensive  front.  Owing  to  the  force  of  circumstances, 
the  cohesion  of  the  arriving  reenforcements  had  to  be  broken 
up  in  order  to  avoid  the  danger  of  the  enemy  breaking  through. 

Ur  der  these  difficult  conditions  the  whole  organization  of  the 
defense  had  to  be  constituted  anew.  It  was  only  after  the 
lapse;  of  long  weeks  that  the  defense  could  be  put  on  equal  terms 
with  the  enemy's  superiority  as  regards  fighting  material  of 
every  kind. 

In  spite  of  this,  the  enemy  has  not  succeeded  in  achieving  the 
inter  ded  breaking  through  of  our  western  front.  His  plans 
have  been  shattered  by  the  devoted  and  untiring  courage  and 
loyalty  of  our  army.  Every  man  who  has  fought  on  the  Somme 
may  be  proud  that  he  was  there,  and  that  the  battle,  which  is 
so  far  the  greatest  in  any  war,  has,  through  the  failure  of  the 
enemy,  ended  as  a  German  victory. 

B.  OBJECT  AND  ARRANGEMENT  OF  THE  LESSONS  LEARNED. 

3.  The  numerous  lessons  learned  from  the  Somme  Battle  have 
already  been  dealt  with  and  published  in  part  8  of  the  chief  oC 
the  general  staff's  instructions  for  trench  warfare  entitled 
"  Principles  of  Command  During  a  Defensive  Battle  in  Trench 
Warfare."1  A  thorough  acquaintance  with  these  instructions 
is,  therefore,  assumed  as  a  preliminary  to  studying  and  under- 
standing the  following  remarks,  which  have  been  published  by 
the  First  Army  at  the  desire  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria's 
group  of  armies.  In  this  memorandum,  the  "Principles  of 
Command  During  a  Defensive  Battle,"  will  only  be  referred  to 
in  so  far  as  the  events  on  the  Somme  are  concerned ;  the  organi- 
zation, tactical  employment,  and  cooperation  of  the  different 
arms  will  be  described  in  the  light  of  the  experience  gained  dur- 
ing a  battle  in  which  the  forces  involved  have  been  on  a  scale 
hitherto  unknown. 

1  This  is  being  issued  separately. — G.  S. 


80          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

The  subject  matter  has  been  divided  up  in  such  a  way  that  in 
Part  I  (Tactical)  the  different  arms  are  treated  under  the  fol- 
lowing subheadings: 

(1)  The  causes  of  initial  failures. 

(2)  The  measures  by  which  a  gradual  improvement  was 

attained. 

(3)  Experiences  and  lessons. 

In  this  way  a  picture  of  the  development  of  all  details  of  the 
fighting  during  the  battle  will  be  obtained,  which  will  perhaps 
be  of  use  to  a  commander  who  may  in  future  find  himself  en- 
gaged in  a  battle  of  similar  nature. 

Part  2  deals  with  all  questions  connected  with  administra- 
tion and  interior  economy. 

C.  HIGHER  COMMAND— EXPERIENCES  AND  LESSONS. 

4.  Before  the  beginning  of  the  Somme  Battle  the  headquar- 
ters of  the  Second  Army,  as  then  constituted,  had  grouped  the 
five  divisions  north  of  the  Somme  and  the  four  divisions  south 
of  the  Somme  under  the  two  corps  staffs  which  were  available 
in  the  area,  in  order  to  obtain  a  uniform  system  of  command 
throughout  the  anticipated  zone  of  attack.  The  battle  frontage 
of  the  two  corps  thus  constituted  amounted  to  22  miles  north 
of  the  river  and  20  miles  south  of  the  river.  The  initial  attack 
by  the  enemy  astride  the  river,  and  the  consequent  reentrant 
created  in  our  line,  increased  these  frontages  considerably. 
The  divisions  sent  up  as  reenforcements  by  the  supreme  army 
command  were  only  accompanied  very  gradually  by  fresh  corps 
staffs,  and  these  staffs  were  totally  unacquainted  with  the 
Somme  battle  front.  Their  entry  into  line  did  indeed  reduce 
the  frontages  held  by  formations,  but  the  commanders  had  to 
become  acquainted  with  the  ground  before  they  could  carry  out 
their  tasks. 

The  ever-increasing  size  of  the  Second  Army  prompted  the 
higher  command  to  reorganize  the  troops  engaged  on  the  bat- 
tle front  in  the  First  and  Second  Armies.  This  change  took 
effect  from  the  19th  July.  The  First  Army  took  over  approxi- 
mately the  same  battle  front  as  had  been  previously  held  by  the 
northern  corps  of  the  Second  Army.  This  sector  was  gradually 
divided  up  between  five  groups,  each  under  a  corps  headquarters, 
each  group  commanding  two  or  four  divisions. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          81 

It  was  not  till  the  1st  October  that  the  new  First  Army  was 
given  a  separate  lines-of-communication  headquarters.  Until 
then  its  administration  was  effected  by  the  lines-of-communica- 
tion headquarters  of  the  Second  Army. 

5.  The  difficulties  of  command  which  arose  from  the  constant 
change  of  sectors  and  staffs  were  very  considerable,  and  were 
still  farther  increased  by  the  frequent  shifting  of  headquarters, 
rende  red  necessary  by  the  loss  of  ground ;  this  had  a  most  dele- 
terious  effect  on  the  smooth  running  of  telephonic  communica- 
tion.    A  rigid  system  of  command,  equal  to  all  demands,  could 
not  bo  thoroughly  established  until  the  organization  of  the  army 
was  placed  on  a  clear  and  permanent  basis ;  unity  of  command 
was  then  attained  by  retaining  more  or  less  permanent  corps 
staffs  in  sectors. 

It  is  evident  that  an  army  which  is  subject  during  a  battle  to 
constant  changes  of  command  is,  especially  when  acting  on  the 
defensive,  at  a  very  great  disadvantage  as  compared  with  an 
attacking  enemy  whose  organization  has  been  thoroughly 
planned  with  a  view  to  carrying  out  his  designs.  As  far  as  pos- 
sible, therefore,  efforts  must  be  made,  whenever  a  hostile  offen- 
sive on  a  large  scale  is  anticipated,  to  organize  the  system  of 
command  in  good  time  and  on  so  firm  a  basis  that  the  army  and 
corps  headquarters  can  retain  command  of  their  former  sectors 
during  the  progress  of  the  battle. 

6.  The  lateral  boundaries  of  the  battle  sectors  of  armies, 
corps,  and  divisions  are  primarily  dictated  by  the  ground,  and, 
above  all,  by  the  facilities  which  they  give  for  the  development 
of  artillery  fire  and  for  artillery  observation. 

7.  In  the  heat  of  the  battle  the  influence  of  a  well-known 
commander  plays  a  great  part.     Acquaintance  with  the  person- 
ality of  his  subordinates,  an  appreciation  of  their  abilities,  and 
a  right  judgment  of  their  qualities  enable  the  higher  commander 
to  make  his  decisions  as  regards  the  employment  of  his  troops 
at  the  decisive  points  of  the  fight.     This  is  especially  the  case 
as  regards  the  divisional  fighting  units.     It  is  therefore  desir- 
able that  divisional  commanders  should  change  with  their  divi- 
sions. 

8.  As  regards  corps  headquarters,  which,  during  a  battle,  com- 
mand a  group  of  three  to  four  division^,  it  is  desirable  that  they 
retain  command  of  their  own  original  divisions  as  far  as  possi- 
ble.    Within  a  group,  however,  the  advantage  of  fighting  under 
a  commander  whom  one  knows  is  secondary  to  the  consideration 

3577°— 17 6 


82  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

that  the  command  must  be  on  as  permanent  a  footing  as  possible. 
This  condition  can  only  be  attained  by  allotting  permanent  corps 
staffs  to  sectors. 

9.  The  demands  made  on  the  staffs  of  armies,  corps,  and  divi- 
sions by  the  work  and  responsibility  entailed  in  the  course  of  a 
great  battle  of  long  duration  are  so  enormous  that  the  usual 
number  of  officers  allotted  to  staffs  is  not  sufficient.    To  every 
corps  headquarters  a  permanent  chief  administrative  staff  officer 
was  therefore  allotted  during  the  battle,  principally  for  duties 
of  supply,  and  also  a  permanent  general  staff  officer ;  each  divi- 
sion was  allotted  a  second   (permanent)   general  staff  officer. 
Corps  and  divisions  were  also  allotted  permanent  pioneer  and 
communication  officers,  while,  in  addition  to  the  above,  perma- 
nent wing  commanders,  antiaircraft  officers,  and  wireless  officers 
were  allotted  to  corps  headquarters. 

The  number  of  orderly  officers,  also,  required  to  be  increased 
in  order  to  provide  the  personnel  for  visiting  the  trenches  (a 
procedure  which  demanded  much  time)  and  for  keeping  in  per- 
sonal touch  with  the  subordinate  commanders,  as  well  as  to  con- 
vey to  the  higher  commanders  a  picture  of  the  events  of  the 
battle  independently  of  the  reports  received  from  the  troops. 

10.  It  is  of  much  importance  to  make  new  formations  ac- 
quainted in  good  time  with  the  battle  situation.     General  staff 
officers  must,  therefore,  be  sent  ahead  at  once  to  gain  touch  with 
every  new  corps  and  division  arriving. 

Besides  the  above,  during  the  last  weeks  of  the  battle,  army 
headquarters  sent  a  copy  of  all  orders  dealing  with  general  prin- 
ciples to  the  staffs  of  formations  which  were  earmarked  for 
future  inclusion  in  the  army,  through  the  medium  of  their  old 
formations.  The  higher  commanders,  as  they  arrived,  were  then 
interviewed  personally  by  the  commander  in  chief  or  by  the 
army  commander  ;  the  importance  and  nature  of  the  Somme  Bat- 
tle was  explained  to  them,  and  they  were  also  made  acquainted 
with  the  features  of  the  ground  in  their  future  sectors  and  with 
the  instructions  and  general  principles  already  issued  by  the 
army  for  the  battle.  General  staff  officers,  artillery  command- 
ers, and  pioneer  commanders  of  the  relieving  corps  and  divisions 
worked  for  several  days,  prior  to  the  arrival  of  their  own  forma- 
tions, with  the  staffs  of. the  formations  to  be  relieved;  these 
latter  formations,  in  turn,  left  part  of  their  staffs  behind  for 
several  days  after  the  relief. 

11.  It  is  of  great  importance  for  the  execution  of  the  com- 
mand  during   a   battle   that   the   higher   commanders    should 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPEEATIONS.  83 

obtain  a  rapid  knowledge  of  the  progress  of  events  which  are 
taking  place  in  front.  This  knowledge  often  forms  the  only 
basis  for  sending  forward  and  putting  in  reserves  at  the  right 
moment.  Army  headquarters  have,  with  this  object,  organized 
in  each  group  sector  special  army  observation  posts.  A  similar 
organization  was  formed  in  all  corps  and  divisions.  A  special 
artillery  system  of  telephonic  communication  connected  to  the 
headc  uarters  of  the  general  officer  commanding  artillery  has 
frequently  provided  the  most  valuable  rapid  pictures  of  the 
situation. 

12.  In  their  conduct  of  the  battle,  army  and  corps  headquar- 
ters must,  in  addition  to  issuing  strict  orders  as  regards  de- 
fensive work,  confine  themselves  principally  to  insuring  clear 
and  well-defined  relations  in  the  grouping  of  the  troops  and  in 
the  holding  in  readiness  of  reserves  behind  dangerous  points. 
Both  the  commander  in  chief  and  the  army  commanders  will 
obtai  i  the  best  foundations  for  their  decisions  by  keeping  con- 
stantly in  personal  touch  with  the  commanders  of  the  troops. 
Verbal  discussions  are  of  considerably  more  value,  than  tele- 
phonic conversations.     During  the  Somme  Battle  the  comman- 
der in  chief,  in  company  with  the  army  commander,  visited 
almost  daily  three  or  four  divisional  commanders  at  their  head- 
quarters or  their  battle  stations.     These  interviews,  at  which 
the  group  commanders  were  usually  present,   were  of  great 
advantage  to  the  unity  of  control  in  the  battle  and  to  the  co- 
operation of  all  arms.    This  procedure  was  of  particular  value  at 
moments  when  the  situation  was  rapidly  changing.    After  such 
conferences,  army  orders  and  corps  orders  were  frequently  dic- 
tated at  divisional  headquarters  and  forwarded  to  the  units 
concerned  by  telephone. 

13.  The  real  weight  of  the  fighting  rests  on  the  shoulders  of 
the  divisional  commanders,  on  whom  devolves  full  responsibility 
for  the  maintenance  of  their  sectors.     Divisional  commanders 
must,  therefore,  be  given  control  of  all  the  organs  of  action 
available  in  their  sectors,  with  the  exception  of  guns  employed 
on  special  tasks  and,  in  exceptional  cases,  corps  artillery  groups 
detailed  for  special  long-range  objectives.     They  must  at  the 
right  time  allot  to  their  subordinate  commanders  both  their 
own  reserves  and  the  reserves  placed  at  their  disposal  by  supe- 
rior authority;  these  subordinate  commanders  must,  in  their 
turn,  make  local  arrangements  for  the  employment  of  these 
reserves  on  the  battle  field. 


84          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

The  divisional  commander  must  exert  a  continuous  and  keen 
influence  on  the  whole  control  of  the  action ;  this  will  he  insured 
by  accurate  reconnaissances  on  the  ground  and  by  maintaining 
daily  personal  touch  with  his  troops  and  their  commanders. 

14.  Every  higher  commander  must  clearly  recognize  that  every 
report  from  front  to  rear  and  every  order  from  rear  to  front 
requires  a  very  long  time  to  reach  its  destination.     During  a 
defensive  battle  the  fighting  zone  lies  almost  continuously  under 
the  enemy's  intense  artillery  bombardment.     It  Jias  been  fre- 
quently found  that  orders  take  8  to  10  hours  to  reach  the  front 
line   from   divisional   headquarters.     It   has   often   proved   of 
value  to  forward  orders  to  reserves  by  staff  officers  in  motor 
cars. 

15.  To  carry  out  a  well-ordered  relief,  it  is  of  great  impor- 
tance that  accurate  and  up-to-date  maps  and  plans  are  handed 
over.    These  maps  must  show  not  only  the  details  of  the  actual 
front  and  the  distribution  of  the  fighting  material  available, 
but  must  also  include  the  area  in  rear  (billeting  facilities,  con- 
dition of  the  roads  and  administrative  arrangements).     It  is 
desirable  that  the  arrangements  for  these  maps  should  be  con- 
trolled by  the   general   staff  officers    allotted   permanently   to 
sectors. 

D.  INFANTRY  AND  MACHINE  GUNS. 
I.  Causes  of  initial  failures. 

16.  The  reasons  for  our  previous  failures  arose  not  so  much 
in  the  domain  of  purely  infantry  considerations  as  from  our 
inability  at  the  outset  to  make  equivalent  reply  to  the  enemy's 
concentrations,  more  especially  of  aircraft  and  artillery. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  battle  telephone  lines  which 
worked  perfectly  well  in  quiet  times  were  at  once  cut,  and  only 
a- small  supply  of  apparatus  for  visual  signaling  and  wireless 
was  available.  The  transmission  of  information  was  conse- 
quently faulty  and  resulted  frequently  in  the  total  isolation  of 
the  higher  command  and  in  the  absence  of  all  cooperation 
between  the  various  arms. 

The  infantry,  heavily  engaged,  were  often  left  to  their  own 
devices  for  hours  and  days  at  a  time,  or  else  the  front-line 
trenches  would  be  crammed  with  troops  owing  to  the  ignorance 
of  the  situation  that  prevailed  in  rear.  This  entailed  unneces- 
sary casualties,  and  the  moral  effect  was  bad.  This  state  of 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  85 

affairs  was  aggravated  by  the  enemy's  superiority  in  the  air, 
which  at  first  was  incontestable.  Not  only  did  the  enemy's 
airmen  direct  the  artillery  fire  undisturbed,  but  by  day  and 
by  ni?ht  they  harassed  our  infantry  with  bombs  and  machine 
guns,  in  their  trenches  and  shell  holes,  as  well  as  on  the  march 
to  and  from  the  trenches.  Even  although  the  losses  thus  caused 
were  comparatively  small,  their  occurrence  had  an  extremely 
lowering  effect  on  the  morale  of  the  troops,  who  at  first  were 
helpless.  The  innumerable  balloons,  hanging  like  grapes  in 
clusters  over  the  enemy's  lines,  produced  a  similar  effect,  for 
the  troops  thought  that  individual  men  and  machine  guns  could 
bo  picked  up  and  watched  by  them  and  subjected  to  fire  with 
observation. 

17.  On  long  stretches  of  front  the  small  forces  which  were  at 
first  available  were  not  distributed  sufficiently  in  depth.     The 
consequent  feeling  of  uncertainty  experienced  by  commanders 
led  them  not  infrequently,  in  their  determination  to  hold  the 
front  line  at  all  costs,  to  reinforce  the  front  line  prematurely, 
to  crowd  it  unnecessarily,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  leave  the 
rearward  trenches  unoccupied. 

This  failure  to  distribute  the  infantry  in  depth  went  hand 
in  hand  with  a  trench  system  of  insufficient  depth,  a  scarcity 
of  serviceable  positions  in  rear,  and  a  shortage  of  labor. 

The  impossibility  of  regular  reliefs  made  it  necessary  to 
overtax  the  strength  of  the  infantry. 

The  first  reinforcements  to  dribble  in  could  only  fill  the 
largest  gaps.  Even  the  infantry  of  freshly  assigned  divisions 
had  to  be  thrown  into  the  fight  unit  by  unit  as  soon  as  each 
arrived,  or  else  were  pushed  up  to  take  over  in  too  great  a 
hurry  from  utterly  exhausted  troops.  The  consequence  was 
that  portions  of  the  positions  were  not  infrequently  lost. 

18.  Many  units,  more  especially  those  coming  from  quiet  parts 
of  the  front,  lacked  training  and  fighting  experience.    Not  in- 
frequently the  fighting  efficiency  of  the  infantry  suffered  from 
faulty  arrangements  made  within  the  regiments  for  bringing 
up  rations,  ammunition,  etc. 

II.  Measures  by  which  a  gradual  improvement  wag  attained. 

19.  As  the  allotment  of  artillery  ammunition,  aeroplanes,  and 
antiaircraft  sections  increased  and  steps  were  taken  for  ma- 
chine guns  to  engage  aviators  flying  low,  the  infantryman's 


86  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

lot  began  to  improve.  His  self-confidence  returned  and  his 
fighting  efficiency  increased.  Command  and  cooperation  between 
all  arms  were  greatly  assisted  by  the  provision  of  large  quanti- 
ties of  means  of  communication  and  the  reorganization  of  the 
reporting  and  communication  systems. 

20.  Barrage  zones  were  made  deep  and  narrow,  and  behind 
them  the  infantry  lines  could  be  lightly  held.    The  fact  of  push- 
ing in  a  number  of  divisions  led  to  narrower  fronts  and  greater 
distribution   in   depth.     The   allotment  of  fresh   divisions   in 
rapid  succession  made  timely  and  regular  reliefs  possible,  and 
finally  reached  such  a  point  that  reserves  behind  the  front 
could  be  trained  in  the  light  of  the  most  recent  experience  and 
could  be  employed  on  the  construction  of  rearward  positions. 

21.  The  progressive  completion  of  positions  made  it  possible 
to  apply  the  lessons  of  recent  experience  (defense  of  an  area 
with  numerous  trenches  and  switch  lines,  rational  distribution, 
and  siting  of  dugouts). 

22.  The  fact  of  organizing  supplies  within  regiments  before 
they  went  into  line,  in  the  light  of  the  experience  of  troops 
already  relieved  (formation  of  fourth  platoons,  organization  of 
special  carrying  parties,  provision  of  intermediate  depots  of 
rations,  ammunitions,  etc.),  kept  the  infantry  up  to  fighting 
standard  for  a  longer  period  when  in  line  and  economized  the 
employment  of  other  units.     In  this  way,  again,  methodical 
counterattacks  could  be  made  by  fresh  troops. 

III.  Experiences  and  lessons. 

(Based  chiefly  on  reports  from  the  troops.) 
(a)    GENERAL. 

23.  Our  infantry  is  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy. — In  the 
Somme  Battle  wherever  the  enemy  gained  the  upper  hand  it 
was  chiefly  due  to  the  perfected  application  of  technical  means, 
in  particular  to  the  employment  of  guns  and  ammunition  in 
quantities  which  had  been  hitherto  inconceivable.    It  was  also 
due  to  the  exemplary  manner  in  which  infantry,  artillery,  and 
aeroplanes  cooperated.     After  artillery  preparation,  wherever 
the  enemy's  infantry,  following  up  the  last  shell,  came  upon 
positions  that  were  still  held,  the  attack  usually  broke  down, 
and  if  the  advance  was  made  against  positions  already  de- 
stroyed the  infantry  could  be  ejected  by  determined  and  rap- 
idly executed  counterattacks. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  87 

The  duty  of  every  infantry  commander  is,  firstly,  to  train 
and  educate  the  infantry  soldier  for  this  hand-to-hand  fighting 
(which  should  not  be  a  privilege  reserved  for  assault  units, 
but  should  be  a  universal  one)  ;  next,  and  more  difficult,  to 
keep  him  physically  and  mentally  fit  to  fight  both  before  and 
during  an  engagement;  and,  lastly,  the  most  difficult  of  all,  to 
get  liis  men  out  of  their  shelters  and  dugouts  in  time  and 
launch  them  against  the  enemy. 

(b)  TRAINING. 

24.  In  this  war,  which  is  apparently  dominated  by  science  and 
numbers,  individual  will  power  is,  nevertheless,   the  ultimate 
deciding  factor. 

The  defense  of  a  position  depends  more  than  it  ever  did  before 
on  the  unshakable  determination  of  the  subordinate  commander 
and  of  each  individual  man  to  hold  his  position. 

25.  It  is  a  sound  principle  to  keep  troops  intended  for  use 
on  a  certain  battle  front  behind  this  front  for  about  14  days 
to  enable  them  to  complete  their  training.    In  this  manner  im- 
mediate advantage  can  be  taken  of  the  lessons  of  the  most 
recent  fighting,  while  at  the  same  time  commanders  can  famil- 
iarize themselves  with  the  ground  on  which  they  are  to  be 
employed  and  with  the  special  features  of  operations  in  that 
locality. 

26.  Apart  from  the  general  regulations  in  force,  the  instruc- 
tions laid  down  for  assault  formations  form  the  best  guide  for 
the  training  of  the  infantry  soldier. 

Physical  fitness  and  confidence  in  his  arms  (rifle,  hand  gre- 
nade, spade,  etc.)  must  be  increased  by  constant  practice, 
self-confidence  and  resolute  determination  are  a  guaranty  of  suc- 
cess, even  against  a  numerically  superior  opponent. 

27.  The  education  and  training  of  subordinate  commanders 
is  of  particular  importance. 

To  come  supreme  through  the  crises  which  even  the  best- 
trained  infantry  will  undergo  when  suddenly  experiencing  such 
overwhelming  mental  and  physical  sensations,  especially  when 
torn  from  quiet  trench  warfare  and  hurled  into  a  battle  like 
that  of  the  Somme,  to  combat  the  demoralizing  effect  that 
results  from  continuously  remaining  in  shell  holes  and  craters, 
requires  whole-hearted  disinterestedness  and  self-sacrificing 
care  for  subordinates,  particularly  on  the  part  of  company, 
platoon,  and  subordinate  commanders. 


88  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS 

The  fighting  value  of  troops  depends  on  the  standard  of 
training  attained  by  the  men  and  on  the  military  proficiency  of 
the  subordinate  commanders. 

28.  The  following  are  the  most  important  branches  of  train- 
ing: 

(a)  The  education  of  the  group1  commander  and  of  the  indi- 
vidual private  to  the  highest  possible  degree  of  self-reliance. 
(In  positions  which  often  consist  of  unconnected  shell  holes 
control  by  platoon  and  company  commanders  is  rendered  ex- 
tremely difficult.) 

(&)  The  training  of  every  single  man  of  the  infantry  in  the 
use  of  all  patterns  of  German  hand  grenades. 

(c)  The  training  of  the  greatest  possible  number  of  men  in 
the  use  of  captured  hand  grenades. 

(d)  An  increase  in  the  personnel  trained  in  the  use  of  our 
own  and  of  the  enemy's  machine  guns.    Every  infantry  officer 
must  be  able  to  work  a  German  machine  gun.    The  gun  crews 
must  be  drilled  until,  when  prepared  for  action,  they  can  bring 
up  an  unloaded  gun  from  the  bottom  of  a  dugout  and  be  ready 
to  open  fire  within  30  seconds.     Special  practice  is  required  in 
the  use  of  improvised  mountings  and  sandbag  supports. 

(e)  Patrol  work. 

(/)  Rapid  counterattack  across  open  ground,  launched  on  the 
initiative  of  a  subordinate  commander,  down  to  a  group  com- 
mander or  some  stout-hearted  man. 

(g)  Methodical  counterattack,  following  an  artillery  prepa- 
ration. 

(h)  Rapid  organization  of  shell  holes  for  defense  (to  be  con- 
nected as  soon  as  possible  by  an  irregular  trench  so  as  to 
facilitate  command). 

(i)  The  passage  of  areas  which  are  under  heavy  shell  fire 
(in  file,  lines  of  skirmishers,  small  parties). 

(k)  Behavior  under  intense  bombardment  in  incompleted 
trenches  (taking  cover  in  shell  holes  in  advance  of  the  line). 

(I)  Practice  in  cooperating  with  artillery  and  with  infantry 
aeroplanes. 

(m)  Training  of  regimental  and  headquarters  communication 
sections. 

Where  a  unit  is  to  be  employed  for  a  special  operation,  it  is 
advisable  to'  train  it  in  specially  constructed  practice  trenches, 
and  the  details  of  the  tasks  allotted  to  it  should  be  thoroughly 
practiced. 

*A  group  consists  of  eight  men  under  a  noncommissioned  officer. — G  S. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          89 

(C)    BELIEFS. 

29.  It  is  often  contended  that  as  fresh  troops  are  coming  into 
the  line  a  relief  means  a  period  of  increased  strength,  whereas, 
on  the  contrary,  it  usually  means  a  temporary  weakness.  What 
really  is  of  vital  importance  during  a  relief  is  not  the  number 
of  units  in  front  line,  but  solely  that  the  arrangements  made 
for  responsibility  and  command  are  clearly  defined  and  that 
or<  er  and  close  supervision  are  maintained. 

For  these  reasons,  reliefs  must  be  organized  carefully,  thor- 
oughly, and  in  ample  time. 

oO.  The  conduct  of  reliefs  must  be  in  the  hands  of  the  out- 
going staff. 

] before  moving  in  units  must  be  provided  with  everything 
(equipment,  clothing,  rations,  close-range  weapons,  maps,  sig- 
nal stores,  tracing  tape,  etc.)  that  they  will  require  during  the 
time  they  are  employed  in  the  front  line. 

r?he  commanders  of  incoming  troops  will  be  given  an  oppor- 
tunity of  getting  into  touch  with  the  infantry,  pioneer,  and 
artillery  commanders  of  the  outgoing  troops,  and  of  reconnoiter- 
ing  the  ground. 

Advance  parties  of  the  relieving  troops  (including  machine- 
gun  units)  must  be  sent  on  ahead  as  early  as  possible  to  the 
position  to  be  taken  over.  Rear  parties  of  the  outgoing  troops 
will  be  retained  for  at  least  24  hours.  The  chief  duty  of  rear 
parties  is  to  insure  that  no  gaps  occur  in  taking  over  the  position 
and  that  touch  is  maintained  with  units  on  the  flanks.  Both 
parties  will  be  commanded  by  officers. 

Depressions,  ravines,  sunken  roads,  small  woods  or  isolated 
farms  should  not  be  chosen  as  boundaries  between  sectors,  for, 
being  uually  exposed  to  heavy  shell  fire,  they  call  for  special 
precautionary  measures  (construction  of  entanglements,  dis- 
tribution of  troops  in  depth,  flanking  fire  from  machine  guns). 

31.  Fresh  troops  will  be  led  up  by  the  most  reliable  guides 
of  the  outgoing  garrison.  These  guides  must  be  capable  of 
making  suggestions  as  to  the  formation  to  be  adopted  at  differ- 
ent points  (file,  lines  of  skirmishers,  or  small  parties).  Delays, 
crossings  and  blocks  occasion  unnecessary  losses  and  have  a 
depressing  influence  on  the  troops. 


90  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

Communication  trenches  are  best  marked  by  signboards  of 
the  type  shown  below. 


Triangle  Ball  Cross  Rectangle 

trench.  trench.  trench.  trench. 

32.  If  commanders  and  advance  parties  have  already  become 
acquainted  with  the  ground,  the  trenches,  and  the  enemy's  char- 
acteristics, portions  of  the  front  line  can  be  relieved  during  the 
first  night  without  cause  for  anxiety.    This  has  the  advantage 
that  fresh  troops  come  into  the  front  line.     If  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  make  sufficiently  detailed  arrangements  for  the  re- 
lief, it  is  advisable  to  relieve  only  portions  of  the  supports 
during  the  first  night. 

Liaison  and  order  are  best  guaranteed  by  pushing  in  the 
fresh  troops  checkerwise  among  the  outgoing  troops,  thus  reliev- 
ing during  the  first  night  parties  on  the  flanks  in  the  front 
line  and  those  in  the  center  in  the  support  line. 

Where  positions  merely  consist  of  shell  holes,  the  front  line 
and  the  flanks  of  the  position  should  be  marked  out  with  tape. 

It  considerably  stiffens  incoming  troops  in  their  first  uncer- 
tainty if  the  machine-gun  units  are  relieved  24  hours  later  than 
the  infantry. 

The  exchange  of  machine  guns  should  be  avoided,  but  am- 
munition, water  buckets,  etc.,  may  be  handed  over. 

33.  The  nerves  and  endurance  even  of  the  best  troops  have 
their  limits,  so  that  timely  reliefs  are  absolutely  essential.    The 
utter  exhaustion  of  troops  in  action  usually  culminates  in  the 
loss  of  the  position.    Worn-out  troops  are  incapable  of  strenu- 
ous efforts  for  months  afterwards.    To  rush  troops  into  action 
as  reinforcements  at  the  last  moment  is  to  engage  them  under 
the  most  trying  conditions ;  they  will  generally  be  used  up  in  a 
very  short  period,  without  there  being  any  possibility  of  their 
saving  the  position,  owing  to  their  ignorance  of  the  ground. 

34.  Every  endeavor  must  be  made  to  procure  a  thorough  rest 
outside  the  shelled  area  for  troops  that  have  been  relieved. 
Only  thus  can  troops  regain  their  fighting  efficiency  and  become 
fit  for  further  employment. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          91 

(d)    DISTBIBUTION. 

35.  The  distribution  of  the  infantry  depends  on  battle  condi- 
tions and  especially  on  the  efficacy  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  It 
is  also  affected  by  the  ground  and  by  the  nature  of  the  positions 
available. 

3»>.  The  fire  for  effect  which  precedes  the  enemy's  great  at- 
tacks and  lasts  for  days,  frequently  rising  to  an  intense  bom- 
bar  ilment,  soon  converts  the  front-line  trenches  into  a  succes- 
sion of  shell  holes.  This  becomes  a  permanent  state  of  affairs 
where  frequent  attacks  preceded  by  violent  bombardments  fol- 
low each  other  in  rapid  succession.  This  hurricane  of  fire, 
which  is  intended  to  clear  the  way  for  the  enemy's  infantry, 
sweeps  right  over  the  area  occupied  by  the  supports.  The 
barrage  zone  established  by  the  enemy  behind  his  objective  adds 
to  the  difficulty  of  bringing  up  reserves  from  the  rear.  The  in- 
fantry battle  will,  therefore,  usually  have  to  be  decided  by  the 
troops  up  in  the  front,  who  are  completely  isolated.  Hence  the 
nec9ssity  for  distribution  in  depth.  To  avoid  unnecessary  losses 
from  the  intense  bombardment,  the  front  line  will  be  held  as 
lightly  as  possible.  One  man  for  every  4  to  6  yards  of  front 
will  suffice  if  the  supports  can  be  accommodated  close  behind 
the  front  line.  To  compensate  for  this,  the  strength  of  the 
defense  must  lie  in  distribution  in  depth. 

37.  The  distribution  of  the  troops  must  be  such  that  in  all 
circumstances  the  struggle  for  the  position  can  be  fought  out 
in  the  front  line  without  bringing  up  appreciable  reserves  from 
farther  in  rear.     Supports,  posted  behind  the  front  line  either 
in  squads  or  in  open  formation,  can  only  reach  this  line  in  time 
if  they  are  close  behind  it. 

38.  If  possible,  units  will  not  be  mixed,  for  at  a  critical  junc- 
ture small  forces  in  the  front  line  led  by  commanders  that  the 
men  know  are  preferable  to  a  medley  of  detachments,  hurriedly 
engaged,  who  are  strange  to  each  other. 

It  is  preferable  to  engage  units  side  by  side,  so  that  they  can 
be  distributed  in  depth  in  narrow  sectors,  rather  than  engage 
them  one  behind  the  other.  The  same  system  of  reinforcing 
from  the  rear  applies  equally  to  bringing  up  supplies  and  re- 
placing casualties.  It  has  proved  sound  to  form  for  this  pur- 
pose fourth  platoons  from  the  companies  engaged  and  to  keep 
them  in  reserve. 

39.  Machine  guns,  for  the  employment  of  which  the  infantry 
sector  commander   (battalion  or  regimental  commander)  is  re- 


92          NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

sponsible,  will  be  spread  over  the  zone  of  defense  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  distribution  in  depth. 

Machine  guns  should  be  sparingly  employed  in  the  front-line 
trench,  where  they  will  generally  be  prematurely  put  out  of 
action  by  the  intense  bombardment.  They  will  seldom  have  a 
good  frontal  field  of  fire  in  positions  which  are  sited  on  reverse 
slopes ;  flanking  effect  should  consequently  be  employed.  Their 
effect  is  to  be  supplemented  by  that  of  machine  guns  sited  in 
pairs  farther  in  rear,  as  far  as  possible  in  commanding  positions, 
in  such  a  manner  that  zones  of  fire  can  be  formed  both  in  front 
of  and  within  defended  area. 

40.  The  experience  of  the  Somme  Battle  teaches  that  an  infan- 
try regiment  which  has  one  battalion  in  front  line,  one  in  sup- 
port, and  one  in  reserve,  can  hold  a  front  of  about  800  meters  for 
some  14  days  in  a  defensive  battle.    After  this  period  relief  is 
generally  necessary. 

(6)     CONSTRUCTION    OF    POSITIONS. 

41.  The  measures  required  in  the  construction  of  positions 
have  as  their  basis  the  necessity  of  having  infantry  organized 
in  depth  and  of  maintaining  the  garrison  of  the  position  ready 
for  action. 

42.  In  laying  out  new  and  in  improving  existing  positions  the 
infantry  line  must  be  traced  to  accord  with  the  situation  of  the 
artillery  observation  posts.    The  principal  artillery  observation 
posts  must  not  be  exposed  to  fire  directed  on  the  infantry  line. 
The  dust  and  smoke  and  the  moral  effect  on  the  observer,  if 
posted  in  the  infantry  line,  render  observation  in  it  difficult,  if 
not  impossible.    An  observer  is  useless  if  his  means  of  communi- 
cation are  broken. 

43.  The  front  infantry  trenches  are  well  placed  if  they  are 
situated  on  a  reverse  slope  out  of  sight  of  the  ground  observa- 
tion of  the  enemy's  artillery  and  are  overlooked  directly  by  their 
own  artillery  observers  from  a  position  at  least  550  yards  in 
rear.    At  the  same  time  these  observers  should  be  able  to  see 
well  into  the  ground  over  which  the  enemy  must  attack  for  at 
least  200  yards  in  front  of  their  own  wire,  and  it  should  be 
possible  to  overlook,  either  from  the  front  or  a  flank,  at  least 
a  part  of  the  ground  behind  this  belt  over  which  the  enemy  must 
make  his  approach  marches.    A  very  short  field  of  fire  is  suffi- 
cient for  the  infantry.     A  line  of  this  nature  in  undulating 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  93 

country  will  be  generally  a  reverse-slope  position.  If  the  enemy 
breaks  into  such  a  reverse-slope  position,  his  infantry  will  have 
to  fight  exposed  to  our  concentric,  well-observed,  and  most  effec- 
tive1, fire,  without  the  support  of  artillery  which  is  assisted  by 
ground  observation. 

41.  For  an  obstinate  defense  of  the  front  position  it  is  not 
suflicient  to  dig  a  few  parallel  lines  of  trenches  one  behind 
another;  a  broad  defensive  zone  must  be  constructed,  com- 
posed of  a  network  of  trenches  disposed  in  depth,  with  plenty 
of  switches  and  cross  trenches.  Every  fire  trench,  communica- 
tion trench,  and  approach  trench  must,  no  matter  in  what  direc- 
tion it  leads,  be  prepared  for  defense  at  least  on  one  side,  and 
be  provided  with  an  obstacle  and  dugouts  for  its  garrison  or 
assault  detachment.  An  enemy  who  penetrates  the  front  line 
of  i;renches  must  find  himself  opposed  not  only  in  front  but  in 
flank  at  the  next  line,  and  it  must  be  possible  to  counterattack 
him  from  all  sides.  If  he  can  not  be  turned  out  at  once,  he 
wil  at  least  be  bottled  up  in  a  pocket,  and  thus  the  best  condi- 
tion for  a  deliberately  planned  counterattack  will  be  created. 

45.  Even  a  position  formed  of  broad,  deep,  defensive  zones  is 
not  enough  to  stop  the  attempts  of  a  strong  enemy  to  break 
through,  if  he  has  made  careful  preparations.     The  power  of 
concentrated  artillery  fire  is   sc  great  that  losses  of  ground 
will  be  inevitable  even  in  the  finest  positions.    Behind  the  front 
position,  therefore,  there  must  be  at  least  two  rearward  posi- 
tions, spaced  so  far  apart  from  one  another  that  the  enemy 
will  be  compelled  to  change  the  position  of  his  artillery  in  order 
to  attack  them.     It  must  be  a  fixed  principle  in  battle  that  as 
many  new  positions  are  organized  behind  as  positions  are  lost 
in  front. 

46.  It  is  desirable  in  constructing  new  positions  that  have  to 
be  organized  during  a  battle  to  begin  by  making  an  entangle- 
ment in  advance  of  the  front  fighting  line,  and  simultaneously 
to  commence  the  dugouts  of  the  second  line.    From  this  frame- 
work a  position  of  two  lines  will  gradually  be  developed.    The 
trenches  themselves  come  last. 

47.  In   addition   to   the   continuous   rearward   positions,    all 
localities  for  about  9  miles  behind  the  front  line  of  trenches 
must  be  organized  for  defense.     In  connection  with  this,  all 
available  shell-proof  cellars  must  be  converted   into  dugouts 
and  provided  with  the  necessary  number  of  entrances.    As  far 
as  possible,  machine-gun  emplacements  should  be  provided  to 
sweep  the  ground  between  the  localities. 


94 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 


48.  In  the  front  trenches  of  a  position  only  sufficient  shell- 
proof  dugouts  are  required  as  will  shelter  the  garrison,  which 
should  be  kept  as  weak  in  numbers  as  can  be.    In  the  rearward 
trenches  it  is  hardly  possible  to  make  too  many  dugouts  for 
the  mass  of  the  infantry.    The  following  conditions  have  proved 
most  suitable :  24  to  33  feet  of  earth  or  5  feet  of  concrete  over- 
head  cover;   at  least  two  entrances  a  good  distance  apart; 
chambers  for  10  to  20  men. 

The  deeper  the  dugouts  the  more  important  are  a  good,  wide 
entanglement,  continuous  observation  of  the  foreground,  and 
reliable  alarms.  Dugouts  without  these  precautions  are  mere 
man  traps. 

The  construction  of  dugouts  is  absolutely  indispensable  along 
lines  of  approach  for  the  temporary  shelter  of  reliefs  and  car- 
rying parties  if  caught  by  shell  fire,  in  the  communication 
trenches,  for  runners,  and  along  the  route  of  cable  trenches  for 
the  linemen. 

49.  Entanglements  in  advance  of  the  front  trenches  must  be 
as  strong  as  possible,  must  be  erected  in  regular  lines,  and  must 
cover  wide  spaces  of  ground  for  60  to  200  yards  in  depth.    This 
will  force  the  enemy  to  an  enormous  expenditure  of  ammunition 
to  destroy  them,  and  will  insure  that,  even  after  several  days' 
wire  cutting,  he  will  still  find  a  tangle  of  wood,  wire,  and  iron 
in  front  of  him. 

The  flanking  of  the  front  line  of  the  entanglements  by  a  suit- 
able arrangement  of  machine-gun  fire  should  not  be  overlooked. 


?  Mac  fit  fie  (jufis  in  command  my  position. 


To  leave  a  free  field  for  the  counterattacks  of  the  garrison  of 
the  rearward  trenches,  it  is  an  advantage  to  arrange  the  en- 
tanglements of  the  rearward  lines  checkerwise.  There  must  be 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.          95 

plenty  of  material  ready  to  block  the  gaps  (knife  rests  and  con- 
certinas). 


50.  The  construction  of  infantry  observation  posts,  command 
posts,  and  latrines  is  of  special  importance,  as  are  also  bomb- 
proof 1   shelters    for    ammunition,    weapons   for    close    combat 
(gronades,  etc.),  supplies,  water  tanks,  and  kitchens  in  the  rear- 
war  i  trenches  and  support  positions. 

Built-up  machine-gun  emplacements  are  soon  smashed  to 
piecas  unless  they  are  shellproof  (against  heavy  artillery).  As 
a  rule,  the  best  course  is  to  provide  shellproof1  shelters  for  the 
machine  guns  in  which  they  are  to  be  kept  until  required  for 
action,  when  they  are  fired  over  the  parapet. 

Covered  battle  emplacements  of  concrete  or  armor  plates  are 
usually  only  possible  on  steep  reverse  slopes.  They  must  not 
be  conspicuously  high. 

In  view  of  the  importance  of  signal  communications,  special 
dugouts  are  necessary  for  them.  These  should  be  suited  to  their 
various  natures  (telephone  offices,  visual  signaling,  trench  wire- 
less, power  buzzer,  and  listening  sets). 

Open  cable  trenches  have  proved  more  serviceable  than  buried 
cable,  as  the  difficulty  of  repairing  the  latter  is  very  great. 

51.  A  well-considered  scheme  and  plenty  of  dugout  dressing 
stations  are  required  for  the  care  of  the  wounded.     For  periods 
of  special  activity  there  must  be  at  least  one  medical  dugout  in 
each   company   sector.     It   should   be  built   in   the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  second    (support)    trench,  be  large  enough  to 
accommodate   14  men  lying  down,   and   must   be  bombproof.1 

iln  the  second  edition  of  "  Stellungsbau,"  dated  15/12/16,  T)oml- 
cnsicher  (bombproof)  is  defined  as  proof  against  continuous  bombard- 
ment by  8-inch  howitzers  and  heavy  trench  mortars,  and  against  single 
hits  by  heavier  natures;  schussicher  (shellproof)  as  proof  against  con- 
tinuous bombardment  by  6-inch  howitzers. — G.  S.  I. 


96  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

There  must  also  be  sufficient  space  for  the  Medical  Corps  per- 
sonnel, first-aid  dressings,  trench  stretchers,  blankets,  mineral 
water,  disinfecting  material,  reserve  antigas  material,  supplies, 
etc.  There  should  be  larger  medical  dugouts  capable  of  holding 
25  to  40  men  and  a  larger  quantity  of  medical  stores  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  battalion  reserve.  In  each  regimental  sector 
dugouts  should  be  arranged  about  2,000  to  3,000  yards  behind 
the  front  line  (cellars  are  most  suitable,  in  each  of  which  about 
100  wounded  can  be  accommodated  lyiijg  down) .  The  entrances, 
of  which  there  should  be  at  least  two,  of  all  medical  dugouts, 
must  be  constructed  so  that  stretchers  can  be  easily  carried  in 
and  out. 

52.  Defensive  positions  formed  by  connecting  shell  holes, 
which  are  the  rule  in  the  front  line  during  heavy  fighting,  have 
the  advantage  that  they  are  difficult  to  recognize  and  are  cor- 
respondingly less  effectively  shelled.  Infantry,  therefore,  feels 
safe  in  them,  and  is  disinclined  to  dig  the  more  easily  seen  con- 
tinuous trenches.  The  advantages  of  shell-hole  positions  are, 
however,  practically  negligible  in  comparison  with  the  following 
disadvantages : 

Lack  of  accurate  definition  of  the  firing  line ;  continual  changes 
in  the  position  of  the  line ;  uncertainty  when  arranging  barrage 
fire ;  increased  difficulty,  if  not  absolute  impossibility,  of  control 
of  the  men;  nearly  complete  absence  of  any  kind  of  leading, 
which  makes  itself  particularly  noticeable  as  the  men  are  so  dis- 
persed, and  nearly  always  involves  loss  of  ground  and  casualties 
in  missing ;  more  rapid  expenditure  of  the  physical  power  of  the 
men,  for  they  can  not  shelter  themselves  from  weather  in  the 
shell  holes,  and  in  heavy  rain  are  often  up  to  the  waist  in  mud, 
whereas  in  continuous  trenches  some  sort  of  drainage  can  be 
arranged  quickly.  In  shell-hole  positions,  in  which  obstacles 
are  generally  lacking,  the  scattered  groups  are  exposed  to  any 
surprise  by  hostile  patrols,  and  a  counterattack  lacks  supporting 
points  and  jumping-off  trenches. 

Rules  can  hardly  be  laid  down  for  the  construction  of  shell- 
hole  positions  during  the  fight.  The  obvious  procedure  here  is 
at  once  to  establish  nests  of  infantry  consisting  of  one  or  two 
groups,  supported,  if  circumstances  render  it  advisable,  by  one 
or  two  machine  guns  in  or  behind  the  line  of  shell  holes  occupied, 
and  to  construct  obstacles  and  dugouts  for  them.  By  degrees 
these  nests  are  linked  up  with  one  another  and  with  the  switch 
trenches  and  retired  positions  behind  them. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  97 

(f)     DEFENSE. 

53.  An  active  conduct  of  the  defense  is  absolutely  essential 
even  against  an  enemy  who  is  far  superior  in  numbers.     Intense 
activity  of  patrols  and  raids  on  weak  points  of  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion interfere  with  his  preparations  for  attack  and  compel  him 
to  k'iep  in  a  condition  of  continual  readiness  for  our  attacks, 
and  so  to  hold  his  positions  more  strongly  even  at  times  when 
he  is  not  contemplating  an  attack  himself. 

54.  In  shell-hole  positions,  in  which  the  infantry  finds  but 
little    shelter  from  the  enemy's  fire,  an  active  defense  is  of 
greater    importance.     Every   man   must   understand   that   the 
losses  caused  by  the  enemy's  artillery  fire  diminish,  the  closer 
our  ::ront  lines  are  to  those  of  the  enemy.    The  completion  of 
the  position  should,  therefore,  be  combined  with  a  pushing  for- 
ward of  our  lines  where  the  situation  permits. 

55.  It  is  the  task  of  the  artillery  and  of  the  minenwerfer  to 
nip  1he  enemy's  attack  in  the  bud  as  far  as  possible.     If  the 
eneny  none  the  less  succeeds  in  leaving  his  trenches  for  the 
assault,  it  should  be  possible  to  repulse  every  attack  by  holding 
the  j'ront  line  with  a  weak  garrison,  provided  with  some  ma- 
chine; guns  and  a  large  supply  of  close-range  weapons,  in  com- 
bination with  well-directed  and  rapidly  opened  barrage  fire, 
and  also  with  machine  guns  sited  on  points  of  rising  ground 
farther  in  rear. 

56.  It  is  absolutely  essential  to  remember  that  in  spite  of 
"  defended  areas  "  the  fighting  must  take  place  in  the  foremost 
line  and,  if  this  is  overrun,  for  its  recapture. 

57.  The  necessary  preliminary  for  the  repulse  of  a  hostile  at- 
tack is  that  our  own  infantry,  distributed  in  depth,  shall  be 
kept  fit  for  fighting  in  spite  of  effective  and  intense  bombard- 
ment for  days  by  the  enemy's  artillery.    Continual  work  on  the 
positions,  and  a  good  organization  of  the  supply  of  rations  and 
ammunition,  are  the  most  important  points  in  maintaining  their 
fighting  strength. 

58.  As  a  matter  of  principle,  every  unit  must  fight  in  that 
portion  of  the  foremost  position  which  is  given  to  it  to  defend. 

The  voluntary  evacuation  of  a  position,  or  of  portions  of  a 
position,  can  lead  to  most  disastrous  results  for  the  troops  on 
the  flanks.  The  voluntary  evacuation  of  positions  must,  there- 
fore, only  take  place  with  the  express  permission  of  the  higher 
3577°— 17 7 


98  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

commanders,  who  are  in  a  position  to  realize  its  effects  on  the 
troops  on  the  flanks  and  on  other  arms  (artillery). 

59.  Such  an  evacuation  can  scarcely  ever  be  carried  out  me- 
thodically except  by  night  or  in  very  misty  weather,  for  experi- 
ence shows  that  during  the  fighting  every  visible  movement  by 
day  is  immediately  subjected  to  the  most  intense  fire,  and  all 
movements  cause  heavy  losses  owing  to  the  fact  that  communi- 
cation trenches  are  usually  entirely  lacking. 

60.  No  objection  can  be  taken  to  the  temporary  evacuation  in 
a  forward  direction  of  portions  of  the  foremost  line  which  are 
exposed  to  very  heavy  shell  fire  in  the  case  of  good  troops  who 
are  well  trained  in  initiative  and  in  rapid  counterattack.     The 
movement  will  then  consist  in  individual  groups  dashing  for- 
ward into  shell  holes  which  lie  in  front  of  their  position. 

61.  A  movement  to  the  flank  under  hostile  fire  can  only  be 
carried  out  on  a  very  narrow  front,  and  then  by  moving  quickly 
from  crater  to  crater,  or  by  creeping  along  the  remains  of  the 
trenches.     During  the  battle  the  front  covered  by  the  enemy's 
intense  bombardment  will  usually  be  so  broad  that  nothing  is 
gained  by  moving  the  trench  garrison  to  the  flank.     The  maneu- 
ver, however,  is  always  exposed  to  the  great  risk  that  the  enemy 
observes  the  evacuation,  lifts  his  fire  farther  forward,  and  im- 
mediately occupies  the  position  which  has  been  evacuated. 

62.  The  risk  is  very  much  increased  if  the  garrison  of  a  trench 
retires  from  its  foremost  line.    All  intense  artillery  fire,  even 
if  directed  against  a  narrow  front,  covers  the  ground  in  rear. 
As   a   general  rule,   all  lines   which   lie   behind   the  foremost 
trenches  are  methodically  shelled.     If  our  trench  garrison  moves 
to  the  rear  in  the  zone  of  fire,  it  quickly  becomes  demoralized. 
All  experience  proves  that  such  troops  can  no  longer  be  ex- 
pected to  carry  out  a  counterattack.     The  result  is  almost  in- 
variably the  loss  of  the  portion  of  the  position  which  has  been 
evacuated  and,  as  a  further  result,  the  creation  of  a  very  diffi- 
cult position  for  the  troops  on  the  flanks.     These,  if  the  enemy 
attacks  on  a  broader  front,  are  usually  attacked  frontally  and 
on  the  flank,  and  have  to  fight  under  the  most  unfavorable 
conditions. 

63.  During  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  the.  methodical  evacua- 
tion of  portions  of  the  position  depended  on  obtaining  permis- 
sion from  army  headquarters,  and  every  evacuation  of  positions, 
even  to  the  smallest  extent,  carried  out  on  the  responsibility  of 
the   individual   commander,   was   forbidden.     Every   man   was 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 


obliged  to  fight  at  that  point  at  which  he  was  stationed ;  the 
enemy's  line  of  advance  could  only  lead  over  his  dead  body. 
Army  headquarters  believes  that  it  was  owing  to  this  firm  de- 
termination to  fight,  with  which  every  leader  was  inspired,  that 
the  enemy,  in  spite  of  his  superior  numbers,  bled  to  death  in 
front  of  the  serried  ranks  of  our  soldiers. 

64.  If  the  enemy  succeeds  in  overrunning  the  front  lines  in  an 
attack,  he  can  only  be  ejected  by  immediate  counterattacks 
which  must  envelop  him  on  all  sides.     If  he  has  once  managed 
to  consolidate  his  hold  on  our  positions,  a  methodical  counter- 
attack, which  takes  time,  is  necessary. 

65.  Penetration  of  our  lines  by  the  enemy  occurs  during  the 
battle  not  only  in  the  case  of  attacks,  which  are  carefully  pre- 
pared, but  is  frequently  effected  by  patrols  or  small  detachments 
with  machine  guns  which  penetrate  or  sap  their  way  into  gaps, 
particularly  in  shell-hole  positions.    These  small  detachments 
are  gradually  followed  by  larger  forces.    This  kind  of  "  nest  "  is 
ofte:i  scarcely  noticed  to  begin  with,  or  does  not  have  sufficient 
atte  ition  paid  to  it.    The  seriousness  of  the  situation  is  usually 
first  recognized  when  it  is  too  late.     Instead  of  cutting  off  the 
"  nest "  or  countering  it  by  a  vigorous  attack,  a  methodical  attack 
has  to  be  made. 

The  necessary  preparations  for  methodical  attacks  on  nests 
of  this  kind  must  be  made  at  once,  as  soon  as  the  nest  is  dis- 
covered. The  most  important  are  to  reconnoiter  the  position 
as  quickly  as  possible,  to  block  the  nest  off  on  all  sides,  so  that 
a  shell  hole  is  occupied  at  once  as  close  as  possible  behind  the 
breach.  A  trench  should  then  be  dug  leading  to  the  shell  hole. 
Other  trenches  should  be  dug  in  which  assault  detachments  can 
be  assembled;  patrols  should  feel  their  way  toward  the  flanks 
of  the  enemy  who  has  penetrated  our  position  and  should  dig 
themselves  in.  Every  available  means  to  assist  in  the  attack 
should  be  carefully  concentrated,  such  as  assault  detachments, 
Flammenwerfer,  Oranatenwerfer,  light  Minemverfer,  infantry 
gun  batteries,  etc. 

(g)    IMMEDIATE  AND  METHODICAL  COUNTERATTACKS. 

66.  An  immediate  counterattack  can  scarcely  ever  be  ordered 
by  the  higher  commanders.     It  must  be  the  result  of  the  quick 
initiative   of  the   commanders,   subordinate   commanders,   and 
men  in  the  front  line.     Every  man  must  be  trained  to  eject,  on 
his  own  initiative,  an  enemy  who  has  penetrated  our  positions, 


100  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

and  not  to  rest  content  until  the  foremost  line  has  been  entirely 
cleared.  Quick,  mobile  bombing  parties,  moving  rapidly  over 
the  open  or  along  the  trenches,  vie  with  assault  detachments 
specially  distributed  and  allotted  to  special  objectives.  The 
commanders  of  the  supports  must  take  in  the  situation  and 
make  up  their  minds  quickly  and  attack  the  enemy,  distributing 
their  groups,  platoons,  and  companies  to  meet  the  situation,  al- 
lotting special  tasks  to  detachments  and  giving  them  short  and 
precise  instructions  as  to  objectives.  For  this  purpose  it  is 
necessary  that  the  quarters  of  supports  and  reserves,  when  the 
fighting  develops  its  full  intensity,  should  be  distributed  over 
different  points  in  the  ground  (in  trenches  and  dugouts  or  on 
the  slopes  of  hills).  The  collection  of  numbers  of  dugouts  or 
camps  at  one  point  will  not  escape  the  enemy's  notice ;  by  open- 
ing heavy  fire  on  such  points  he  puts  the  massed  supports  ac- 
commodated there  out  of  action  at  the  critical  moment. 

It  is  very  important  that,  in  addition  to,  the  transmission  of 
information  from  front  to  rear,  communication  should  also  be 
established  from  rear  to  front.  Troops  which  wait  for  reports 
to  reach  them  from  the  front  will  always  come  up  too  late  for 
a  counterattack.  Continual  observation  of  our  own  and  the 
enemy's  positions  is  absolutely  essential  on  the  part  of  the 
sentries  of  the  supports  and  reserves.  Commanders  must  keep 
themselves  continually  informed  as  to  the  situation  and  at 
critical  moments  keep  a  lookout  themselves,  for  only  thus  can 
they  have  a  clear  idea  of  what  is  happening  and  come  to  quick 
and  correct  decisions. 

67.  The  execution  of  methodical  counterattacks  can  not  be 
dispensed  with  even  in  a  purely  defensive  battle.    They  are 
necessary  in  order  to  recapture  important  points  which  have 
been  lost,  or  at  least  not  to  leave  the  enemy  full  freedom  of  ac- 
tion.   If  they  are  well  prepared,  they  do  not  involve  more 
casualties  or   a  greater  expenditure  of  ammunition  than  do 
passive  endurance  of  an  intense  bombardment  and  numerous 
unnecessary  requests  for  barrage  fire,  which  become  more  fre- 
quent as  the  self-confidence  of  the  troops  diminishes  as  a  result 
of  adopting  a  purely  passive  attitude. 

In  every  attack,  rearward  positions,  strong  points,  and  flank- 
ing positions  must  be  held  by  emergency  garrisons  as  a  precau- 
tion against  possible  defeats. 

68.  Methodical  attacks  may  either  be  carried  out  as  surprise 
attacks  without  artillery  preparation  or  with  the  employment 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  101 

of  intense  artillery  preparation.    A  compromise  between  the 
two  methods  nearly  always  leads  to  failure. 

69.  Surprise  attacks  should  be  limited  to  a  narrow  front,  and 
can  only  be  carried  out  if  the  habits  of  the  enemy  are  exactly 
known,  if  the  approach  to  the  enemy's  position  is  short  and 
free  of  obstacles,  and  if  it  is  possible  to  penetrate  into  the 
enemy's   position   at   several   points   simultaneously   and   with 
practically  no  casualties.     Thorough  rehearsals,  a  detailed  al- 
lotment of  tasks  down  to  individuals,  taking  full  advantage*  of 
the  weather    (e.  g.,  mist  or  twilight)",  aM';  simultaneous  ;and 
rapid  action  are  preliminary  conditions'  necessary  /orj  the  ,suc-i 
cess  of  a  surprise  attack.  - "  >J  '.  V  >  /•' 

70.  Raids  on  a  larger  scale  will,  as1  a  rule/  only  be  successful 
after  intense  artillery  preparation.     The  preparatory  measures 
to  be  carried  out  by  the  artillery  (accurate  registration  on  all 
the  targets  which  are  to  be  shelled  in  the  course  of  the  raid) 
and  the  expenditure  of  ammunition  must  be  so  regulated  that 
the  portions  of  positions  to  be  captured  are  really  shelled  into 
a  condition  in  which  they  are  ready  to  be  assaulted.     It  will 
often  be  necessary  to  evacuate  our  own  front  lines  during  the 
fire  for  effect ;  this  can  be  done  without  hesitation  if  our  artil- 
lery fire  is  properly  directed  against  the  enemy's  trenches. 

71.  Troops  who  have  been  lying  widely  scattered  in  trenches 
which  have  been  destroyed  and  in  shell  holes,  with  insufficient 
food,  and  who  are  longing  for  the  day  when  they  will  be  re- 
lieved, will  only  be  induced  to  attack  cheerfully  and  resolutely 
at  a  fixed  time,  without  the  possibility  of  being  thoroughly  in- 
structed as  to  the  reasons  and  objective  of  the  attack,  if  their 
leaders  are  extraordinarily  efficient,  and  then  only,  as  a  rule,  in 
driblets.    A  necessary  preliminary  for  a  successful  attack  on  a 
large  scale  is  fresh  infantry  to  make  the  assault  (a  regiment 
to  every  1,000  yards  of  front)  and  the  detailing  of  a  relief  for 
the  assault  troops.    The  original  troops  in  the  line  may  be  em- 
ployed for  this  purpose  if  they  have  not  been  exhausted  by 
previous  fighting. 

72.  It  is  advisable  not  to  relieve  the  troops  who  have  made  a 
successful  assault  immediately,  but  two  or  three  days  later. 
Troops  who  have  won  ground  after  heavy  fighting  will  hold  the 
captured  position  more  tenaciously  than  new  troops  who  also, 
in  many  cases,  do  not  know  the  ground  sufficiently  well. 

To  avoid  any  weakening  during  these  two  days  of  the  troops 
who  have  made  the  assault,  special  parties,  commanded  by  offi- 


102  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

cers,  must  be  detailed  to  evacuate  prisoners  and  wounded,  to 
clear  the  ground  and,  above  all,  to  bring  up  supplies  of  building 
material.  Thorough  and  special  infantry  preparations  for  this 
work  are  necessary,  even  with  well-trained  troops. 

Machine  guns  form  a  support  and  protection  for  the  assault- 
ing troops  in  immediate  and  methodical  counterattacks  and 
hold  the  enemy  to  his  trenches  by  flanking  fire,  especially  at 
the  moment  when  the  assaulting  troops  leave  their  trenches. 
The*  section  commanders;  of  the  machine  guns  specially  detailed 
beforehand  4:i€oJlfvW  tig!  the  assault,  advance  with  the  assault- 
ing .infantry  §9,  as  to  reconnoiter  the  captured  position  at  once 
for  diiitatel*  gini  posjtifyzs,  (« 

Machine  guns  should  be  brought  up  to  the  captured  position 
as  soon  as  the  infantry  has  taken  it.  They  must  be  dug  in  be- 
fore a  hostile  counterattack  is  delivered  or  the  enemy's  anni- 
hilating fire  is  opened  against  the  captured  position.  To  bring 
up  machine  guns  from  the  lines  in  rear  into  the  position  from 
which  the  attack  is  to  be  made,  and  thence  to  the  captured 
trenches,  demands  thorough  reconnaissance  and  clear  orders  as 
to  time,  route,  objective,  and  duties. 

It  is  advisable  to  detail  a  few  infantrymen  to  the  machine 
guns  to  act  under  the  order  of  the  section  commander.  Their 
duties  are  to  protect  the  machine  guns,  to  defend  it  in  hand-to- 
hand  fighting  (hand  grenades),  to  help  in  digging  in  the  gun 
in  the  captured  trench,  and  to  dig  connecting  trenches  in  shell- 
hole  positions. 

73.  The  basis  for  the  preparations  for  the  attack  is  thor- 
ough reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  position  by  patrols,  ob- 
servers, and  aeroplane  photographs.  The  nature  of  the  ground, 
the  trace  of  the  enemy's  trenches,  the  condition  and  nature  of 
his  entanglements,  the  situation  of  dugouts,  machine  guns  and 
trench  guns,  the  degree  of  the  enemy's  vigilance  are  factors 
which  demand  thorough  reconnaissance  and  must  be  taken  into 
consideration  in  deciding  on  the  manner  in  which  the  attack  is 
to  be  carried  out. 

The  well-considered  employment  of  all  technical  means  and 
close  cooperation  of  the  artillery  with  the  infantry  and  of  the 
airmen  with  the  artillery  and  infantry  require  the  nicest  ad- 
justment of  arrangements  as  regards  both  time  and  space.  If 
a  hostile  position  has  been  conquered  by  technical  means,  all 
the  infantry  has  to  do  is  to  occupy  it.  It  is  advisable  to  issue 
good  maps  (1:  5,000),  specially  prepared  for  the  operations  and 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  103 

containing  all  the  information  gained  by  reconnaissance,  and  to 
distribute  them  down  to  group  commanders. 

74.  While  the  troops  in  the  front-line  trenches  are  preparing 
the  starting  point  for  the  attack  (which  is  absolutely  essential 
and  should  consist,  if  possible,  of  several  trenches  with  dug- 
outs )  the  troops  who  are  to  deliver  the  attack  should  be  kept 
in  rear,  with  good  rations  and  quarters,  and  trained  on  a  prac- 
tice defense  work  which  resembles  the  actual  position  to  be 
attacked  as  closely  as  possible.     The  detailing  of  special  as- 
sau  t  detachments  which   are  to  deal  entirely  with  machine 
guns  which  have  not  been  put  out  of  action  has  proved  to  be 
very  effective.     It  is  necessary  to  practice  the  individual  de- 
tachments— even  the  individual  men — in  the  tasks  allotted  to 
them  again  and  again. 

Feint  preparations  for  an  attack  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
front  which  is  to  be  attacked,  the  employment  of  gas  or  smoke 
bombs,  machine-gun  and  Flammenwerfer  activity,  in  combina- 
tion with  bursts  of  artillery  fire  and  unusual  aerial  activity, 
leave  the  enemy  in  doubt  as  to  the  actual  point  to  be  attacked 
am.  cause  him  to  distribute  his  artillery  fire. 

75.  The  attack  should  not  go  beyond  the  objective  unless  a 
complete  understanding  has  been  arrived  at  with  the  artillery. 

At  the  moment  for  the  attack,  which,  if  possible,  should  not 
be  made  evident  by  increased  intensity  of  artillery  fire,  the 
most  important  point  is  for  all  detachments  and  waves  of  as- 
sault to  leave  the  trenches  simultaneously  and  sufficiently  rap- 
idly to  avoid  the  enemy's  barrage  fire  and  to  prevent  any  of  the 
enemy's  machine  guns  which  have  not  been  put  out  of  action 
from  opening  fire.  Once  the  waves  of  assault  have  forced 
their  way  into  the  enemy's  first  line,  they  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  enemy's  destructive  or  barrage  fire,  but  can  deal  with 
the  enemy's  infantry  without  interference. 

76.  Counterthrusts  and  counterattacks  are  still  too  seldom 
employed  as  a  means  of  escaping  from  the  enemy's  fire  for 
effect  and  taking  advantage  of  the  moral  superiority  of  our 
own  infantry.     Troops  who  have  lain  passively  under  intense 
artillery  fire  leave  the  first  line  with  a  greater  loss  of  moraJe 
than  a  unit  which  has  carried  out  a  counterattack,  even  if  this 
is  only  partially  successful. 

(h)    EQUIPMENT. 

77.  The  steel  helmet  has  proved  thoroughly  satisfactory  and 
is  very  popular.     To  diminish  the  polish  of  the  helmet,  which 


104  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

remains  bright  in  spite  of  the  gray  paint,  it  has  been  found 
useful  to  smear  the  helmet  with  clay  and  earth. 

78.  Assault  kit  must  be  supplemented  by  sand  bags  carried 
like  a  rucksack,  which  serve  to  carry  up  rations  and  ammuni- 
tion in  place  of  the  pack,  which  is  too  heavy.     It  is  always  ad- 
visable to  take  greatcoats  and  waterproof  sheets.     Blankets  are 
only  necessary  in  cold  weather. 

One  hundred  and  fifty  cartridges  per  man  are  enough.  Be- 
fore the  men  go  into  action  it  is  necessary  to  issue  large  num- 
bers of  hand  grenades  in  sandbags  and  to  equip  every  man  with 
a  large  spade  (every  section  with  a  pickax,  pioneer,  and 
building  material)  as  well  as  with  cold  rations  for  three  or 
four  days. 

79.  On  days  when  there  is  heavy  fighting,  the  demand  for 
food  is  not  so  great  as  that  for  something  to  drink.     It  is  neces- 
sary to  equip  the  men  with  two  water  bogles  full  of  tea  or 
coffee,  and  to  issue  several  bottles  of  mineral  water,  as  well  as 
to  avoid  all  food  which  causes  thirst  (no  salted  or  smoked  meat). 
Bacon,  sausage  which  will  keep,  bread,  rusks,  biscuits,  chocolate, 
tinned  meat  and  tinned  fat  are  recommended.    No  rations  must 
be  issued  in  larger  packages  than  half-packages,  so  as  to  make 
each  man  independent  of  the  others.     Tobacco  and  cigars  in 
fairly  large  quantities  are  a  very  welcome  supplement,  as  also 
is  alcohol  in  wet,  cold  weather.    To  avoid  the  misuse  of  con- 
centrated alcohol,  it  is  advisable  to  mix  rum  or  red  wine  with  the 
tea.     It  has  proved  verj  useful  to  issue  solidified  methylated 
spirits  to  warm  up  tinned  food  and  the  food  sent  up  from  the 
traveling  kitchens.     It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  issue  illuminat- 
ing materials  such  as  candles,  carbide,  and  electric  lamps  with 
spare  batteries. 

80.  To  keep  the  rifle  from  getting  dirty,  it  is  a  good  plan  to 
wrap  waterproof  cloth  around  the  breech. 

Orderlies,  runners,  and  carrying  parties  are  best  armed  with 
pistols,  as  the  rifle  gets  in  the  men's  way  as  they  dash  from  one 
shell  hole,  to  another. 

81.  The  issue  of  light  pistols  on  the  establishment  scale  is  not 
sufficient  for  the  requirements  during  a  battle.     It  is  necessary 
to  increase  the  number  of  pistols  and  the  amount  of  light-pistol 
ammunition  before  heavy  fighting  begins. 

82.  For  machine-gun  personnel  the  following  equipment  has 
proved  useful  in  addition  to  the  sandbag  which  is  used  for  car- 
rying stores. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  105 

(a)  Gun  teams  of  the  strength  of  one  noncommissioned  officer 
and  seven  men. 

Gun  commander. — One  water  can,  telescope  attached  to  the 
belt,  one  reserve  barrel  in  a  roughly  made  wooden  bos  or 
wrapped  up  in  cloth  or  the  waterproof  sheet,  one  condenser  tube, 
one  spare,  lock  in  his  trouser  pocket,  one  folding  cleaning  rod 
and  a  pair  of  pliers  in  his  sandbag. 

No.  1:  One  auxiliary  mounting,  one  light  pistol  and  cartridges. 
AT9.  2:  The  machine  gun  itself  wrapped  up  in  a  tent  square, 
tool  bag  attached  to  his  belt,  one  spare  lock  in  his  trouser 
pocket. 

Nos.  3  and  4-  One  ammunition  box  each  containing  500  rounds ; 
oil,  greasej  and  tow  in  their  sandbags. 

Nos.  5,  6,  and  7:  One  ammunition  box  each  containing  500 
rounds ;  hand  grenades  in  their  sandbags. 

(?>)  Three  section  commanders  with  two  orderlies  each. 

Section  commander:  Light  pistol  and  cartridges,  one 

water  can. 

First  orderly:  One  water  can  and  an  oil  can  in  his  sand 

bag. 
Second  orderly:  One  water  can,  a  belt  filler  in  his  sand 

bag. 
(c)   Company  commander. 

First  orderly  with  a  belt  filler  in  his  sand  bag. 
Second  orderly:  One  oil  can  in  his  sand  bag. 
Third  orderly:  Tow  and  a  belt  filler  in  his  sand  bag. 

One  assistant  armorer  with  a  No.  11  tool  box  in  his  sand 
bag. 

(i)   SUPPLY. 

83.  The  supply  of  rations,  ammunition,  and  pioneer  material 
must  be  organized  down  to  the  smallest  details  and  controlled 
by  officers.  It  is  extraordinary  how  far  forward  wagons  (and 
also  traveling  kitchens)  can  go  under  skillful  and  smart  leader- 
ship without  casualties,  even  on  days  when  the  artillery  fire  is 
intense.  It  has  proved  very  useful  to  form  fourth  platoons  and 
divide  them  up  into  carrying  parties.  All  ammunition  and  ra- 
tions which  have  to  be  brought  up  must  be  packed  up  by  the 
carrying  parties  beforehand  in  their  quarters  in  packages  which 
can  be  easily  handled  and  distributed.  It  is  a  good  plan  to  pack 
the  stores  for  each  group  in  a  few  sand  bags. 


106  NOTES  ON  EECENT  OPERATIONS. 

84.  The  widely  spread  idea  that  the  troops  in  the  foremost 
line  do  not  care  for  hot  food  and  prefer  the  cold  rations  which 
they  take  up  with  them  is  erroneous.     It  is  true  that  the  troops 
do  not  care  for  cooked  food  when  it  reaches  them  as  a  cold  and 
greasy  mess.     On  the  other  hand,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  health  and  spirits  of  the  troops,  especi- 
ally in  wet  and  cold  weather,  to  do  everything  possible  to  bring 
up  something  hot  to  eat  and  drink  to  the  men  in  the  front 
trenches  at  least  once  a  day.     In  places  where  the  traveling 
kitchens  can  not  come  up  close  enough  cooking  places  must  be 
provided  in  the  reserve  and  support  trenches  in  which  the  food 
can  be  warmed  up  again  en  route.     From  these  points  the  food 
should  be  sent  on  in  handy  light  mess  tins,  which  retain  heat 
well  and  with  which  the  carrier  can  throw  himself  down,  in  case 
the  enemy  opens  fire,  without  spilling  the  food.     Tightly-closing 
receptacles,  shaped  like  a  vintner's  tub  and  carried  like  a  pack, 
are  strongly  recommended. 

85.  To  make  the  supply  easier  it  is  advisable  to  establish 
depots  and  intermediate  depots  of  ammunition  and  rations  in 
the  second  and  third  trenches  and  with  the  supports  and  re- 
serves ;  these  should  be  established  beforehand,  while  things  are 
quiet.     It  is  also  advisable  to  establish  advanced  clothing  stores 
from  which  the  troops  can  draw  the  most  necessary  articles  of 
clothing  and  equipment,  such  as  water  bottles,  stockings,  foot 
bandages,  and  boots  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  to  incorporate 
the   company    tradesmen   in   the   fourth   platoons    (mentioned 
above). 

86.  The  machine-gun  officer  on  the  regimental  staff  is  respon- 
sible for  the  supply  for  the  whole  of  the  machine-gun  units  of 
an  infantry  regiment.     He  must  arrange  for  the  replacement 
and  bringing  up  of  equipment  and  ammunition  and  controls  the 
supply  of  rations  for  the  machine-gun  detachments  which,  for 
this  purpose,  are  best  incorporated  in  the  infantry  companies 
with  which  they  are  working. 

E.  PIONEERS,  SEARCHLIGHTS,  "  FLAMMENWERFER,"  AND  TRENCH 
MORTARS. 

87.  The  experience  of  the  Somme  Battle  shows  that  the  follow- 
ing staffs  and  troops  are  necessary : 

STAFFS. 

Pioneer  general  at  army  headquarters  with  one  adjutant,  one 
officer  for  pioneer  services,  one  officer  for  Minenwerfer  services, 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  107 

and  one  senior  officer  with  three  subalterns  for  the  supply  of 
material. 

Stuff  officer  of  pioneers  with  the  groups  (corps ) .  Pioneer  com- 
mander with  each  division ;  he  also  commands  the  pioneer  bat- 
talions of  the  division  and  is  the  technical  adviser  of  the  divi- 
sional commander  on  all  questions  of  the  construction  of  de- 
fenses, Minenwerfer,  and  the  employment  of  pioneers  and 
M in  c  nwerfer. 

A  senior,  permanent  pioneer  officer  with  each  division.  He 
should  be  employed  for  the  most  part,  under  the  pioneer  com- 
mander, on  the  supply  of  engineer  stores  and  weapons  for  the 
closo  combat,  and,  when  the  division  is  relieved,  will  disseminate 
all  the  experience  gained. 

TBOOPS. 

Four  pioneer  companies  for  each  division,  one  for  each  of  the 
three  infantry  regiments  in  the  position  and  one  at  the  disposal 
of  the  division  for  particular  tasks.  If  there  is  mine  warfare 
in  the  divisional  sector  one  or  two  pioneer  mining  companies 
are  also  necessary. 

One  pioneer  battalion  at  the  disposal  of  the  group  for  the  com- 
pletion of  the  back  lines  and  for  special  tasks.  A  large  number 
of  landwehr  and  landsturm  companies  ( about  as  many  as  there 
are  divisional  sectors)  at  the  disposal  of  the  army  for  the  con- 
struction of  additional  back  lines. 

A  pioneer  park  company  for  every  pioneer  park  and  two  for 
the  army  pioneer  park. 

88.  Divisional  pioneer  companies  will  be  relieved  with  their 
divisions.     Just  as  with  the  infantry,  thorough  instruction  and 
preliminary  training  are  necessary  before  moving  into  the  posi- 
tion, which  must  be  carefully  handed  over,  both  by  means  of 
maps  and  on  the  ground.     If  the  commanders  have  a  good  knowl- 
edge of  the  position,  the  chances  of  ground  being  lost  during  the 
period  immediately  following  the  relief  are  minimized.    It  is, 
therefore,  essential  that  the  pioneer  commander  and  the  com- 
pany commanders  of  the  incoming  division  should  be  sent  on 
several  days  beforehand  with  small  advance  parties  and  that 
rear  parties  of  the  outgoing  division  should  remain  behind  in 
each  regimental  sector. 

89.  One  searchlight  section  per  division  is  sufficient.    Detach- 
ments can  be  detailed  from  these  sections  for  employment  under 
group  or  army  headquarters. 


108  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

90.  The  attachment  of  Flammenwerfer  to  the  assault  troops  is 
specially  desirable  when  methodical  counter  attacks  are  to  be 
carried  out.     Consequently  one  of  the  Flammenwerfer  battalions 
allotted  to  the  army  was  combined  with  an  assault  school,  and, 
by  means  of  small  detachments,  trained  those  divisions  which 
were  behind  the  front,  waiting  to  act  as  reliefs,  in  the  technical 
use  of  Flammenwerfer. 

91.  The  requirements  of  an  infantry  division  in  a  defensive 
battle  have,  on  the  whole,  been  met  by  the  allotment  of  light 
Minenwerfer  to  infantry  battalions,  in  addition  to  the  divisional 
Hinenwerfer  company,  as  long  as  the  army  also  has  at  its  dis- 
posal a  few  Minenwerfer  companies  which  can  be  engaged  at 
decisive  points.    There  is  hardly  likely  to  be  any  occasion  to 
engage  a  Hinenwerfer  battalion  as  a  complete  unit  on  the  actual 
battle  front,  but  a  vigorous  and  overwhelming  bombardment  by 
Minemcerfer  on  portions  of  the  army  front  where  no  attack  is 
being  made  can  do  considerable  injury  to  the  enemy. 

92.  In  previously  prepared  positions  trench  mortars  of  all 
kinds  can  be  employed;  on  the  actual  battle  field,  when  there 
are  no  previously  prepared  positions,  heavy  and  medium  Minen- 
iverfer  can  not  be  employed,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  ammuni- 
tion supply. 

Light  Minenwerfer  can  only  be  employed  when  cover  is  avail- 
able.   Their  main  tasks  are  annihilating  and  barrage  fire. 

93.  Minenwerfer  are  best  employed  iu  groups  of  two  to  four 
mortars,  in  order  to  avoid  overconcentration.    The  distance  be- 
hind the  front  line  should  be  such  that  they  can  not  be  overrun 
immediately  the  enemy  penetrates  into  the  position.     Conspicu- 
ous points  are  to  be  avoided  and  every  advantage  should  be 
taken  of  cover  provided  by  the  lie  of  the  ground.     Alternative 
emplacements    are   of   value,   provided   ammunition   supply    is 
feasible  and  covered  communications  are  available.     Coopera- 
tion with  infantry  and  artillery  must  be  effected  in  accordance 
with  a  fixed  scheme  of  targets  and  barrage  fire. 

F.  ARTILLERY. 
I.   Causes  of  initial  failures. 

94.  At  the  beginning  of  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  our  artil- 
lery was  far  too  weak  in  numbers,  in  calibers,  supply  of  am- 
munition, and  means  of  observation  to  meet  the  enemy  from  the 
outset  with  the  requisite  counter  measures.    To  this  may  be 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  109 

added  the  quite  noticeable  inferiority  of  our  reconnaissance, 
especially  aerial  reconnaissance,  for  which  the  enemy  produced 
a  very  large  number  of  machines,  corresponding  to  his  artillery 
equipment,  and  which  doubtless  also  were  well  organized  and 
employed. 

£5.  Thus  our  infantry  lacked  the  necessary  artillery  support. 
Th3  result  was  a  retrograde  movement  under  pressure  from  the 
enemy,  which  made  general  supervision  and  a  clear  system  of 
command  even  more  difficult  and  caused  the  artillery  also  heavy 
losses  in  men  and  material.  The  ground  on  which  systematic 
preparations  had  been  made  for  the  massed  employment  of  re- 
enlorcing  artillery,  especially  heavy  artillery,  was  partly  lost  to 
the  enemy,  so  that  the  rapid  and  smooth  carrying  out  of  reen- 
f  or  cement  on  a  very  large  scale  could  no  longer  be  insured. 
Practically  all  the  reenforcing  divisions  came  without  their  own 
artillery;  thus  there  was  a  great  mixture  of  formations,  and 
consequently  uniformity  of  action  again  suffered. 

1»6.  Under  these  difficult  conditions  the  artillery  reenforce- 
inents  which  were  hurriedly  brought  up  were  thrown  into  line  as 
they  happened  to  arrive,  wherever  the  situation  seemed  to  be 
most  serious.  The  batteries  no  longer  found  positions  already 
du,?  and  prepared.  Under  the  enemy's  fire  they  had  to  start 
everything  from  the  beginning.  Any  fresh  headquarters  that 
were  allotted  had  to  be  employed  as  quickly  as  possible  wherever 
the  need  was  greatest.  This  produced  for  a  time  a  confusion 
of  units,  which  was  bound  to  react  on  the  command  of  the 
artillery  in  the  battle  and  necessarily  decrease  the  effective  work 
of  the  troops.  The  artillery  was  therefore  only  partially  able 
to  carry  out  its  task  in  the  defensive  battle. 

97.  A  systematic  engagement  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  of  the 
enemy's  points  of  departure,  and  of  the  troops  waiting  for  the 
assault  could  not,  in  most  cases,  take  place.  Continual  barrage 
fire,  and  nothing  else,  was  regarded  by  the  troops  as  the  only 
salvation  when  on  the  defensive. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  battle  the  troops  had  not  been  made  to 
see  that  barrage  is  simply  a  protective  measure  to  hinder  the 
enemy  entering  a  certain  strip  of  country  in  front  of  our  own 
line,  but  that  it  does  not  do  the  enemy  any  damage  if  he  does  not 
run  into  this  strip  or  is  not  surprised  there.  Thus  by  continual 
barrage  fire,  with  its  huge  expenditure  of  ammunition  and  ma- 
terial and  human  energy,  no  real  damage  to  the  enemy  is  insured* 


110  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

98.  Owing  to  the  noticeable  lack  of  long-range  flat-trajectory 
guns  there  was,  from  the  outset,  no  possibility  of  a  well  thought 
out  and  systematic  interference  with  the  enemy's  organizations 
behind  his  front  of  attack. 

II.  Measures  by  which  a  gradual  improvement  was  attained. 

99.  An  improvement  in  the  situation  only  became  possible  after 
the  arrival  of  considerable  artillery  reenforcements  (especially 
heavy  artillery)   and  of  their  auxiliaries   (aeroplanes  and  kite 
balloons)  ;  it  thus  became  possible  to  give  the  infantry  defense 
more  support.     But  with  the  loss  of  ground  still  continuing  in 
spite  of  these  measures,  and  the  necessaray  shifting  of  battle 
fronts  owing  to  new  divisions  being  engaged  and   new   army 
groups  being  formed,  it  was  only  gradually  possible  to  obtain 
an  effective  organization  of  the  artillery  command  and  intel- 
ligence. 

100.  Attention  is  called  to  the  following  points  as  the  most  im- 
portant in  the  organization  that  arose : 

(a)  Provision  of  a  separate  artillery  telephone  system. 

(&)  A  large  increase  of  the  previously  well  arranged  survey 
system  by  forming  an  artillery  survey  section,  where  all  results 
of  reconnaissance  could  be  sifted  and  issued  on  a  daily  artillery 
map,  which  served  as  the  basis  for  artillery  fire  control.  Close 
liaison  with  balloons  and  aeroplanes  by  connecting  them  up  with 
the  artillery  telephone  system. 

(c)  Equipment  of  field  and  heavy  artillery  with  good  maps 
and  reliable  battery  boards. 

(d)  Expansion  of  the  means  of  aerial  reconnaissance  and  im- 
provement of  the  cooperation  between  aeroplanes  and  artillery. 
Increased   barrage  protection   against   the  enemy's  aerial   ob- 
servers. 

(e)  Regulating  the  ammunition  expenditure  in  accordance 
with  the  possibilities  of  supply  and  thus  forming  an  assured 
reserve  of  ammunition. 

(/)  Employment  of  the  ammunition  parks  within  the  groups 
to  carry  out  the  supply  of  material  as  well  as  that  of  ammuni- 
tion. 

(#)  More  careful  supervision  of  the  handling  by  the  troops  of 
material  and  ammunition^  The  erection  of  efficient  repair  work- 
shops within  the  groups  and  of  a  large  workshop  for  the  whole 
army  area. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  Ill 

( h )  The  following  were  also  aimed  at,  but  were  obtained  only 
partially  or  not  at  all  during  the  battle,  owing  to  the  unfavorable 
circumstances : 

The  formation  of  a  larger  reserve  of  ammunition  to 
make  the  army  more  independent  of  replenishment  from 
the  rear. 

The  most  comprehensive  engagement  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  and  continual  attacks  on  the  enemy's  rearward 
communications  and  billets. 

The  building  of  field  tramways  right  up  to  the  battery 
positions  in  order  to  insure  a  smooth  ammunition  sup- 
ply, to  spare  the  horses,  and  to  use  fewer  motor  lorries, 
thus  saving  the  roads. 

The  construction  and  use  of  numerous  alternative 
positions. 

101.  The  results  of  these  measures  were  soon  shown  by  the 
fact  that  the  troops  recognized  that  barrage  fire  diminishes  in 
impDrtance  if  the  enemy  can  be  systematically  engaged  with  ar- 
tillery ;  that  is,  if  proper  attention  is  given  to  the  engagement  of 
the  enemy's  artillery  and  to  destructive  and  annihilating  fire. 
Thanks  to  a  sharp  lookout  on  the  part  of  our  troops,  we  were 
generally  able  to  nip  the  enemy's  attacks  in  the  bud  and  thus 
decreased  the  number  of  useless  calls  for  barrage.    The  more  it 
was  supported  by  the  infantry,  especially  in  exactly  determining 
our  own  and  the  enemy's  lines,  the  better  were  the  results  ob- 
tained by  the  artillery.    Closer  cooperation  with  the  other  means 
of  observation,  especially  with  the  air  service,  produced  further 
improvement  in  this  respect.     A  considerable  decrease  in  the 
expenditure  of  ammunition  and  material  was  attained,  and  yet 
our  reverses  diminished  and  finally  ceased  almost  entirely. 

III.  Experiences  and  lessons. 

(a)    PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  BATTLE. 

102.  The  employment  of  artillery  reenforcements  must  be  car- 
ried out  on  the  basis  of  a  scheme,  thought  over  and  worked  out 
during  quiet  times,  making  full  use  of  prepared  battery  positions, 
methods  of  command  and  observation,  battery  boards,  and  lists 
of  targets.    For  this  a  type  of  armament  plan,  similar  to  those 
used  in  a  fortress,  must  be  prepared ;  it  must  include  not  only 
the  front  but  also  the  back  lines. 

103.  In  addition  there  must  be  an  artillery  telephone  system 
which  is  quite  separate  from  the  general  tactical  system.    Where 


112  NOTES  ON  KECENT  OPERATIONS. 

the  complete  construction  of  such  a  system,  which  is  desirable, 
does  not  appear  to  be  possible  or  necessary  in  a  quiet  sector,  the 
whole  of  the  material  must  be  available  to  be  built  in.  Material 
brought  by  the  newly  arrived  staffs  and  batteries  is  generally 
quite  insufficient  and  should  only  be  used  in  cases  of  urgent 
necessity. 

Special  safety  measures  are  advisable  for  the  most  important 
communications  between  command  posts  and  observation  posts ; 
these  include  placing  the  wire  in  special  cable  trenches,  avoiding 
localities  and  prominent  points  on  the  ground  which  are  known 
to  be  much  shelled,  and  laying  the  double  lines  of  cable,  which 
must  be  placed  well  apart  in  the  form  of  ladder  circuits,  etc. 

104.  All  troops  as  they  arrive  should,  if  possible,  be  tested  as 
to  their  fighting  capacity.     Troops  that  have  suffered  severely 
and  are  worn  out  by  their  exertions  in  other  theaters  of  the  war 
can  not  do  what  is  expected  of  them.    In  general,  their  move  into 
line  will  be  hastened  and  more  efficiently  carried  out  if  officers 
are  sent  on  in  advance.    These  latter  can  instruct  the  troops  in 
the  tasks  that  are  allotted  to  them  (battery  positions,  condition 
of  the  roads,  billets),  and  at  the  same  time  hand  over  the  neces- 
sary maps  and  plans. 

105.  A  sufficient  supply  of  ammunition  must  be  kept  ready 
within  armies,  and,  if  possible,  within  corps  (groups)  in  order 
to  be  able  to  meet  sudden  demands  quickly. 

106.  The  supply  in  times  of  battle  must  be  insured,  even  in  the 
case  of  the  roads  becoming  bad,  etc.,  by  the  construction  of  a 
large  number  of  field  tramways. 

107.  It  is  necessary  to  erect  large  repair  workshops,  which  must 
be  able  to  form  branches  at  short  notice  with  the  groups,  if  neces- 
sary, by  making  use  of  favorably  situated  and  suitable  armorers' 
workshops  belonging  to  the  troops. 

(b)  COMMAND. 

108.  In  face  of  the  frequently  changing  groups  a  certain  per- 
manency in  command  must  be  maintained  if  all  useful  experi- 
ences, etc.,  are  not  to  be  lost.    The  longer  the  command  remains 
in  the  same  hands  the  better. 

This  also  applies  "to  artillery  commanders ;  the  latter  should 
not  be  changed  in  a  shorter  period  than  four  weeks,  even  if  their 
divisions  are  withdrawn  sooner.  A  simultaneous  change  of  the 
divisional  commanders  and  the  artillery  commanders  must  bo 
avoided  in  all  circumstances, 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  113 


109.  The  correct  employment  of  the  artillery  calls  for  a  well- 
conceived  plan  of  action,  in  which  the  questions  of  the  most 
suitable  directions  of  fire  and  ranges,  enfilade  and  oblique  fire, 
increasing  the  density  of  fire  and  supporting  neighboring  sectors, 
cover  and  the  state  of  the  roads  have  all  been  carefully  thought 
out   and   properly   coordinated.     When  the   tactical   situation 
changes,  all  moves  and  changes  of  positions  must  be  carried  out 

••  in  accordance  with  this  plan. 

It  is  often  advisable  to  place  batteries  outside  the  divisional 
sector;  neighboring  divisions  may  only  refuse  their  consent  if 
they  themselves  have  urgent  need  of  the  position. 

110.  As  far  as  possible  artillery  brigades  and  battalions  should 
only  be  put  into  line  as  complete  units.    Splitting  up  into  single 
batteries  doubtless  leads,  with  officers  and  men  of  the  present 
type   (little  experience,  scanty  training),  to  a  distinct  drop  in 
fighting  power  in  a  battle.     In  addition,  splitting  up  the  units 
leads  to  difficulties  of  interior  economy  (preliminary  and  further 
training,  clothing,  equipment,  condition  of  the  horses,  etc.). 

111.  It  has  proved  advisable  for  purposes  of  command  dur- 
ing the  battle  to  concentrate  the  command  posts  of  the  divisional 
commander,  the  artillery  commander,  and  the  commander  of  the 
heavy  artillery  at  the  same  place. 

The  increased  length  of  the  telephone  wires  from  the  artillery 
commander  to  the  groups  (Abteilungen  battalions)  is  of  no  im- 
portance, as  experience  shows  that  the  lines  in  the  back  area 
can  always  be  maintained  in  working  order  without  difficulty. 

112.  The  continual  presence  of  the  commander  of  the  troops 
at  battle  headquarters  which  give  a  good  all-round  view  has 
very  great  disadvantages  from  the  point  of  view  of  command 
during  the  battle.    Excluding  the  fact  that  it  is  only  in  very  rare 
cases  that  battle  headquarters  will  allow  of  a  view  over  the  whole 
battle  field,  they  entail  an  increased  amount  of  personnel  and 
material  in  buildings,  wrhich  are  generally  quite  inadequate  for 
a  properly  conducted  office  organization,  as  the  artillery  com- 
manders with  their  extensive  system  of  telephone  communica- 
tions must  be  at  battle  headquarters  with  the  commander  of  the 
troops.    The  shorter  distance  from  the  fire  zone  endangers  com- 
munications and  thus  also  the  continuity  of  command  in  the  bat- 
tle; the  latter  also  suffers  from  the  continual  moves  between 
billets  and  battle  headquarters.    It  will  therefore,  as  a  rule,  be 
preferable  if  commanders  of  troops  and  their  artillery  command- 
ers direct  the  battle  from  their  billets,  and  insure  that  they  are 
quickly  informed  of  events  ia  front  line  by  officer  observers 

3577°— 17 8 


114  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

specially  sent  out  and  provided  with  independent  communica- 
tions (observing  stations). 

(C)    TKAINING. 

113.  The  training  of  the  troops,  especially  in  the  case  of  the 
young  officers  and  battery  commanders,  no  longer  reaches  the 
standard  formerly  required.    In  particular,  the  results  obtained 
in  shooting  by  officers  and  acting  officers,  some  of  whom  are  in- 
experienced, have  been  insufficient.    It  has  proved  of  practical 
value,  when  circumstances  have  permitted  it,  to  discuss  the  gen- 
eral idea  and  execution  of  an  important  shoot  beforehand,  as 
well  as  subsequently  to  criticize  the  shoots  that  have  been  carried 
out,  on  the  basis  of  the  rounds  recorded. 

It  is  necessary  to  arrange  for  further  training  areas,  where 
formations  stationed  in  readiness  as  a  reserve  in  the  hands  of 
the  higher  command,  can  stiffen  their  training.  In  these  areas 
artillery  schools  and  practice  with  live  rounds  must  be  arranged 
for;  individuals  belonging  to  troops  in  line  will  be  detailed  to 
attend  such  courses. 

114.  There  must  be  a  considerable  improvement  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  capabilities  of  the  artillery  amongst  infantry  officers. 
Not  only  the  higher  commanders  but  the  subordinate  infantry 
leaders  down  to  the  group  *  commanders  must  know  the  most  im- 
portant facts  about  the  artillery.     Instructions  on  this  subject 
must  take  place  during  quiet  periods,  and  should  consist  of 
lectures  on  artillery,  the  methods  of  fire  and  their  object,  and  of 
actual  examples  of  gun  drill  and  observing  station  work.    Every 
man  will  take  an  interest  in  this ;  his  interest  in  the  sister  arm 
will  be  excited  and  cooperation  between  the  two  arms  will  con- 
sequently benefit. 

115.  According  to  our  experience,  reenforcements  asked  for 
from  the  depot  units  at  home  are  very  slow  in  arriving  and 
sometimes  come  so  late  that  the  fighting  power  of  the  troops 
is  endangered.    To  obviate  this  the  formation  of  a  special  depot 
detachment  behind  the  army  front  has  proved  valuable.     Its 
object  is  to  preserve  the  fighting  efficiency  of  the  troops  in  case 
of  casualties  occurring  until  the  reenforcements  from  home  ar- 
rive; at  the  same  time  it  allows  of  more  opportunity  for  rest 
than  is  possible  in  battery  billets  being  given  to  men  who  are 
worn  out  or  who  need  a  rest,  and  avoids  the  necessity  for  sending 
them  back  to  Germany.     This  depot  detachment  is  also  fitted, 

4  A  group  consists  of  eight  men  under  a  noncommissioned  officer. — G.  S. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  115 

on  account  of  its  better  equipment  with  modern  guns,  to  carry 
out  the  further  instruction  of  reenforcements,  which,  according 
to  our  experience,  are  often  quite  insufficiently  trained. 

(d)    ORGANIZATION. 

113.  If  it  is  in  any  way  possible,  the  fighting  sectors  of  the  field 
artillery  groups  should  coincide  with  those  of  the  infantry  regi- 
ments. For  this  it  is  necessary  for  a  group  to  be  able  to  carry 
out  all  fighting  tasks  independently,  and  it  must  therefore  con- 
sist of  guns  and  light  field  howitzers  mixed.  Difficulties  of  in- 
terior economy  must  be  put  up  with.  A  division  into  flat-trajec- 
tory and  high-angle  fire  groups  is  unsuitable.  The  strength  of  a 
group  must  depend  on  the  tactical  situation.  The  formation  of 
too  small  groups  and  the  further  splitting  up  into  subgroups 
makes  the  issue  of  orders  more  difficult  and  slower. 

U7.  Fire  direction  by  the  artillery  group  commander  must  be 
car  lied  out  on  the  actual  ground  from  personal  observation. 
Whore  this  is  impossible  each  group  must  have  at  least  one  aux- 
iliary observer  who  can  see  over  the  battle  field.  It  must  be 
left  to  the  decision  of  the  group  commander  how  he  will  carry  out 
the  various  battle  tasks  allotted  him  and  which  batteries  and 
guns  he  will  make  use  of  for  certain  tasks.  This  especially  ap- 
plies to  the  expenditure  of  ammunition.  The  artillery  group  com- 
mander must  try  to  minimize  the  expenditure  so  that  he  may 
always  have  sufficient  ammunition  at  hand  for  decisive  move- 
ments. 

118.  The  closest  cooperation  with  the  infantry  will  be  obtained 
if  the  command  posts  are  as  close  together  as  possible ;  this  gives 
an  opportunity  for  the  two  commanders  to  confer  together  (artil- 
lery group  commander  and  infantry  regimental  commander). 
Such  conferences  will  be  supplemented  or,  in  unfavorable  local 
circumstances,  replaced  by  artillery  liaison  officers,  who  must  be 
provided  with  direct  and  safe  telephone  communications. 

This  mutual  understanding  will  be  increased  by  a  continual 
exchange,  of  observations,  by  frequent  visits  of  artillery  officers 
to  the  trenches,  and  by  frequent  visits  of  infantry  officers  to 
artillery  observing  stations. 

119.  The  boundaries  of  infantry  battle  sectors  are  weak  points 
in  a  position.    The  artillery  must  observe  past  them,  and,  by  the 
closest  liaison  to  right  and  left,  must  prevent  them  becoming 
actual  dividing  lines. 


116  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

Gross  communications  are  therefore  necessary  to  the  neighbor- 
ing artillery  commanders  and  group  commanders  and  to  their 
observing  stations.  The  possibilities  of  effectice  fire  from  neigh- 
boring sectors  must  be  known  and  made  use  of  for  increasing  the 
density  of  fire  according  to  some  prepared  scheme. 

Cooperation  with  a  neighboring  sector  is  not  a  favor  but  sim- 
ply a  duty  from  which  only  more  urgent  tasks  on  one's  own 
sector  can  absolve  one. 

120.  The  question  as  to  how  far  the  artillery  line  should,  as  a 
general  rule,  be  in  rear  of  the  most  advanced  infantry  line  needs 
special  attention.     The  question  of  the  most  effective  distance 
for  barrage  fire  lays  down  a  limit  for  the  field  artillery  ;  batteries 
must  not  be  more  than  3,300  yards  from  the  front  line.     Special 
tasks,  such  as  enfilade  fire  on  certain  areas,  may  necessitate  plac- 
ing batteries  considerably  closer  up. 

121.  Heavy  artillery,  especially  when  armed  with  flat-trajec- 
tory guns,  must  not  be  led  away  by  its  greater  range  into  choos- 
ing battery  positions  farther  in  rear.     The  object  in  providing 
long-range  guns  is  not  to  enable  such  batteries  to  avoid  the 
enemy's  fire  more  easily,  but  to  make  their  effect  felt  far  behind 
the  enemy's  line. 

122.  The  same  principles  hold  good  for  the  employment  of  the 
very  heavy  flat-trajectory  guns,  in  so  far  as  their  dependence  on 
the  railway  lines  does  not  from  the  outset  force  them  into 
certain  defined  positions. 

(e)    CONSTRUCTION   OF   BATTERY  POSITIONS. 

123.  A  suitable  choice  of  a  battery  position  will  save  much 
labor  in  construction.    A  systematic  scheme  of  construction  is 
necessary;  first  cover  from  aeroplanes,  then  deep  dugouts  for 
the  detachments,  ammunition  pits,  communication  trenches,  and, 
finally,  wire  entanglements  and  preparations  for  infantry  de- 
fense.   Special  attention  must  be  paid  to  cover  for  the  ammuni- 
tion, which  must  be  made  absolutely  proof  against  the  enemy's 
fire  and  the  weather.    The  ammunition  dumps,  which  are  some 
distance  from  the  battery  position  and  have  to  hold  a  second 
day's  supply,  will  also  need  sufficient  cover. 

124.  Gun  pits  require  as  large  an  arc  of  fire  as  possible.    This 
must  be  taken  into  consideration  when  they  are  first  built,  as 
subsequent  alterations  are  difficult  and  take  much  time. 

125.  It  is  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  ammunition 
supply  and  change  of  position  to  keep  the  roads  of  approach  in 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  lit 

a  good  state.  The  possibility  of  their  being  replaced  or  supple- 
mented by  means  of  field  railways  or  tramways  must  be  taken 
into  consideration  as  soon  as  possible.  If  the  ground  is  bad, 
they  will  have  to  be  worked  by  men  instead  of  horses  to  attain 
the  necessary  standard  of  efficiency. 

126.  Continual  strengthening  of  the  positions  makes  it  pos- 
sible for  batteries  to  remain  longer  in  them,  even  when  they 
have  been  located  by  the  enemy  and  are  subjected  to  heavy  fire. 
A  chai.ge  of  position,  with  its  disadvantages  (loss  of  registra- 
tion records  and  experiences  gained,  the  necessity   for  fresh 
communications    and    registration),    can    thus    be    frequently 
avoided. 

127.  The  construction  of  dummy  and  alternative  positions  is  a 
valuable  means  of  weakening  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire.    The 
men  required  for  such  work  can  only  partly  be  provided  by  the 
arti.lery  and  must  be  reinforced  by  parties  detailed  by  other 
troops. 

(f)    FIRE    CONTROL. 

128.  The  weaker  our  infantry  position  is,  and  the  less  obser- 
vation is  possible  from  the  front  line,  the  more  important  be- 
comes thr.  watch  kept  by  artillery  observation ;  the  latter  must 
be  able  to  view  the  whole  area  of  close  fighting.    Where  this  can 
not  be  effected  by  frontal  observation,  it  will  have  to  be  sup- 
plemented by  observation  from  a  flank.     The  moment  the  in- 
fantry retires  on  the  artillery  observing  stations,  observation 
usually  ceases. 

129.  The  general  demand  that,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  the 
observing  stations  should  be  near  the  battery  positions  in  order 
to  maintain  proper  communication  must  be  considerably  modi- 
fied  under  conditions  which  actually   obtain.     In   no  circum- 
stances must  a  battery  commander  be  satisfied  with  a  battle 
station  from  which  little  or  nothing  can  be  seen.    On  the  other 
hand,   artillery  group  commanders  must  generally  be  content 
with  poorer  possibilities  of  observation,  especially  if  their  fight- 
ing sector  is  wide.    They  must,  however,  always  seek  to  insure 
their  influence  on  the  battle  by  controlling  the  observation.    A 
concentration  of  observing  stations  at  any  one  point  must  be 
avoided  in  all  circumstances. 

130.  The  laying  of  telephone  lines  which  are  most  exposed  to 
destruction  by  the  enemy's  fire  must  be  carried  out.  according 
to  an  exact  plan.     The  avoidance  of  localities  and  areas  that 


118  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

are  kept  under  heavy  fire  is  not  usually  sufficiently  taken  into 
account.  Tins  is  often  clue  to  the  fact  that  officers  with  tech- 
nical knowledge  are  not  everywhere  entrusted  with  the  super- 
vision of  telephone  communications.  These  officers,  with  their 
subordinates,  should  be  kept  as  long  as  possible  at  such  duty. 

Large  numbers  of  wires  are  often  run  along  the  same  route, 
with  the  result  that  they  mutually  affect  each  other.  Lines  no 
longer  required  must  be  removed  altogether  and  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. 

131.  Communication  between  infantry  and  artillery  is  espe- 
cially important    It  must  be  the  aim  of  both  arms  to  effect  and 
maintain   the  closest  mutual  cooperation.     The  continual   ex- 
change of  all  observations  about  the  enemy  by  means  of  tele- 
pone  conversations,  liaison  officers  and  personal  conferences  at 
battle  headquarters  is  necessary.     Every  man  in  the  infantry 
must  be  made  to  understand  that  his  observations  regarding 
both  the  enemy  and  the  fall  and  effect  of  our  own  fire  provide 
the  artillery  with  most  valuable  supplementary  information  for 
fire  control.    On  the  other  hand,  caution  is  necessary  when  the 
infantry  express  an  opinion  as  to  the  fall  of  our  shell,  as  it  is 
a  matter  of  experience  that  they  very  often  mistake  our  own 
and  the  enemy's  fire,  with  the  result  that  a  battery  that  is  shoot- 
ing well  is  taken  off  the  target  by  faulty  correction. 

132.  Changes  in  the  distribution  of  sectors  should  only  be 
made  if  there  are  urgent  reasons  for  it.     Making  the  artillery 
fit  in  with  such  changes  causes  far  more  friction  and  upsets 
matters  far  more  than  it  does  in  the  case  of  infantry,  and  may 
in  some  circumstances  interrupt  or  endanger  effective  fire  at 
the  right  moment. 

(g)    FIRE   ACTIVITY. 

133.  In  addition  to  the  ammunition  allotment,  counterbattery 
work  is  to  a  large  degree  dependent  on  possibilities  of  observa- 
tion.    It  is,  therefore,  the  special  duty  of  all  artillery  com- 
manders to  keep  the  preliminary  arrangements  for  bombarding 
the  enemy's  artillery  up  to  date,  so  that  effective  shoots  can 
start  as  soon  as  observation  becomes  good.     Continual  active 
cooperation  with  artillery  aeroplanes,  balloons,  and  survey  sec- 
tions is  therefore  necessary. 

134.  Weather  conditions  will  often  make  the  employment  of 
the  very   heavy  flat-trajectory  guns  against  distant  targets  a 
difficult  matter.     We  have,  however,  learned  from  experience 
that  the  fire  effect  of  these  guns  can  not  be  made  full  use  of 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  119 

when  shooting  from  the  map.  In  spite  of  most  carefully  taking 
into  account  all  the  influences  which  are  foreseen  in  the  regu- 
lations for  arranging  such  shoots,  there  are  generally  such  large 
errors  that  unobserved  shoots  are  a  complete  failure.  It  does 
not.  therefore,  seem  justifiable  to  use  these  guns  for  shooting 
from  the  map,  when  their  short  length  of  life  and  their  expen- 
sive ammunition  are  taken  into  consideration.  During  battle, 
however,  it  must  be  possible  to  employ  the  fire  of  these  guns 
age  inst  targets  close  in  front  of  our  own  line.  Their  fire  should 
then  be  directed  mainly  on  villages,  and  this  must  be  prepared 
for  by  the  arrangement  of  the  requisite  observing  stations  on 
the  ground. 

135.  The  field  artillery,  especially  with  its  light  field  howitz- 
ers, can  relieve  the  heavy  artillery  of  some  of  the  counterbat- 
tery  work,  and  should  in  the  main  be  employed  against  hostile 
batteries  that  have  only  recently  occupied  their  positions,  and 
are,  therefore,  in  all  probability,  provided  with  less  cover.    The 
former  must  become  accustomed  to  the  fact  that  all  the  special 
means  of  reconnaissance  and  observation,  such  as  balloons  and 
aeroplanes,  are  at  their  disposal  just  as  much  as  at  that  of 
the  heavy  artillery  and  must  be  made  full  use  of.    The  necessary 
communications  must  be  provided  from  the  outset  and  must 
be  maintained. 

136.  For  the  purpose  of  destructive  fire,   the  most  careful 
observation  of  the  situation  and  state  of  construction  of  the 
enemy's  front  and  rear  lines  is  necessary.    Every  change  in  the 
enemy's  positions,  recognized  from  an  infantry  report  or  from 
a  balloon  or  photographic  reconnaissance,  will  cause  an  altera- 
tion  in   the  basis   for  destructive   fire.     The   divisional   com- 
mander, who  bears  all  responsibility  for  his  sector,  and  under 
whose  command  the  whole  artillery  in  the  sector  is  placed,  must 
therefore  daily  issue  orders  to  the  artillery  commander  as  to  the 
targets  for  destructive  fire  and  the  ammunition  to   be  used 
against  them  by  the  artillery.    For  this  purpose  it  will  generally 
be  necessary  for  the  divisional  commander  to  issue  daily  two 
artillery  orders  (morning  or  evening)  in  writing. 

Should  the  conditions  change  during  the  course  of  any  day, 
it  will  be  possible  to  switch  the  fire  over  quickly,  as  the  com- 
mand posts  of  the  divisional  commander  and  the  artillery  com- 
mander are  close  together. 

137.  The  best  picture  of  targets  for  annihilating  fire  will  be 
obtained  if  one  puts  one's  self  in  the  place  of  the  enemy  before 


120  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

his  attack,  and  paints  in  on  the  map  the  probable  formations 
which  the  enemy  would  adopt  before  the  attack  on  account  of 
the  peculiarity  of  the  ground  and  the  situation  of  the  enemy's 
trenches.  From  this  it  will  be  at  once  seen  that  annihilating 
fire  must  not  be  rigid,  but  must  be  -flexible,  as  it  must  conform 
to  all  changes  in  the  enemy's  position,  especially  such  changes 
as  imply  preparations  for  an  offensive. 

138.  As  annihilating  fire  must  be  used  not  only  before  an 
assault,  but  also  during  an  assault,  at  which  time  the  field  bat- 
teries are  employed  for  delivering  barrage  fire,  it  will  be  ad- 
visable to  distribute  the  heavy  artillery  fire  over  the  most  ini- 
portant  points  in  the  enemy's  trenches ;  these  trenches  will  thus 
be  kept  under  fire  when  the  field  artillery  passes  from  annihilat- 
ing to  barrage  fire.     For  example,  it  is  wrong,  during  anni- 
hilating fire,  only  to  bombard  the  enemy's  front  line  trenches 
with  field  artillery,  for  then  these  trenches  would  not  be  fired 
at  at  all  as  soon  as  the  field  artillery  passes  to  barrage  fire,  and 
therefore  drops  its  fire  close  in  front  of  our  own  front  line. 
This  front  line  trench  is,  however,  naturally  the  starting  point 
for  the  assault  and  also  for  the  enemy's  rear  assaulting  waves, 
which  up  to  this  point  can  still  make  use  of  their  communication 
trenches. 

139.  Annihilating  and  barrage  fire  must  always  be  registered 
and  the  registration  checked.     Just  as  in  the  case  of  barrage 
fire,  preparations  must  be  made  to  concentrate  annihilating  fire 
in  front  of  certain  sectors,  especially  in  those  parts  of  the  front 
where  signs  of  any  intended  attack  are  increasing.    Exact  maps 
must  also  be  kept  for  annihilating  fire.    It  will  be  best  opened 
on  the  receipt  of  short  code  words,  each  sector  being  allotted  its 
own  code  word. 

140.  The  use  of  light  signals  to  call  for  the  opening  of  barrage 
fire  has  proved  the  best  method,  as  compared  with  sound  signals 
which  either  entirely  failed,  or,  at  any  rate,  made  it  impossible 
to  recognize  with  sufficient  certainty  the  sector  which  was  call- 
ing for  fire.     The  wish  for  a  more  frequent  change  of  light 
signals  is  always  recurring  and  is  quite  justified,  as  the  few  sig- 
nals so  far  provided  make  it  easy  for  the  enemy  to  imitate  them 
and  thus  inveigle  us  into  opening  barrage  fire  with  its  heavy 
expenditure  of  ammunition. 

It  is,  therefore,  advisable  to  order  the  artillery  not  to  comply 
with  the  light  signal  for  "  lengthen  the  range  "  during  barrage 
fire,  in  order  to  stop  any  attempts  at  deception  by  the  enemy. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  121 

Compliance  with  such  a  signal  sent  up  by  the  enemy  may  make 
our  whole  barrage  ineffective  and  lead  to  the  success  of  the 
enemy's  attack. 

141.  In  addition  to  light  signals,  which  are  often  useless  in  a 
fog.  all  other  means  (horn  signals,  klaxons,  sirens,  trench  wire 
less  sets)  must  be  employed  for  calling  for  barrage  fire. 

142.  A  special  light  signal  has  recently  been  introduced  in  the 
army  to  call  for  the  opening  of  annihilating  fire.    This  will  only 
be  sent  up  from  the  battle  headquarters  of  battalions  in  front 
line ,  and  then  only  if  the  telephone  breaks  down. 

143.  The  selection  of  a  "directing  barrage  battery,"  the  coni- 
muiications  to  which  from  the  front  and  from  other  units  of 
the  artillery  must  be  especially  carefully  constructed,  has  proved 
of  value.     This  battery  must  be  known  to  all  other  batteries  in 
the  divisional  sector,  and  as  soon  as  it  opens  barrage  or  anni- 
hilating fire,  all  other  batteries  must  at  once  open  barrage  fire, 
that  is,  if  barrage  or  annihilating  fire  has  not  already  been 
called  for  by  some  other  means.     Inquiries  must,  however,  at 
once  be  made  as  to  whether  the  directing  barrage  battery  is 
del  vering  annihilating  fire;  if  so,  the  other  batteries  will  at 
once  change  to  this  method  of  fire. 

144.  Battery  commanders  must  make  every  effort  to  pass  as 
soon  as  possible  to  observed  fire  from  annihilating  or  barrage 
fire  which  has  been  automatically  opened,  and  is  thus  at  first 
not  being  observed.     This  is  the  best  means  of  insuring  that  an 
enemy,  \vho  has  broken  through,  comes  under  our  fire  during 
his  further  advance.     It  is  the  special  duty  of  the  senior  artillery 
commanders  to  make  the  young  battery  commanders  proficient 
in  such  duties  by  means  of  instructional  schemes,  which  should 
be  discussed  on  the  ground. 

145.  The   field   artillery   must   take   an   active  part   in   de- 
structive fire.    For  this  purpose,  it  will  be  advisable  to  employ 
certain  batteries  which,  on  account  of  their  positions  being  as 
far  forward  as  possible,  are  able  to  make  full  use  of  their  maxi- 
mum range. 

The  view  that  the  enemy's  organizations  should  only  be  bom- 
barded if  he  annoys  us  in  the  same  way  (retaliation  fire)  is 
wrong  and  must  be  combated  emphatically.  This  applies  es- 
pecially to  the  rearward  works  and  billets,  where  considerable 
damage  can  be  done  to  the  enemy.  In  this  sphere  also  the 
initiative  must  not  be  left  to  him. 


122  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

(h)   ATTACKS  AND  COUNTERATTACKS. 

146.  To  prepare  for  attacks  and  counterattacks,  the  artillery 
must  always  be  given  sufficient  time  for  reconnaissance,  registra- 
tion and  fire  for  effect.     Breaches  of  this  rule  lead  to  self-decep- 
tion and  reverses.     It  is  the  duty  of  artillery  commanders  to 
see  that  this  is  taken  into  consideration.     It  follows  from  the 
above  that  shortly  before  or  after  daybreak  is  an  unsuitable 
time  for  an  assault.     Artillery  night  firing  can  never  be  de- 
scribed as  real  fire  for  effect.     It  is  only  a  more  or  less  heavy 
harassing  fire  according  to  the  number  and  caliber  of  batteries 
employed  and  the  amount  of  ammunition  expended. 

An  unsuccessful  attack  means  greater  sacrifice  than  keeping 
the  assaulting  troops  for  a  longer  period  in  the  assembly  position. 

147.  In  a  methodical  attack,  registration  must  be  carried  out 
as  unobstrusively  as  possible  and  should  be  distributed  over 
several  days,  so  that  on  the  actual  day  of  attack  it  will  only  be 
necessary  to  check  registration.    In  order  to  deceive  the  enemy, 
it   will   be   advisable   to   carry   out   simultaneous   registration 
against  other  positions  some  distance  away. 

148.  In  an  assault  the  artillery  should  not  lift  its  fire  off  the 
objective  until  the  moment  the  infantry  enters  the  enemy's  line, 
and  this  must  be  carried  out  exactly  according  to  the  scheduled 
time ;  fire  must  not  lift  the  moment  the  assaulting  infantry  goes 
over  the  parapet,  otherwise  the  enemy  generally  finds  time  to 
man  his  trenches.    A  certain  amount  of  danger  to  our  own  in- 
fantry, which  can  be  diminished  by  the  use  of  shells  with  delay 
action  fuzes  shortly  before  the  assault,  must  be  put  up  with. 
Similarly,  the  lifts  of  the  artillery  fire  during  an  assault  must 
not  be  too  large.     The  fire  should  be  immediately  in  front  of 
the  advancing  infantry.    This  needs  very  careful  arrangement. 

(i)    CLOSE   DEFENSE. 

149.  The  battery  positions  must  be  provided  with  obstacles; 
the  guns  must  be  able  to  fire  at  once  at  case-shot  distance;  to 
do  this  they  must  be  able  to  be  pulled  quickly  out  of  their  pits ; 
hand  grenades  must  be  placed  in  readiness  and  the  gun  detach- 
ments must  be  trained  for  defense  at  close  quarters.    An  ample 
supply  of  small-arms  ammunition  must  be  dumped  in  the  bat- 
teries in  order  to  be  able  to  supply  retiring  infantry  with  am- 
munition, and  thus  make  it  more  easy  to  hold  these  strong  points 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  123 

until  the  counterattack  is  launched.  In  advanced  positions  an 
allotment  of  machine  guns  is  desirable ;  the  field  artillery  must 
know  how  to  use  them. 

(k)    AMMUNITION    AND    MATERIAL. 

]50.  The  ammunition  supply  within  groups  (corps)  and  divi- 
sions must  be  under  central  control;  a  special  officer  is  neces- 
sary for  this  duty,  who  must  remain  permanently  in  the  area. 
This  must  be  taken  into  consideration  when  staffs  are  being 
completed;  detailing  an  officer  for  this  duty  from  one  of  the 
units  permanently  weakens  the  latter  to  an  inadmissible  extent. 
The  same  holds  good  as  regards  material.  Whether  one  and  the 
same  officer  can  simultaneously  control  ammunition  and  mate- 
rial will  depend  on  circumstances. 

1.51.  Ammunition  and  material  must  frequently  be  inspected 
in  the  battery  positions.  For  this  purpose  artificers  and  armor- 
ers should  frequently  be  sent  to  the  positions.  In  addition, 
commanders  (including  regimental  commanders)  must  also  oc- 
casionally carry  out  inspections  as  to  the  treatment  of  ammuni- 
tion and  material,  in  addition  to  their  inspections  of  battery 
routine,  by  means  of  personal  visits  to  the  battery  positions. 

152.  For   ammunition   supply,    small    ammunition   depots   on 
roads  not  very  far  behind  the  battery  positions  have  proved 
useful.     It  is  a  matter  of  the  most  urgent  importance  to  keep 
the  roads  of  approach  in  good  condition,  and  to  have  an  active 
body  of  road  police,  especially  in  villages  and  at  cross  roads. 

153.  It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  our  enemy's  guns  apparently 
have  a  much  smaller  zone  of  dispersion  than  our  own.    He  also 
appears  to  have  better  and  more  accurate  data  for  shooting  from 
the  map  than  we  have.     This  seems  to  be  proved  by  the  fact 
that  in  weather  that  excludes  all  possibility  of  observation,  and 
under  conditions  very  different  from  those  prevailing  during 
previous  shoots,  he  obtains  hits  on  small  targets  with  great  ac- 
curacy. 

G.  COMMUNICATIONS  AND  AIR  RECONNAISSANCE. 
I.   Causes  of  initial  failures. 

154.  The  breakdown  of  the  communication  service  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  battle  is  chiefly  attributable  to  the  inadequate  pro- 
vision of  means  of  communication.     These  were  numerically 
much  inferior  to  those  of  the  enemy.     Their  increase  did  not 


124  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

keep  pace  with  the  increase  in  the  number  of  divisions  and 
heavy  artillery  units  engaged. 

155.  Further,  there  was  at  the  outset  no  organization  which 
could  make  preparations  for  the  ever-increasing  engagement  of 
new  formations.     It  was  impossible  to  control  the  new  forma- 
tions from  army  headquarters  and  there  was  no  organization  for 
this  purpose  at  corps  headquarters.    The  organization  had  first 
to  be  created,   instead   of  the  newly   allotted   communication 
troops  being  able  to  fit  themselves  into  an  existing  organization. 
A  further  difficulty  was  caused  by  the  individual  communication 
units  being  allotted,  one  by  one,  so  that  the  organization  was 
merely  *patch  work  at  first. 

156.  On  the  22d  June  the  following  flights  were  available, 
viz,  3  artillery,  5  reconnaissance,  13  battle  plane,  and  2  pursuit 
flights.    These  weak  forces  were  unable  to  play  any  part  against 
the  enemy,  who  was  able  to  prevent  long  distance  reconnais- 
sances entirely,  and  almost  completely  stop  our  artillery  ob- 
servation and  photographic  work.    The  situation  demanded  that, 
groups  (corps)  should  have  been  allotted,  on  a  scale  correspond- 
ing to  their  frontage,   number  of  divisions,   and   strength   in 
artillery,  a  number  of  artillery  and  reconnaissance  flights  to- 
gether with  the  necessary  number  of  the  battle-plane  flights. 
For   this,    however,   the   numbers    available   were   insufficient. 
Several  divisions  had  to  manage  with  one  artillery  flight  be- 
tween them,  and,  at  the  less  important  points  in  the  line,  this 
flight  was  not  protected  by  battle  planes,  as  army  headquarters 
were  obliged  to  employ  these  at  the  most  threatened  points  in 
order  to  be  able,  there  at  least,  to  obtain  information. 

157.  As  regards  balloon  detachments,  the  army  had  at  its  dis- 
posal two  detachments  with  a  total  of  five  balloons,  as  against 
25  to  30  possessed  by  the  enemy.    Inadequate  antiaircrafts  gun 
protection  hampered  their  work.     It  was  impossible  to  make 
use  of  balloon  observation  from   neighboring  sectors,   as   the 
necessary  telephone  system  was  lacking  and  each  balloon  was 
already  unable  to  cope  with  its  own  work.     The  result  of  this 
complete  inferiority  in  aerial  observation  was  that  our  artillery 
was  fighting  blindfold.     No  machines  were  available  for  the 
purpose  of  communication  with  the  front  line,  nor  were  either 
the  troops  or  the  aeroplanes  and  balloons  prepared  for  this,  as 
the  army  was  not  yet  familiar  with  the  lessons  learned  at  Ver- 
dun. 

158.  The  establishment  of  telephone  stores  normally  allotted 
to  corps  and  divisions  was  not  nearly  sufficient,  and  there  were 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  125 

but  few  additional  motor  lorry  sections  available.  The  army 
telephone  detachment  was  only  formed  at  the  same  time  as  the 
first  army  itself.  It  was  quite  impossible,  simultaneously  and 
as  rapidly  as  desirable,  to  meet  all  the  requirements  due  to  the 
me  vements  of  numerous  headquarters,  as  well  as  to  the  necessity 
for  new  lines  for  the  artillery,  aviation,  A.A.  gun,  and  balloon 
systems. 

The  leading  and  fighting  suffered,  and  it  was  quite  impossible 
to  make  full  use  of  even  the  small  available  number  of  aviation, 
A.A.  gun  and  balloon  units.  Owing  to  the  defective  organiza- 
tion, the  experience  and  knowledge  of  the  telephone  system 
\v£.s  lost  when  the  corps  and  divisions  changed  so  rapidly. 

159.  Field   signal   sections,   power   buzzer   stations,   wireless 
detachments,  and  carrier  pigeon  lofts,  which  were  necessary  to 
supplement  the  telephone  system  in  the  main  fire  zone,  were 
almost  entirely  lacking,  with  the  exception  of  the  signal  sections 
wich  the  divisions  and  a  few  pigeon  lofts.    The  small  number  of 
pigeons  was  insufficient,  as   "  infantry  aeroplanes "   were  not 
ye :  available,  and  runners  and  light  signals  were  the  only  means 
left  for  communication  with  the  front  line.    It  was  unavoidable 
that,  after  heavy  attacks,  the  position  of  the  front  line  should 
often  be  unknown  to  commanders  and  to  the  artillery  for  a  con- 
siderable time. 

160.  The  survey  section  was  also  only  formed  at  the  same  time 
as  the  first  army,  and  was  consequently  deficient  in  most  re- 
spects at  first.    New  surveys  had  to  be  undertaken,  as  our  own 
line  had  in-  places   almost   reached   the  eastern  limit  of  the 
mapped  area.     Owing  to  the  inferiority  of  our  aviators,  air 
photographs  did  not  furnish,  as  quickly  as  was  desirable,  the 
data  on  which  to  decide  which  battery  positions  and  trenches 
were  still  used  by  the  enemy.     Our  artillery  was  much  handi- 
capped on  this  account. 

II.  Measures  by  which  a  gradual  improvement  was  attained. 
INCREASE  OF  THE   MEANS   OF   COMMUNICATION. 

161.  An  improvement  in  these  conditions  was  at  once  effected, 
as  soon  as  the  means  of  communication  had  been  increased  to 
such  an  extent  that  they  met  the  most  urgent  requirements. 
This  increase  must  be  considered  as  a  decisive  factor  in  the 
whole  course  of  the  battle.    Only  of  secondary  importance  were 
the  measures  which  aimed  at  securing  uniformity  of  control  over 
the  means  of  reconnaissance,  and.  the  cooperation  of  all  other 


126  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

means  of  communication,  as  well  as  insuring  that  the  experience 
gained  would  be  available  even  if  there  were  changes  in  com- 
mand. 

162.  The  whole  of  the  aircraft  was  employed  with  a  view  to 
providing    observation    for    artillery    and    obtaining    aeroplane 
photographs.    All  the  special  duties  of  the  battle  plane  were  sub- 
ordinated to  this. 

The  employment  of  aeroplanes  with  a  view  to  obtaining  a 
complete  mosaic  of  aeroplane  photographs,  and  the  collection  of 
information  gained  by  air  reconnaissance,  were  handed  over  to 
the  aeroplane  group  (wing)  commanders  at  corps  headquarters. 
The  cooperation  of  these  commanders  with  the  general  staff 
officer  for  intelligence  insured  coordination  of  aerial  and  ground 
reconnaissance. 

As  soon  as  sufficient  artillery  flights  were  available  they  were 
allotted,  together  with  protective  flights,  to  the  divisional  ar- 
tillery commanders. 

After  infantry  aeroplanes  had  been  introduced  by  orders  of 
army  headquarters  on  special  occasions  in  the  first  few  weeks  of 
the  battle,  an  infantry  flight  was  detailed  for  each  group  as 
soon  as  the  number  of  reconnaissance  flights  had  been  increased. 

163.  The  balloon  detachments  were  connected,  by  means  of 
a  telephone  system  of  their  own,  with  each  other  and  with  a 
newly  formed  balloon  central  station.     The  latter  collected  the 
results  of  reconnaissances  with  a  view  to  their  being  collated 
by  the  survey  section,  and  disseminated  all  the  observations 
made.    This  enabled  every  battery  to  fire  with  observation  from 
the  particular  balloon  which  was  best  able  to  observe  the  target. 

164.  The  telephone  system  was  improved  by  the  allotment  of 
permanent  units   (communication  officers,  traffic  and  construc- 
tion sections).    This  prevented  the  experience  gained  and  knowl- 
edge of  the  system  from  being  lost. 

The  grouping  of  the  various  means  of  communication  in 
"  headquarters  communication  sections "  under  a  responsible 
commander  insured  a  better  system  of  tactical  cooperation  and 
mutual  assistance. 

165.  The  wireless  detachments  proved  their  value.     It  was 
found  necessary  to  control  the  wireless  traffic  within  groups. 
For  this  purpose  group  wireless  officers  were  appointed  who  con- 
trolled the  whole  of  the  wireless  traffic,   including  aeroplane 
wireless.    Arrangements  were  made  to  use  wireless  for  calling 
for  barrage,  by  employing  aeroplane  receiving  stations  (ground 
stations)  for  the  purpose. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  127 

166.  The  field  signal  sections,  when  they  were  not  on  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  subordinate  formations  but  were  army  troops, 
were  relieved  from  time  to  time  in  order  to  maintain  their  effi- 
ciency.    The  small  number  of  sections  available  in  the  army 
necessitated  their  being  relieved  by  sections  from  other  armies. 

167.  The  number  of  carrier  pigeon  lofts  was  increased. 

168.  In  order  to  increase  its  usefulness,  the  survey  section  was 
reinforced  by  a  special  detachment  under  the  staff  officer  for 
survey  of  the  fifth  army.     Entirely  new  mapping  material  was 
obtained.    All  results  of  reconnaissances  were  centralized,  firstly 
at  group  headquarters  and  secondly  at  army  headquarters;  which 
insured  that  full  use  wras  made  of  all  information.    The  extent 
of  this  information  and  the  necessity  for  passing  it  rapidly  to 
the  troops  led  to  the  formation  or  expansion  of  the  topographical 
sections  with  each  group   (corps).     These  sections  had  also  to 
keep  the  maps  of  our  own  positions  up  to  date  and  were  made 
responsible  for  all  information  regarding  a  definite  area  in  their 
front. 

III.  Experiences  and  lessons, 
(a)    EMPLOYMENT. 

169.  The  defensive  battle  necessitates  the  employment,  on  a 
very  large  scale,  of  means  of  communication  and  reconnaissance, 
which  should  be  proportionate  to  the  number  of  divisions  and 
the  quantity  of  heavy   artillery   engaged.     Whereas   a   newly 
engaged  division  is  at  once  effective,  communication  units  re- 
quire a  certain  amount  of  time  in  which  to  settle  down  before 
they  can  develop  their  full  powers.     Consequently  they  should 
be  engaged  as  early  as  possible,  and  from  the  outset  on  a  scale 
which  is  based  on  the  number  of  troops  which  will  be  engaged 
later  on. 

170.  The  following  proportion,  which  was  found  sufficient  on 
the  Somme,  may  be  taken-  as  a  basis  on  which  to  allot  artillery 
and  reconnaissance  flights,  viz.,  one  artillery  flight  with  a  pro- 
tective flight  for  each  division,  one  infantry  flight  for  every 
group  (corps),  and  two  or  three  reconnaissance  flights,  includ- 
ing one  for  photographic  reconnaissance,  for  every  group  of 
three  or  four  divisions.    Whether  this  allotment  will  suffice  in 
the  next  defensive  battle  will  depend  mainly  on  whether  the 
number   and   efficiency   of   our   pursuit   flights   will   suffice  to 
establish  superiority  in  aerial  fighting. 

171.  Early  engagement  is  also  necessary  for  the  balloon  de- 
tachments if  the  observers  are  to  obtain  good  results  early. 
At  the  same  time,   sufficient  antiaircraft  protection  must  be 


128  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

provided.  The  number  of  balloons  should  amount  to  about  two 
per  division  (they  need  not  be  placed  under  the  orders  of  the 
divisions),  A  portion  can  be  detailed  as  infantry  balloons. 
Other  troops  must  keep  clear  of  the  anchorages  of  kite  balloons. 

172.  When  the  reorganization  has  been  completed  the  tele- 
phone units  will  suffice,  as  far  as  can  be  seen,  for  the  needs  of 
corps  and  divisions.     A  special  allotment  of  these  units  will, 
however,  be  necessary  in  order  to  construct  the  extensive  artil- 
lery, aviation,  antiaircraft,  and  balloon  systems  which  become 
necessary  at  the  beginning  of  the  battle.    It  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  keep  these  systems  separate  from  the  tactical  lines  and 
from  the  general  telephone  system.    The  sooner  they  are  ready, 
the  sooner  will  the  weapon  concerned  be  effective.    Every  econ- 
omy, especially  at  the  beginning  of  a  battle,  decreases  the  effec- 
tiveness of  other  branches  of  the  service. 

When  engaging  telephone  units  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  maintenance  of  the  lines  in  the  main  fire  zone  can  not  be 
expected ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  importance  of  this  means 
of  communication  demands  that  everything  possible  should  be 
done  to  repair,  at  least,  the  most  important  lines.  With  this 
in  view  the  number  of  lines  close  up  to  the  fighting  line  should 
be  strictly  limited.  They  should  be  laid  in  special  deep  cable 
trenches,  or,  at  any  rate,  in  shallow  trenches  to  protect  them 
against  the  blast  of  the  explosion  of  the  enemy's  sheila.  Nu- 
merous cable  repair  squads  should  be  quartered  in  shell-proof 
dugouts  along  the  whole  line.  Roads  and  villages  should  be 
avoided.  The  enemy's  artillery  fire  should  be  continually 
watched,  so  that  heavily  shelled  areas  may  be  avoided  when 
constructing  new  lines;  existing  lines  should  be  removed  from 
these  areas  as  soon  as  possible,  as  it  wall  be  impossible  to  keep 
them  in  repair. 

In  the  main  fire  zone  the  telephone  must  be  supplemented  by 
other  means  of  communication. 

173.  Shell-proof  dugouts  are  essential  for  wireless  stations; 
when  these  are  provided,  wireless  proves  very  useful.    As  the 
number  of  sets  available  is  limited  the  forward  stations  should 
be  placed   near   the  front  line,   close  to  battle   headquarters 
(battalion  commanders),  which  have  as  extended  a  view  as 
possible  over  our  own  and  the  enemy's  front,  so  that  they  will 
be  able  to  give  information  regarding  neighboring  sectors.    The 
fear  of  losing  a  forward  station  should  in  no  circumstances 
act  as  an  inducement  to  withdraw  it  prematurely  or  to  place 
it  in  a  retired  position  from  the  outset.    The  whole  object  of 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  129 

wireless  stations  would  thus  be  defeated.  Forward  artillery 
observers  can  also  employ  wireless  stations  with  advantage. 
Owing  to  the  small  number  of  stations  available  it  wrill  gener- 
ally be  advisable  to  allot  several  forward  stations  to  one  back 
station.  It  is  most  desirable  to  employ  the  aeroplane  fighting 
stations  with  a  view  to  using  their  wireless  for  ground  com- 
munication. The  employment  of  wireless  and  aeroplane  wireless 
stations  for  regulating  barrage  fire  is  now  being  experimented 
with.  It  is  for  consideration  whether  each  field  artillery 
Ahteilung  should  not  be  equipped  with  a  receiving  set,  to  be 
manned  exclusively  by  the  artillery,  for  the  receipt  of  calls 
for  barrage  fire. 

174.  Power  buzzer  stations  have  proved  their  value.    In  order 
to  prevent  their  disturbing  the  telephone  traffic,  telephone  earths 
should  be  placed  as  far  away  from  them  as  possible  (at  least 
165  yards). 

175.  Field  signal  sections,  as  well  as  the  medium  and  small 
signaling  apparatus,  have  proved  their  value.    All  light-signal- 
ing communication  necessitates  an  accurate  study  of  the  map 
and  the  ground,  so  that  rearward  communication  may  be  estab- 
lished in  cases  of  necessity  by  means  of  the  neighboring  sectors 
when  direct  communication  is  no  longer  possible. 

176.  Carrier-pigeon  lofts  are  required  in  large  numbers.    Every 
division  should  have  its  own  loft.     As  it  is  often  impossible 
to  avoid  moving  divisional  headquarters  it  seems  advisable  not 
to  place  the  lofts  at  divisional  headquarters,  so  as  to  obviate 
the  difficulty  of  not  being  able  to  use  the  pigeons  when  head- 
quarters are  moved,  but  they  should  be  kept  farther  in  rear  at 
points  provided  with  direct  telephone  connection.     In  order  to 
get  the  pigeons  forward  energetic  subordinate  commanders  are 
necessary  in  certain  circumstances. 

177.  Hitherto  runners  have  proved  the  most  reliable  means 
of  communication  in  the  foremost  line. 

In  order  to  reduce  casualties  among  the  runners  it  is  neces- 
sary to  introduce  a  special  bullet  to  carry  the  messages  and  to 
be  fired  from  a  rifle  or  light  pistol  with  a  view  to  connecting 
the  front  line  with  the  company  commanders  and  the  latter 
with  their  battalion  commander. 

178.  The   employment   of   infantry   aeroplanes   and   infantry 
balloons   has  proved   very  valuable.     The   infantry   aeroplane 
will,  in  many  cases,  bring  the  quickest  and  best  information 
regarding  the  situation  of  the  front  line.     Communication  be- 

3577°— 17 9 


130  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

tween  battle  headquarters  and  aeroplanes  by  means  of  light 
signals  is  extremely  difficult.  It  is  better  to  send  predetermined 
signals  by  displaying  various  arrangements  of  the  linen  signals 
at  battle  headquarters. 

Signaling    communication    with    infantry    balloons    requires 
thorough  practice. 

(b)    ORGANIZATION. 

179.  Now  that  means  of  communication  are  employed  on  such 
a  large  scale  in  a  defensive  battle  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  con- 
trol them  from  army  headquarters.     Consequently  the  neces- 
sary officers  for  this  control  must  be  appointed  at  corps  head- 
quarters. 

180.  The  command  of  the  aviation  units  of  each  group  must 
be  handed  over  to  an  "  aviation  group  commander,"  who  will 
arrange  for  their  employment  in  accordance  with  orders  from 
corps  headquarters,  will  collect  the  information  obtained,  and 
will  see  that  this  is  supplemented  by  information  obtained  by 
other  means  of  reconnaissance.     Artillery  flights  are  under  the 
artillery  commanders,  infantry  aeroplanes  under  the  divisions, 
and  all  other  aviation  units  under  the  corps,  unless  they  are 
retained  at  the  disposal  of  army  headquarters. 

181.  Balloon  detachments  are  under  corps,  who  allot  them  to 
the  various  artillery  groups.     In  this  manner  the  observations 
made  in  neighboring  sectors  will  be  better  utilized  than  if  these 
detachments  were  under  the  divisions.     A  balloon  central  sta- 
tion has  been  formed  for  the  whole  army  area.    It  disseminates 
the  information  to  all  groups,  collects  the  results  of  reconnais- 
sances, and  is  responsible  for  disseminating  them.     It  can  also 
take  over  the  supply  of  material.     Infantry  balloons  are  under 
corps  or  divisional  headquarters,  depending  on  their  employ- 
ment. 

182.  The  other  means  of  communication  are,  for  tactical  pur- 
poses, grouped  together  in  "  headquarters  communication  sec- 
tions."  which   facilitates   their   proper   employment   and   coop- 
eration. 

Whereas  flights  and  balloon  sections,  as  army  troops,  are 
stationed  permanently  in  certain  areas,  a  portion  of  the  other 
communication  units  change  with  their  divisions. 

1S3.  For  those  units  which  belong  to  groups  (corps)  a  special 
organisation  appears  to  be  neeeaimry.  The  existemv  of  many 
email  units  which  are  distributed  throughout  the  whole  array 
militates  against  their  being  rapidly  engaged  on  the  main 
!>;ittle  front?,  Small  units  are  not  de*irnW.?,  either  from  an 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  131 

administrative  or  a  training  point  of  view,  and  during  a  long- 
drawn-out  battle  they  can  not  effect  the  necessary  reliefs.  In 
the  next  battle  the  troops  and  commanders  will  make  still 
greater  demands  on  cable  communications,  and  a  still  greater 
expenditure  of  ammunition  by  the  enemy,  with  a  corresponding 
destruction  of  the  communications  in  the  front  battle  zone, 
must  be  expected.  It  appears  essential  to  have  large  reserves 
of  communication  troops  available  (telephone,  wireless,  field 
sigaal  sections,  power  buzzer  stations,  carrier  pigeons,  and  mes- 
serger  dogs).  It  will  be  advisable  to  form  communication  units 
which  comprise  all  these  means  of  communication  in  various  de- 
tachments. The  formation  of  these  reserves  under  general 
headquarters  would  enable  as  many  communication  units  as 
were  necessary  to  be  engaged  at  once  at  the  beginning  of  a 
trench  battle.  The  gradual  withdrawal  of  many  small  isolated 
units  from  other  fronts,  which  so  easily  leads  to  their  being 
engaged  "  drop  by  drop,"  would  be  obviated.  The  formations 
would  be  accustomed  to  working  together  and  would  be  able 
to  effect  the  requisite  reliefs  within  themselves,  the  necessity 
for  which  has  been  so  clearly  shown.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
majority  of  these  means  of  communication  can  be  dispensed 
with  on  quiet  sectors  of  the  front  where  telephone  communica- 
tion is  maintained. 

184.  As  regards  organization  after  the  units  have  been  en- 
gaged the  following  points  have  been  brought  out : 

The  changes  in  the  telephone  units  of  corps  and  divisions 
lead  to  the  experience  and  the  absolutely  necessary  knowledge 
of  the  telephone  system  being  lost.  Consequently,  a  permanent 
communication  officer  is  necessary  for  each  corps  and  divisional 
sector  during  the  whole  period  of  the  battle.  The  telephone 
squads  which  are  necessary  for  the  construction  of  the  special 
artillery,  antiaircraft,  and  aviation  systems  must  remain  with 
corps  throughout  the  whole  battle  as  permanent  traffic  and 
construction  personnel.  This  will  obviate  the  otherwise  un- 
avoidable friction,  with  all  its  disadvantages  to  the  conduct  of 
the  battle.  It  will  be  the  duty  of  the  communication  officer  to 
keep  up  maps  showing  which  portions  of  the  battle  zone  are 
heavily  shelled  or  otherwise  (communication  maps).  Many 
casualties  can  be  avoided  by  these  means. 

185.  The   wireless   units   are   tactically   under   the   division ; 
their  technical  control,  however,  must,  In  view  of  the  jamming 
within  the  group,  which  would  otherwise  be  unavoidable  owing 
to,  the  narrow  fronts  of  the  sectors,  be  exercised  by  the  wireless 


132  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

commander  at  corps  headquarters.  The  allotment  of  wave 
lengths  to  aeroplanes  is  also  included  in  this  officer's  duties. 
The  organization  of  the  wireless  detachment  must  be  such  that 
there  is  a  reserve  station,  with  personnel,  available  in  case  of 
breakdowns,  or  for  employment  with  the  forward  artillery  ob- 
servers. In  addition,  some  detachments  should,  if  possible,  be 
kept  in  reserve  to  act  as  reliefs. 

186.  The  field  signal  sections  and  power  buzzer  stations  are 
entirely  under  the  control  of  the  headquarters  communication 
section.    Here,  too,  organization  in  fairly  large  units  is  desirable, 
so  as  to  make  reliefs  possible. 

187.  Mobile  carrier-pigeon  lofts  should  be  filled  up  with  fresh 
young  birds  whenever  they  are  moved  to  a  different  point,  as 
the  latter  accustom  themselves  to  the  new  place  in  a  compara- 
tively short  time. 

188.  The  means  of  communication  of  the  troops  in  line  (tele- 
phones, signal  apparatus)    must  remain  entirely  at  their  dis- 
posal. 

189.  The  survey   section,   owing  to  the  wide  extent   of  the 
battle,  is  no  longer  in  the  position  to  sift  all  the  information 
sufficiently  quickly  and  disseminate  it  to  the  troops  in  the  form 
of  a  map.     It  is  essential  that  each  corps  headquarters  should 
establish    a   topographical    section,    which   will    undertake   the 
sifting  of  the  information  received  and  print  maps  for  a  par- 
ticular sector  both   in  front  of  and  behind  the  front  of  the 
group.    The  topographical  sections  must  be  provided  with  skilled 
staffs  and  plenty  of  materials. 

190.  When  fresh  army  or  corps  headquarters  are  established 
the  employment  of  newly  formed  telephone  detachments,  sur- 
vey sections,  etc..  must,  in  principle,  be  avoided.    It  takes  weeks 
for  the  units  in  question  to  become  fully  efficient,  a  circumstance 
which  is  perhaps  unobjectionable  on  a  quiet  front,  but  which 
may   have   very   serious   disadvantages   on   a   principal   battle 
front.     It  seems  better  to  withdraw  existing  formations  from 
quiet  fronts  and  to  send  the  new  formations  to  replace  them. 

(C)    PEEPARATIONS    ON    QTJIET   FRONTS. 

191.  A  special  aviation  telephone  system  should  be  prepared, 
sufficient  for  the  conditions  of  a  great  defensive  battle.     The 
infantry   aeroplanes   should   practice   frequently   with   the  in- 
fantry. 

192.  The  balloons  should  practice  signaling  with  the  infantry. 
A  large  number  of  balloon  observers  from  the  other  arms  should 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  133 

be  trained,  so  that  if  new  detachments  are  brought  up  the  neces- 
sary number  of  observers  who  already  know  the  ground  is 
immediately  available. 

193.  The  system  of  telephone  wires  should  be  relaid,  avoid- 
ing roads  and  villages  as  far  as  possible,  so  that  telephone  lines 
f c  r  use  in  battle  lie  entirely  outside  villages,  while  several  lines 
run  to  the  most  important  points  by  different  routes.     Prepara- 
tions should  be  made  to  enable  communications  to  be  quickly 
e.-tablished  in  case  fresh  divisions  are  put  into  the  line  or  the 
existing  divisional  headquarters  are  moved.     (Construction  and 
alteration  of  local  communications.) 

194.  The  construction  of  dug-outs  for  a  large  number  of  power 
buzzer  and  wireless  stations  and  field  signal  sections ;   these 
should  be  provided   in  the  rearward  positions   as  well.     The 
establishment  of  a  large  number  of  light-signal  lines. 

195.  The  ground  to  the  depth  of  about  30  miles  behind  the 
front  should  be  surveyed.     Topographical  sections  should  be 
established.    The  personnel  should  be  dispatched  to  the  survey 
sections  of  the  principal  battle  fronts  to  learn  the  new  require- 
n  ents  which  have  arisen    (e.  g.,  maps  in  which  the  enemy's 
artillery  positions  are  numbered  consecutively  become  useless 
ai:  once  if  the  enemy  brings  up  a  large  number  of  new  batteries, 
as  it  then  becomes  impossible  to  find  any  battery  number.    They 
should  be  designated  by  letters  within  the  map  squares.     Our 
own  trenches  and  those  of  the  enemy  should  be  numbered.) 

H.   THE    FIGHTING    TASKS    OF   AEROPLANES    AND    ANTIAIRCRAFT 
ARTILLERY. 

I.   Causes  of  initial  failures. 

196.  The  beginning  and  the  first  week  of  the  Somme  Battle 
were  marked  by  a  complete  inferiority  of  our  own  air  forces. 

The  enemy's  aeroplanes  enjoyed  complete  freedom  in  carry- 
ing out  distant  reconnaissance.  With  the  aid  of  aeroplane  ob- 
servation the  hostile  artillery  neutralized  our  guns  and  was 
able  to  range  with  the  most  extreme  accuracy  on  the  trenches 
occupied  by  our  infantry ;  the  required  data  for  this  were  pro- 
vided by  undisturbed  trench  reconnaissance  and  photography. 

By  means  of  bombing  and  machine-gun  attacks  from  a  low 
height  against  infantry,  battery  positions,  and  marching  col- 
umns the  enemy's  aircraft  inspired  our  troops  with  a  feeling 
of  defenselessness  against  the  enemy's  mastery  of  the  air. 

On  the  other  hand,  our  own  aeroplanes  only  succeeded,  in 
quite  exceptional  cases,  in  breaking  through  the  hostile  patrol 


134  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

barrage  and  carrying  out  distant  reconnaissances ;  our  artillery 
'machines  were  driven  off  whenever  they  attempted  to  carry  out 
registration  for  their  own  batteries.  Photographic  reconnais- 
sance could  not  fulfill  the  demands  made  upon  it. 

197.  Thus  at  decisive  moments  the  infantry  frequently  lacked 
the  support  of  the  German  artillery  either  in  counterbattery 
work  or  in  barrage  on  the  enemy's  infantry  massing  for  attack. 
Heavy  losses  in  personnel  and  material  were  inflicted  on  our 
artillery  by   the  enemy's   guns,   assisted   by   excellent   air   ob- 
servation, without  our  being  able  to  have  recourse  to  the  same 
methods.    Besides  this,  both  arms  were  exposed  to  attacks  from 
the  air  by  the  enemy's  battle  planes,  the  moral  effect  of  which 
could  not  be  ignored. 

198.  The  causes  of  this  inferiority  on  the  part  of  our  own 
aeroplanes  lay,  firstly,  in  their  numerical  inferiority,  which,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  battle,  was  in  the  proportion  of  1  to  10. 
We  were  also  insufficiently  supported  by  our  antiaircraft  guns, 
the  small  number  of  which  had  been  reduced  still  further  both 
by    numerous   casualties   to   equipment   caused   by    the   hostile 
artillery  and  by  the  wearing  out  of  the  guns  themselves.     An 
adequate   antiaircrift   telephonic   system   was   also  lacking,   so 
that  the  reports  about  the   appearance  of  hostile  aeroplanes 
mostly  arrived  too  late.    The  fact  that  our  battle-plane  squad- 
rons were  stationed  far  in  rear  of  the  front  made  it  difficult 
for  them  to  arrive  in  time,  and  the  fact  that  the  First  Battle- 
plane  Squadron  was  equipped  with  "  G "  machines  made  its 
employment  for  air  fighting  almost  impossible. 

II.   Measures  by  which  a  gradual  improvement  was  attained. 

199.  The  reenforcement  of  the  air  forces  which  was  gradually 
effected,   and  especially   the  arrival   of  powerful   pursuit   ma- 
chines, was  principally  responsible  for  the  improvement  of  tho 
position  in  the  course  of  the  battle. 

200.  A  well-organized  grouping  of  the  available  aircraft  on 
the  most  threatened  sectors  of  the  front,  as  well  as  our  own 
counterattacks,  enabled  us  to  obtain  a  local  superiority  in  the 
air,  at  any  rate  at  decisive  moments.     The  distribution  of  air- 
craft units  to  groups    (corps)    insured  their  suitable  employ- 
ment on  the  days  of  ordinary  fighting. 

201.  The   organization   of  defensive  patrol   barrages,    which 
only  lead  to  a  dispersion  of  strength,  was  forbidden. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  made  the  duty  of  every  flying  officer 
to  attack  the  enemy's  machines  over  the  enemy's  lines  in  order 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  13$ 

to  facilitate  the  work  of  reconnaissance  and  registration. 
Strong  fighting  patrols  of  at  least  three  machines  were  em- 
ployed to  carry  out  this  task. 

202.  As  soon  as  sufficient  aircraft  units  were  available,  bomb- 
ing and  machine-gun  attacks  on  the  enemy's  infantry  and  bat- 
tery positions  were  undertaken. 

203.  The  aircraft  units  in  rear  were  brought  up  as  close  to 
the  front  as  the  choice  of  aerodromes  and  the  range  of  the 
enemy's  guns  allowed.    By  this  means  it  was  insured  that  they 
were  always  well  informed  about  the  situation  on  the  front 
and  could  arrive  rapidly  on  the  spot  whenever  a  number  of 
hostile  machines  appeared.     With  the  same  object,  during  the 
days  of  heavy  fighting,  aeroplane  liaison  officers  were  sent  to 
divisional  command  posts  or  observing  stations. 

204.  Owing  to  the  extension  of  the  front  and  the  activity  of 
th  3  enemy's  machines,  it  became  impossible  to  control  the  strug- 
gle for  air  superiority  from  one  office  at  army  headquarters. 
Each  group  (corps)  was  therefore  allotted  a  wing  commander 
(J'.ieger-gruppenfuhrer)   corresponding  to  the  allotment  of  air- 
craft units  to  the  groups.     This  officer  controlled  the  employ- 
ment of  the  available  forces,  more  especially  as  regards  air 
fighting. 

205.  The  battle-plane  squadrons  were  split  up  as  protective 
flights    (Schutzstaffeln)    and  allotted  to  the  various  artillery 
flights,  their  aerodromes  being  changed  at  the  same  time  so  as 
to  insure  close  cooperation  between  the  fighting  and  reconnais- 
sance units. 

206.  Cooperation  with  antiaircraft  guns,  especially  as  regards 
utilizing  their  observations  of  the  enemy's  aerial  activity,  was 
insured  by  the  organization  of  joint  antiaircraft  report  centers 
and  of  a  single  aircraft  and  antiaircraft  telephone  system.    Re- 
ports concerning  the  situation  on  the  front  and  the  demands; 
of  the  troops  for  antiaircraft  protection  were  collected  by  these 
officers  of  the  antiaircraft  service  stationed  close  to  the  front. 
The  information  was  passed  on  by  them  to  the  wing  command- 
ers of  pursuit  flights  attached  to  army  headquarters,  who  in 
turn  could  regulate  the  employment  of  their  units  accordingly. 

III.  Experiences  and  lessons. 

207.  In  trench  warfare  to  obtain  the  mastery  of  the  air  dur- 
ing a  battle  is  an  essential  condition  for  long-distance  and  trench 
reconnaissances  as  well  as  for  artillery  registration.     Next  to 
the  strength  of  the  artillery  and  the  quantity  of  ammunition 


136  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

available  the  mastery  of  the  air  forms  the  decisive  factor  for 
success  in  the  artillery  combat.  The  struggle  for  supremacy 
in  the  air  must  therefore  precede  the  artillery  battle. 

Only  the  early  employment  of  strong  air  forces  is  here  pro- 
ductive of  success.  These  must  be  supported  by  a  numerous 
antiaircraft  artillery  and  the  efficient  working  of  a  well-or- 
ganized telephone  system. 

The  attacker  will,  by  the  employment  of  strong  air  forces,  be 
able  to  acquire  the  mastery  of  the  air  from  the  outset,  but  at 
the  same  time  will  betray  his  offensive  plan.  As  soon  as  the 
first  preparations  for  hostile  attack  are  recognized  it  will  be  the 
task  of  the  defender  to  concentrate  rapidly  all  the  air  forces 
which  can  be  spared  from  quiet  sectors  of  the  front,  and  par- 
ticularly numerous  strong  pursuit  flights,  with  a  view  to  de- 
priving the  enemy  of  the  mastery  of  the  air.  If  he  is  success- 
ful, at  all  events,  in  hindering  the  enemy  considerably  in  his 
reconnaissances  and  in  disturbing  his  artillery  registration  to 
a  certain  extent,  he  may  then  in  certain  circumstances  delay 
the  attack  considerably  and  gain  sufficient  time  to  complete 
his  other  defensive  measures.  The  sooner  he  can  employ  strong 
aerial  forces  the  better  will  be  his  chances  of  success. 

208.  The  main  object  of  fighting  in  the  air  is  to  enable  our 
artillery   registration   and   photographic   reconnaissance  to  be 
carried  out,  and  at  the  same  time  to  prevent  that  of  the  enemy. 
All  other  tasks,  such  as  bombing  raids,  machine-gun  attacks  on 
troops,    and   even  distance  reconnaissance   in  trench   warfare, 
must  be  secondary  to  this  main  object.     So  long  as  the  execu- 
tion of  the  main  task  is  not  insured,  all  available  forces  must 
be  employed  for  this  purpose.     All  subsidiary  tasks  must  be 
abandoned  even  when  the  enemy's  attacks  in  the  air  are  caus- 
ing us  considerable  annoyance. 

209.  So  long  as  our  air  forces  are  insufficient  to  attain  a 
superiority  of  this  nature  upon  the  whole  front  endeavors  must 
be  made  to  obtain  superiority  at  least  at  the  decisive  points, 
either  during  the  preparation  of  an  attack  by  ourselves  or  by 
the  enemy.    For  this  purpose  the  aerial  forces  must  be  concen- 
trated at  the  right  time  and  the  right  place,  which  is  best 
effected  by  orders  from  army  headquarters.     In  other  respects 
the  available  aircraft  units  should  be  allotted  to  corps  head- 
quarters, where  their  employment  during  the  operations  will 
be  controlled  by  the  wing  commander  in  accordance  with  corps 
orders.     On  days  of  ordinary  fighting,  the  most  effective  em- 
ployment of  all  units  will  be  best  obtained  on  these  lines. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  137 

210.  The  employment  of  numerous  single-seater  fighting  ma- 
chines is  the  best  method  of  destroying  the  enemy's  aircraft. 
These  units  are  most  suitable  for  offensive  work.     Their  task 
is  to  attack  and  destroy  every  hostile  machine  which  shows 
itself.     Whether  the  enemy's  machines  fall  into  our  hands  or 
net  after  they  have  been  shot  down  is  immaterial  in  estimating 
results.     The  shooting  down  of  machines  beyond  the  enemy's 
lilies  bears  equally  good  testimony  to  our  superiority  in  the  air. 

The  number  of  pursuit  flights  engaged  should  be  sufficient  to 
gsin  the  mastery  in  the  air  from  the  enemy.  Their  number  is 
not  the  only  decisive  factor,  but  also  their  success  in  action. 
Daring  the  Somme  Battle  the  First  Army  had  attached  to  it 
the  Second  Pursuit  Flight,  which  now  bears  the  name  of  its 
heroic  commander,  Capt.  Boelcke,  who  unfortunately  perished 
too  soon.  This  pursuit  flight  shot  down  87  machines  during 
the  Somme  Battle,  21  of  these  having  been  brought  down  and 
crashed  by  the  commander  alone. 

211.  In  order  to  carry  out  their  tasks  the  pursuit  flights  must 
bo  allowed  the  greatest  latitude  in  their  employment.     A  pri- 
mary condition  is,  however,  that  they  are  stationed  so  close  to 
tie  front  that  they  can  at  once  act  on  their  own  observations. 
There  is  no  truth  in  the  widely  spread  idea  that,  owing  to  the 
speed  of  the  machines,  the  billeting  of  the  unit  several  kilo- 
meters farther  back  is  of  no  importance,  for  reports  of  the 
appearance  of  hostile  aeroplanes  arrive  too  late  at  positions 
in  rear,  and  a  constant  patrol  barrage  with  the  object  of  always 
being  on  the  spot  involves  an  unnecessary  expenditure  of  force. 

212.  Artillery  machines  are  prevented  by  their  functions  from 
paying  sufficient  attention  to   hostile   aircraft.     Therefore,   in 
addition  to  the  presence  of  single-seater  battle  planes,  they  re- 
quire special  protection  by  escort  machines  belonging  to  pro- 
tective flights.     In  order  to   obtain  perfect  cooperation   it   is 
indispensable  that  their  protective  flights  should  be  housed  in 
the  same  aerodrome. 

213.  The  machines  detailed  for  photographic  or  distant  recon- 
naissance during  a  battle  are  no  longer  able  to  carry  out  their 
tasks  alone;  strong  patrols  of  at  least  three,  machines  should 
be  employed  on  principle. 

214.  Attacks  on  kite  balloons  are  only  seldom  successful  in 
consequence  of  the  effective  protective  measures  adopted  by  the 
enemy.     Such  attacks  require  thorough  preparation  and  some- 
times  the   assistance   of   artillery    in   order   to   neutralize   the 
enemy's  antiaircraft  guns.     In  offensive  operations  they  may 


138  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

be  carried  out  with  advantage  shortly  before  an  assault  in  order 
to  divert  the  attention  of  the  enemy's  artillery. 

215.  Bombing  attacks  by  single  machines  have  only  a  small 
chance  of  producing  results,  even  when  by  frequent  repetition 
they  succeed  in  making  an  impression  on  the  enemy's  morale. 
These  attacks  are,  therefore,  only  worth  while  when  they  are 
carried  out  during  the  course  of  other  duties  and  not  as  a  sole 
objective. 

Bombing  attacks  by  whole  squadrons  against  previously  se- 
lected targets  may  produce  most  successful  results,  especially 
at  night,  when  the  enemy's  countermeasures  are  less  effective. 
The  best  targets  are  large  camps  and  ammunition  depots  known 
to  be  occupied,  as  well  as  railway  stations. 

216.  Machine-gun   attacks   on  troops,  when  carried  out  fre- 
quently, undoubtedly  produce  great  moral  effect,  especially  when 
the  troops  have  been  previously  shaken  by  a  severe  artillery 
bombardment.     This  form  of  attack  can  not,  however,  cause 
the  enemy  any  considerable  casualties. 

In  any  case,  the  employment  of  machines  for  these  subsidiary 
tasks  can  only  be  justified  when  the  main  objective  has  been 
obtained  ;  that  is,  to  enable  artillery  observation  to  be  carried  out. 

217.  All  operations  of  battle  planes  must  be  supported   by 
numerous  antiaircraft  guns  in  order  to  hinder  the  enemy's  re- 
connaissance and  artillery  observation. 

The  employment  of  antiaircraft  units  is  best  organized  by  ar- 
ranging a  forward  line  of  antiaircraft  guns,  the  individual  posi- 
tions being  on  an  average  not  more  than  2,200  yards  apart.  Any 
gaps  in  the  front  line  should  be  closed  by  a  second  back  line. 
The  defense  of  important  railway  junctions,  ammunition  depots, 
etc.,  will  also  be  undertaken  by  antiaircraft  guns  in  order  to  set 
free  the  battle  planes  for  operations  on  the  front. 

218.  In  order  to  engage  the  enemy's  artillery  machines,  which 
work  at  a  low  height  close  behind  the  enemy's  lines,  and  are 
therefore  out  of  reach  of  our  own  battle  planes,  single  guns  must 
be  pushed  forward  as  close  to  the  front  as  possible  (say,  2,200 
yards).     These  guns  must  be  placed  in  concealed  positions  in 
order  not  to  expose  them  to  premature  neutralization.    Suitable 
positions  are  afforded  by  large  villages,  which  are  easy  to  get 
out  of,  and  where  the  cellars  provide  cover  for  the  detachments 
in  case  of  emergency. 

219.  The  machine-gun  antiaircraft  sections  may  be  used  with 
advantage  for  the  protection  of  kite  balloons.    One  section  should 
be  permanently  allotted  to  each  balloon. 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  13d 

220.  So  long  as  the  antiaircraft  guns  are  stationed  within  ef- 
fective range  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  three  alternative  positions 
must  be  prepared  for  each  gun.  In  the  case  of  motor  antiair- 
craft guns  it  is  advisable  to  allot  to  each  gun  a  small  area  within 
which  it  can  change  position  as  required.  It  is  necessary  to 
maintain  an  adequate  supply  of  ammunition  (800  rounds  per 
day)  at  the  positions  of  the  front  line  of  antiaircraft  guns. 

1:21.  Cooperation  with  aeroplanes,  especially  with  pursuit 
flip-Ms,  must  be  insured  by  setting  up  a  special  air-defense  tele- 
phone system,  with  which  all  aircraft  and  antiaircraft  units  are 
connected.  All  reports  are  sent  to  a  central  station  in  each  group, 
wi  :h  which  the  wing  commanders  and  group  antiaircraft  officers 
arc?  directly  connected.  Reports  are  collected  here  and  forwarded 
as  required  to  the  units  concerned. 

222.  The  establishment  of  joint  observing  posts  for  aeroplanes 
anil  antiaircraft  guns  is  recommended.    The  firing  of  a  few  di- 
rection rounds  by  antiaircraft  guns  in  order  to  call  the  attention 
of  their  own  aeroplanes  to  hostile  machines  has  proved  very  suc- 
cessful. 

223.  The  infantry  must  always  take  part  in  the  defense  against 
hostile  aeroplanes  by  means  of  machine-gun  fire.    In  many  cases 
hostile  machines  which  have  caused  great  annoyance  have  been 
successfully  shot  down  by  this  method. 

I.  EFFECTS  OF  GAS  AND  PROTECTION  AGAINST  GAS. 
EXPERIENCES  AND  LESSONS. 

224.  The  lack  of  effect  of  the  great  British  gas  attacks  at  the 
end  of  June,  which  were  delivered  as  a  preparation  for  the  in- 
fantry attacks  in  spite  of  the  unfavorable  weather,  resulted  in 
our  troops  beginning  to  underestimate  the  effects  of  the  enemy's 
gas.    Later  gas  attacks  on  a  smaller  scale,  which  the  enemy  de- 
livered successfully  owing  to  the  weather  conditions  being  favor- 
able, caused  the  same  troops  losses  which  were  partly  due  to 
carelessness. 

225.  The  enemy's  employment  of  gas  shells  caused  a  large 
number  of  isolated  casualties,  especially  when  the  enemy  com- 
bined high  explosive  shell  with  gas  shell.    When  gas  shells  were 
employed  on  a  large  scale  by  the  enemy,  the  gas  was  less  effec- 
tive in  causing  losses  than  it  was  in  interfering  with  our  action. 

Poisonous  gases  were  employed  along  the  whole  front ;  lachry- 
mators,  which  had  but  little  effect,  were  only  employed  by  the 
British. 

226.  The  casualties  from  gas,  apart  from  the  usual  number  of 
unavoidable  accidents,  were  for  the  most  part  attributable  to 


140  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

the  fact  that  the  individual  did  not  sufficiently  understand  to 
what  dangers  he  was  exposing  himself  in  a  gas  attack  if  he 
waited  to  put  on  his  mask  until  the  smell  of  the  gas  became 
intolerable,  or  if  he  became  excited  by  the  fact  that  the  attack 
was  over  and  took  his  mask  off  too  soon.  Disobedience  of  the 
order  that  in  the  line  gas  helmets  are  always  to  be  carried  in  the 
"  alert "  boxes  on  the  person  was  another  reason  for  casualties. 

227.  The  methodical  instruction  of  the  men  in  these  matters, 
which  is  obviously  very  necessary  from  what  has  been  said  above, 
is  the  duty  of  commanding  officers,  who  must  be  assisted  by 
efficient  antigas  officers. 

The  training  and  equipment  of  fresh  drafts  must  be  begun  at 
the  training  depots  in  Germany,  and  be  emphasized  when  the 
recruit  joins  his  unit. 

228.  Our  own  gas  shells  were  employed  for  counterbattery 
work  against  hostile  batteries  which  had  been  located,  and,  ac- 
cording to  prisoner's  statements,  have  often  proved  effective. 
In  methodical  attacks  a  bombardment  with  "  green-cross  "  shell 
of  the  enemy's  observation  posts  and  barrage  batteries  just 
before  the  assault  considerably  reduced  the  intensity  of  his  fire. 

No  experience  is  yet  available  of  the  effect  and  combining 
"  green-cross  "  shell  with  high  explosive  shell  in  harassing  and 
annihilating  fire. 


APPENDIX. 

PREPARATORY   MEASURES    BEFORE   THE    ENGAGE- 
MENT OF  A  DIVISION  IN  A  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE. 

The  following  preparatory  measures,  taken  by  a  particularly 
successful  division  which  was  three  times  put  into  the  Somme 
Battle,  have  proved  both  necessary  and  suitable : 
A.  DIVISIONAL  STAFF. 

Organization  of  the  staff  for  the  increased  stress  of  work 
which  may  be  expected  during  the  battle,  and  attached  troops. 
An  orderly  officer  for  intelligence,  maps,  and  examination  of 
aeroplane  photographs.  Office  work  to  be  so  arranged  that  the 
G.S.O.  may  always  be  able  to  obtain  personal  knowledge  of 
the  battle  field  and  the  tactical  situation.  Formation  of  officers' 
battery  positions.  Officers  and  N.C.O.'s  for  transport  purposes 
divisional  staff  officers. 

As  soon  as  it  is  certain  that  the  division  is  to  be  engaged,  a 
personal  reconnaissance  should  be  made  of  the  position,  ap- 
proaches, existing  communications,  and  distribution  of  the  artil- 
lery. 


NOTES  ON  EECENT  OPERATIONS.  141 

Issue  of  large  scale  maps  to  the  troops  so  that  they  may  be 
informed  beforehand  of  the  situation.  Sketches  of  the  indi- 
vidual infantry  sectors  for  advance  parties  when  the  relief  takes 
place.  Allotment  of  motor  cars  to  facilitate  personal  recon- 
naisance  on  the  part  of  the  infantry  sector  commanders. 

B.  TROOPS. 

I.  INFANTEY. 

.  TRAINING — For  the  combat. — Bombing,  competitions  with 
live  grenades,  practice  with  captured  grenades,  the  best  throwers 
to  be  formed  in  bombing  squads;  the  attack  of  small  parties 
with  a  view  to  clearing  up  lengths  of  trench  from  front  and 
flank;  training  of  as  many  officers  and  men  as  possible  in  ma- 
ch  ne-gun  work ;  early  allotment  of  reserve  material  to  the 
machine  guns  and  registration  of  new  machine  guns ;  formation 
of  a  machine  gun  central  depot,  to  which  a  sergeant  artificer  is 
allotted,  and  which  is  provided  with  a  reserve  of  material ;  later 
th  s  should  be  moved  forward  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  regi- 
mental battle  headquarters. 

instruction  as  to  the  general  situation  and  as  to  when  it  is 
permissible  to  call  for  annihilating  and  barrage  fire;  practice 
with  light  pistols,  signal  rockets,  and  sound  signals ;  arrange- 
ments for  obtaining  intersections  on  points  where  barrage  fire 
is  required ;  instruction  as  to  conduct  if  taken  prisoner ;  inspec- 
tion and  instruction  in  antigas  mueasures. 

For  the  construction  of  defenses. — Construction  of  deep  dug- 
outs (every  man  must  have  put  up  at  least  one  frame)  ;  drainage 
of  trenches  ;  construction  of  portable  entanglements. 

The  division  will  arrange  for  instruction  in  light  signaling 
(especially  1916  pattern  medium  signaling  apparatus),  the  em- 
ployment of  carrier  pigeons,  telephone,  and  wireless. 

Communication  between  infantry  and  aeroplanes  is  to  be  car- 
ried out  practically.  For  this  a  short  code  is  necessary,  which 
comprises  all  phrases  which  are  necessary  for  tactical  messages. 

2.  DISTRIBUTION  OF  FORCES. — With  the  increasing  specializa- 
tion in  the  infantry  (light  machine  guns,  light  Minenwerfer, 
bombing  squads,  light  signalers,  etc.),  it  is  essential  for  a  com- 
pany commander  to  detail  carefully  all  his  men  for  duty  in  the 
trenches  and  allot  to  each  man  his  particular  task. 

General. — Formation  of  a  fourth  platoon  as  carriers  and  to  act 
as  a  reserve;  only  sturdy,  energetic  men  should  be  selected  for 
this,  and  placed  under  good  commanders,  Detailing  of  men  as 
runners  and  messengers, 


142  NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS. 

3.  DISTRIBUTION  or  THE  PERSONNEL. — Uniform  distribution  of 
the  young  drafts ;  in  every  group  one  experienced  soldier,  if  pos- 
sible, to  support  the  group  commander ;  detail  a  reserve  of  sub- 
ordinate commanders  to  the  transport ;  reserve  of  telephonists. 

The  following  to  be  detailed  to  each  company :  One  company 
commander,  one  company  officer,  two  acting  officers  or  vice  ser- 
geant majors.  The  remainder  as  reserve  in  rest  billets  or  with 
the  recruit  depot. 

Special  duties. — Regimental  supply  officer  for  bringing  up 
stores  and  food  supplies  (commands  carrying  parties  and  ar- 
range for  transporting  stores  to  the  regimental  pioneer  park 
with  the  regimental  baggage  wagons). 

Superintendent  of  the  regimental  pioneer  park. — Supervision 
of  engineer  stores  and  demands  on  the  supply  officer. 

One  orderly  officer  (reserve  of  company  commanders)  to  each 
battalion  and  regimental  headquarters. 

A  second  orderly  officer  in  the  office  (reserve  of  adjutants)  ; 
regimental  machine-gun  officer  with  the  support  battalion.  Two 
officers'  patrols  for  infantry  brigade  headquarters.  Officer  in 
charge  of  trench  construction,  so  that  the  trenches  of  the  sector 
may  be  constructed  in  a  uniform  manner  by  the  three  battalions. 

Regimental  observation  officer,  with  a  relief. 

4.  Equipment  and  clothing. — Assault  kit ;  sandbags  for  carry- 
ing hand  grenades  and  iron  rations  to  be  carried  slung  round 
the  neck;  fitting  of  steel  helmets;  second  water  bottle;  large 
entrenching  tool  for  every  man;  working  dress    (for  working 
parties  of  the.  battalions  in  rear)  ;   improvised  puttee  for  use 
over  boot  and  calf  of  leg  in  wet  and  muddy  trenches ;  protective 
coverings  for  breech  and  muzzle  of  rifle  to  be  carried ;  as  large 
a  number  as  possible  of  food  carriers,  improvised  food  carriers, 
knapsacks  to  hold  food  and  water ;  white  cloths  for  signaling  to 
aeroplanes  to  be  carried.     For  machine-gun  units,  improvised 
mountings. 

II.    CAVALRY. 

Training  of  officers  and  intelligent  noncommissioned  officers 
as  observers,  with  a  view  to  employing  them  at  a  divisional  ob- 
servation station.  Patrol  detachment  for  every  infantry  sector, 
whose  task  will  be — 

To  gain  information  regarding  the  general  situation  in  the 
front-line  trench.  Transmission  of  requests  of  the  infantry  in 
front  line.  Accurate  knowledge  of  the  position  of  divisional 
headquarters.  Knowledge  of  the  fall  of  the  enemy's  fire  and  of 
the  approaches  in  the  sector  which  are  consequently  the  most 


NOTES  ON  RECENT  OPERATIONS.  143 

suitable,  so  that  they  will  be  able  to  lead  up  reenforcements  dur- 
ing the  battle. 

Detailing  and  instruction  of  men  for  police  duties.  Formation 
of  one  or  more  parties  for  work  in  connection  with  the  tele- 
phone service.  Their  duties  are  to  ride  daily  along  the  lines  in 
the  back  areas,  to  put  up  poles  and  take  measures  to  prevent 
br  jakdowns. 

The  supervision  of  the  whole  question  of  horsed  transport  in 
th>3  divisional  sector  (the  driving  of  columns  and  trains  to  be 
properly  regulated)  to  be  handed  over  to  the  squadron  com- 
mander. 

III.    ARTILLERY. 

Training,  inspection,  and  further  training  of  the  gunners 
(layers).  Instruction  in  barrage  fire,  error  of  the  day,  han- 
dling and  care  of  the  gun,  the  various  natures  of  ammunition, 
care  of  ammunition.  Instruction  of  observers.  Instruction  in 
intrenching,  special  attention  being  paid  to  cover  from  aero- 
l>h  nes.  Advance  officers  to  be  sent  forward  in  good  time,  if 
possible,  to  gain  a  knowledge  of  the  target  sectors  and  of  the 
ba;tery  positions.  Officers  and  N.C.O.'s  for  transport  purposes 
(communications  to  the  position,  ammunition,  engineer  stores). 

IV.    "  MINENWERFER." 

To  be  detailed  in  good  time  into  three  Minenwerfer  groups, 
one  group  for  every  infantry  sector.  Training  of  the  "  heavy  " 
and  "  medium  "  platoons  in  the  use  of  the  light  Minenwerfer, 
as  this  is  the  only  one  which  can  be  used  in  a  long  drawn-out 
battle.  Preparatory  measures  for  the  supply  of  ammunition  (a 
difficult  matter),  formation  and  allotment  of  ammunition  carry- 
ing parties  by  the  divisional  staff.  Equipment,  clothing,  and 
distribution  of  personnel  as  in  the  infantry. 

v.  PIONEERS. 

As  in  the  infantry. 

VI.    DIVISIONAL    TELEPHONE    DETACHMENT. 

Early  reenforcement  of  the  detachment.  Training  in  light 
signaling,  telephone,  wireless.  Composition  of  a  code  for  the 
transmission  of  the  most  important  tactical  messages  (this  code, 
which  is  also  used  between  aeroplanes  and  infantry,  must  be  is- 
sued in  good  time,  and  the  troops  must  be  perfectly  familiar 
with  it),' 

(Signed)  VON  BELOW, 

General  der  Infantene, 


144 


NOTES  ON  KECENT  OPERATIONS. 


ill 


•    -•«••••«    ~« 


II  B 


1361 


inn 


CALIFORNIA  UBRARY 


